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November 2010
- 40 participants
- 92 messages
Strange register attack
by richard.barnes@gmail.com
If the attacks come from an identifiable set of IP addresses, might it
be more effective to use something like an IP-layer black hole? E.g.:
<http://packetlife.net/blog/2009/jul/6/remotely-triggered-black-hole-rtbh-ro…>
It requires some creative use of iBGP, but keeps all the work down in
the routers and out of your SIP gear.
--Richard
On Fri, Nov 26, 2010 at 7:53 PM, Christian Pena <cpena at ststelecom.com> wrote:
> I did it by creating a bogus session-agent (say with ip 1.1.1.1) and set it
> in disabled state. Then routed the packets to that session agent by changing
> the route header to something like sip:1.1.1.1
>
> anorexicpoodle wrote:
>
> Without getting into the gory details, the recommended method seems to be
> using HMR to add a route header pointing at a bogus session agent which will
> be obeyed over any local policy, then you create a response map mapping
> 503's from that agent back to an unused 6xx code, and then finally setting
> an option in the sip interface to drop the unused 6xx code, and the
> effective result is a black hole based on anything you can get at via HMR.
>
> On Sat, 2010-11-27 at 09:38 +1030, Peter Childs wrote:
>
> I'm interested in this. We use some HMRs to do various manipulations, but
> is there a method to 'drop' traffic matching HMRs, or cause a DOS/ACL block
> on the source?
>
> ________________________________________
> From: voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org [voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On
> Behalf Of anorexicpoodle [anorexicpoodle at gmail.com]
> Sent: Saturday, 27 November 2010 7:15 AM
> To: Christian Pena
> Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org
> Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Strange register attack
>
> I have a fairly substantial HMR ruleset on our access side doing everything
> from user agent filtering, to collecting custom values for CDR's, and while
> there is a CPU hit, its not nearly as bad as you might think.
>
> On Fri, 2010-11-26 at 09:26 -0500, Christian Pena wrote:
> We have seen similar things on our network. I never setup the HMRs on the
> access side of the Acme thinking they would cause a substantial increase in
> CPU usage. Anyone have any luck in doing this on a production network?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Chris
>
>
> anorexicpoodle wrote:
> This is a well-known attack. If you're running an Acme, contact TAC, they
> have a HMR ruleset that will blackhole this attack based on the user agent,
> though if your access side is tuned up well enough it should black-hole
> itself pretty quickly.
>
> On Thu, 2010-11-25 at 23:44 -0600, Lee Riemer wrote:
>
>
> Yes, this is normal. Just figure out how to deal with it.
>
> On 11/25/2010 11:03 PM, Darren Schreiber wrote:
>> We've been suffering from this, too. The SIP headers are hacked and
>> completely bogus. They seem to be from only a few select IPs from us.
>>
>> I'm about ready to abandon port 5060 :-)
>>
>> - Darren
>>
>>
>> On 11/25/10 9:03 PM, "Peter
>> Childs"<PChilds at internode.com.au<mailto:PChilds at internode.com.au>> wrote:
>>
>>> sql> select count(ua) from sip_trace where ua = 'friendly-scanner';
>>> COUNT(UA): 22330
>>>
>>> We get thousands of these scans from all over the joint all the time.
>>>
>>> That is in the last 8 hours...
>>>
>>> sql> select count(fromip), fromip from sip_trace where ua =
>>> 'friendly-scanner' group by fromip;
>>> COUNT(FROMIP): 3
>>> FROMIP : 124.195.52.250
>>>
>>> COUNT(FROMIP): 1
>>> FROMIP : 124.254.44.172
>>>
>>> COUNT(FROMIP): 13127
>>> FROMIP : 202.101.187.66
>>>
>>> COUNT(FROMIP): 9199
>>> FROMIP : 74.218.78.29
>>> (4 rows, 10201 ms)
>>>
>>>
>>> I occasionally have discussions with others about
>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5635 using some thresholds to block some of
>>> these at the border, with the problem being that one day someone will use
>>> some cloud platform and we will take out we shouldn't.
>>>
>>> The ACME SBCs we use seem to eat this stuff up ok, but some of the issues
>>> we encounter
>>> 1. Customers with SIP CPE where a high volume of SIP trash causes the
>>> CPE to lock
>>> 2. Customers running Asterisk implementations getting cracked and
>>> owned
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>> Peter
>>>
>>> On 26/11/2010, at 1:32 PM, Colin wrote:
>>>
>>>> Tonight i'm seeing hundreds of register attempts per second to one of
>>>> my SBC's from an IP in china 61.142.250.96.
>>>>
>>>> the From: and to: line is always one of these 2 below.
>>>>
>>>> \"118\"<sip:118 at my SBC IP>; source port 5063
>>>> \"qwerty\"<sip:qwerty at my SBC IP>; source port 5067
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> user-agent: friendly-scanner is always.
>>>>
>>>> Looks like sipvicious default user agent. Anyone seen a register flood
>>>> like this before?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Colin
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> VoiceOps mailing list
>>>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
>>>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> VoiceOps mailing list
>>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
>>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> VoiceOps mailing list
>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
Nov. 27, 2010
Strange register attack
by cpena@ststelecom.com
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <https://puck.nether.net/pipermail/voiceops/attachments/20101126/add2eeb3/at…>
Nov. 27, 2010
Strange register attack
by anorexicpoodle@gmail.com
Without getting into the gory details, the recommended method seems to
be using HMR to add a route header pointing at a bogus session agent
which will be obeyed over any local policy, then you create a response
map mapping 503's from that agent back to an unused 6xx code, and then
finally setting an option in the sip interface to drop the unused 6xx
code, and the effective result is a black hole based on anything you can
get at via HMR.
On Sat, 2010-11-27 at 09:38 +1030, Peter Childs wrote:
> I'm interested in this. We use some HMRs to do various manipulations, but is there a method to 'drop' traffic matching HMRs, or cause a DOS/ACL block on the source?
>
> ________________________________________
> From: voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org [voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of anorexicpoodle [anorexicpoodle at gmail.com]
> Sent: Saturday, 27 November 2010 7:15 AM
> To: Christian Pena
> Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org
> Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Strange register attack
>
> I have a fairly substantial HMR ruleset on our access side doing everything from user agent filtering, to collecting custom values for CDR's, and while there is a CPU hit, its not nearly as bad as you might think.
>
> On Fri, 2010-11-26 at 09:26 -0500, Christian Pena wrote:
> We have seen similar things on our network. I never setup the HMRs on the access side of the Acme thinking they would cause a substantial increase in CPU usage. Anyone have any luck in doing this on a production network?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Chris
>
>
> anorexicpoodle wrote:
> This is a well-known attack. If you're running an Acme, contact TAC, they have a HMR ruleset that will blackhole this attack based on the user agent, though if your access side is tuned up well enough it should black-hole itself pretty quickly.
>
> On Thu, 2010-11-25 at 23:44 -0600, Lee Riemer wrote:
>
>
> Yes, this is normal. Just figure out how to deal with it.
>
> On 11/25/2010 11:03 PM, Darren Schreiber wrote:
> > We've been suffering from this, too. The SIP headers are hacked and
> > completely bogus. They seem to be from only a few select IPs from us.
> >
> > I'm about ready to abandon port 5060 :-)
> >
> > - Darren
> >
> >
> > On 11/25/10 9:03 PM, "Peter Childs"<PChilds at internode.com.au<mailto:PChilds at internode.com.au>> wrote:
> >
> >> sql> select count(ua) from sip_trace where ua = 'friendly-scanner';
> >> COUNT(UA): 22330
> >>
> >> We get thousands of these scans from all over the joint all the time.
> >>
> >> That is in the last 8 hours...
> >>
> >> sql> select count(fromip), fromip from sip_trace where ua =
> >> 'friendly-scanner' group by fromip;
> >> COUNT(FROMIP): 3
> >> FROMIP : 124.195.52.250
> >>
> >> COUNT(FROMIP): 1
> >> FROMIP : 124.254.44.172
> >>
> >> COUNT(FROMIP): 13127
> >> FROMIP : 202.101.187.66
> >>
> >> COUNT(FROMIP): 9199
> >> FROMIP : 74.218.78.29
> >> (4 rows, 10201 ms)
> >>
> >>
> >> I occasionally have discussions with others about
> >> http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5635 using some thresholds to block some of
> >> these at the border, with the problem being that one day someone will use
> >> some cloud platform and we will take out we shouldn't.
> >>
> >> The ACME SBCs we use seem to eat this stuff up ok, but some of the issues
> >> we encounter
> >> 1. Customers with SIP CPE where a high volume of SIP trash causes the
> >> CPE to lock
> >> 2. Customers running Asterisk implementations getting cracked and
> >> owned
> >>
> >> Cheers,
> >> Peter
> >>
> >> On 26/11/2010, at 1:32 PM, Colin wrote:
> >>
> >>> Tonight i'm seeing hundreds of register attempts per second to one of
> >>> my SBC's from an IP in china 61.142.250.96.
> >>>
> >>> the From: and to: line is always one of these 2 below.
> >>>
> >>> \"118\"<sip:118 at my SBC IP>; source port 5063
> >>> \"qwerty\"<sip:qwerty at my SBC IP>; source port 5067
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> user-agent: friendly-scanner is always.
> >>>
> >>> Looks like sipvicious default user agent. Anyone seen a register flood
> >>> like this before?
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Colin
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> VoiceOps mailing list
> >>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
> >>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> VoiceOps mailing list
> >> VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
> >> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > VoiceOps mailing list
> > VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
> > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
Nov. 27, 2010
Strange register attack
by PChilds@internode.com.au
I'm interested in this. We use some HMRs to do various manipulations, but is there a method to 'drop' traffic matching HMRs, or cause a DOS/ACL block on the source?
________________________________________
From: voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org [voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of anorexicpoodle [anorexicpoodle at gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, 27 November 2010 7:15 AM
To: Christian Pena
Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Strange register attack
I have a fairly substantial HMR ruleset on our access side doing everything from user agent filtering, to collecting custom values for CDR's, and while there is a CPU hit, its not nearly as bad as you might think.
On Fri, 2010-11-26 at 09:26 -0500, Christian Pena wrote:
We have seen similar things on our network. I never setup the HMRs on the access side of the Acme thinking they would cause a substantial increase in CPU usage. Anyone have any luck in doing this on a production network?
Thanks,
Chris
anorexicpoodle wrote:
This is a well-known attack. If you're running an Acme, contact TAC, they have a HMR ruleset that will blackhole this attack based on the user agent, though if your access side is tuned up well enough it should black-hole itself pretty quickly.
On Thu, 2010-11-25 at 23:44 -0600, Lee Riemer wrote:
Yes, this is normal. Just figure out how to deal with it.
On 11/25/2010 11:03 PM, Darren Schreiber wrote:
> We've been suffering from this, too. The SIP headers are hacked and
> completely bogus. They seem to be from only a few select IPs from us.
>
> I'm about ready to abandon port 5060 :-)
>
> - Darren
>
>
> On 11/25/10 9:03 PM, "Peter Childs"<PChilds at internode.com.au<mailto:PChilds at internode.com.au>> wrote:
>
>> sql> select count(ua) from sip_trace where ua = 'friendly-scanner';
>> COUNT(UA): 22330
>>
>> We get thousands of these scans from all over the joint all the time.
>>
>> That is in the last 8 hours...
>>
>> sql> select count(fromip), fromip from sip_trace where ua =
>> 'friendly-scanner' group by fromip;
>> COUNT(FROMIP): 3
>> FROMIP : 124.195.52.250
>>
>> COUNT(FROMIP): 1
>> FROMIP : 124.254.44.172
>>
>> COUNT(FROMIP): 13127
>> FROMIP : 202.101.187.66
>>
>> COUNT(FROMIP): 9199
>> FROMIP : 74.218.78.29
>> (4 rows, 10201 ms)
>>
>>
>> I occasionally have discussions with others about
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5635 using some thresholds to block some of
>> these at the border, with the problem being that one day someone will use
>> some cloud platform and we will take out we shouldn't.
>>
>> The ACME SBCs we use seem to eat this stuff up ok, but some of the issues
>> we encounter
>> 1. Customers with SIP CPE where a high volume of SIP trash causes the
>> CPE to lock
>> 2. Customers running Asterisk implementations getting cracked and
>> owned
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Peter
>>
>> On 26/11/2010, at 1:32 PM, Colin wrote:
>>
>>> Tonight i'm seeing hundreds of register attempts per second to one of
>>> my SBC's from an IP in china 61.142.250.96.
>>>
>>> the From: and to: line is always one of these 2 below.
>>>
>>> \"118\"<sip:118 at my SBC IP>; source port 5063
>>> \"qwerty\"<sip:qwerty at my SBC IP>; source port 5067
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> user-agent: friendly-scanner is always.
>>>
>>> Looks like sipvicious default user agent. Anyone seen a register flood
>>> like this before?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Colin
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> VoiceOps mailing list
>>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
>>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> VoiceOps mailing list
>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
_______________________________________________
VoiceOps mailing list
VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
_______________________________________________
VoiceOps mailing list
VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
Nov. 26, 2010
Strange register attack
by anorexicpoodle@gmail.com
I have a fairly substantial HMR ruleset on our access side doing
everything from user agent filtering, to collecting custom values for
CDR's, and while there is a CPU hit, its not nearly as bad as you might
think.
On Fri, 2010-11-26 at 09:26 -0500, Christian Pena wrote:
> We have seen similar things on our network. I never setup the HMRs on
> the access side of the Acme thinking they would cause a substantial
> increase in CPU usage. Anyone have any luck in doing this on a
> production network?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Chris
>
>
> anorexicpoodle wrote:
>
> > This is a well-known attack. If you're running an Acme, contact TAC,
> > they have a HMR ruleset that will blackhole this attack based on the
> > user agent, though if your access side is tuned up well enough it
> > should black-hole itself pretty quickly.
> >
> > On Thu, 2010-11-25 at 23:44 -0600, Lee Riemer wrote:
> >
> > > Yes, this is normal. Just figure out how to deal with it.
> > >
> > > On 11/25/2010 11:03 PM, Darren Schreiber wrote:
> > > > We've been suffering from this, too. The SIP headers are hacked and
> > > > completely bogus. They seem to be from only a few select IPs from us.
> > > >
> > > > I'm about ready to abandon port 5060 :-)
> > > >
> > > > - Darren
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On 11/25/10 9:03 PM, "Peter Childs"<PChilds at internode.com.au> wrote:
> > > >
> > > >> sql> select count(ua) from sip_trace where ua = 'friendly-scanner';
> > > >> COUNT(UA): 22330
> > > >>
> > > >> We get thousands of these scans from all over the joint all the time.
> > > >>
> > > >> That is in the last 8 hours...
> > > >>
> > > >> sql> select count(fromip), fromip from sip_trace where ua =
> > > >> 'friendly-scanner' group by fromip;
> > > >> COUNT(FROMIP): 3
> > > >> FROMIP : 124.195.52.250
> > > >>
> > > >> COUNT(FROMIP): 1
> > > >> FROMIP : 124.254.44.172
> > > >>
> > > >> COUNT(FROMIP): 13127
> > > >> FROMIP : 202.101.187.66
> > > >>
> > > >> COUNT(FROMIP): 9199
> > > >> FROMIP : 74.218.78.29
> > > >> (4 rows, 10201 ms)
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> I occasionally have discussions with others about
> > > >> http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5635 using some thresholds to block some of
> > > >> these at the border, with the problem being that one day someone will use
> > > >> some cloud platform and we will take out we shouldn't.
> > > >>
> > > >> The ACME SBCs we use seem to eat this stuff up ok, but some of the issues
> > > >> we encounter
> > > >> 1. Customers with SIP CPE where a high volume of SIP trash causes the
> > > >> CPE to lock
> > > >> 2. Customers running Asterisk implementations getting cracked and
> > > >> owned
> > > >>
> > > >> Cheers,
> > > >> Peter
> > > >>
> > > >> On 26/11/2010, at 1:32 PM, Colin wrote:
> > > >>
> > > >>> Tonight i'm seeing hundreds of register attempts per second to one of
> > > >>> my SBC's from an IP in china 61.142.250.96.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> the From: and to: line is always one of these 2 below.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> \"118\"<sip:118 at my SBC IP>; source port 5063
> > > >>> \"qwerty\"<sip:qwerty at my SBC IP>; source port 5067
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >>> user-agent: friendly-scanner is always.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Looks like sipvicious default user agent. Anyone seen a register flood
> > > >>> like this before?
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Colin
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >>> _______________________________________________
> > > >>> VoiceOps mailing list
> > > >>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> > > >>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> > > >>
> > > >> _______________________________________________
> > > >> VoiceOps mailing list
> > > >> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> > > >> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> > > >
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > VoiceOps mailing list
> > > > VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> > > > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > VoiceOps mailing list
> > > VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> > > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > VoiceOps mailing list
> > VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
Nov. 26, 2010
Strange register attack
by sil@infiltrated.net
On 11/26/2010 9:26 AM, Christian Pena wrote:
> We have seen similar things on our network. I never setup the HMRs on
> the access side of the Acme thinking they would cause a substantial
> increase in CPU usage. Anyone have any luck in doing this on a
> production network?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Chris
As an FYI, that is a sipvicious scan against your machine. I've seen
something to the tune of an 1800% increase in these scans beginning on
Halloween of this year (www.infiltrated.net/voipabuse/logs/) and I try
to keep track of what is going on. As long as your devices are on the
'net, you will see the debris. Not much you can do other than try
blocking either entire netblocks or individual hosts.
While I've had honeypots up tracking what it is these guys do, it is
becoming increasingly difficult due to the mass amounts of scans. I have
a theory that about one or two dozen groups have created a distributed
SIP scanning method as when I see one attacker plop up from one
netblock, about 1/2 dozen follow suit immediately after. My view is that
they're sending multiple scans out in the event that if one is detected
and blocked, the others will pick up and continue on.
Attacker1 --> scans --> 100-200
Attacker2 --> scans --> 100-200
Attacker1 is detected and blocked when it reaches say extension 150
Attacker3 pops up and scans 151 - 200
I see these come through now with some pretty specific targets that make
little sense at first, but when I parse out and analyze the logs, I come
to what I concluded above. For those who've read about the VoIP Abuse
Project or perhaps have heard the TUC conference I was on, there is a
lot more sophistication going on right now. As a test, I changed the
passwords of about 100 honeypot accounts I have on the net, within 2-3
hours, they had re-established connections to try to place calls
through. From what I see, two distinct attacks: 1st, enumeration
(someone tries to find an account) 2nd, when an account is found a
completely different host sends calls. The individual's IP SENDING the
call NEVER (ever, ever, ever) is on any bruteforcing log. I truly
believe the individual sending the calls or at least trying to is an
actual person and not some script. I base this on the fact of the timing
parameters involved with dial plan tinkering.
--
=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
J. Oquendo
SGFA, SGFE, C|EH, CNDA, CHFI, OSCP, CPT
"It takes 20 years to build a reputation and five minutes to
ruin it. If you think about that, you'll do things
differently." - Warren Buffett
227C 5D35 7DCB 0893 95AA 4771 1DCE 1FD1 5CCD 6B5E
http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x5CCD6B5E
Nov. 26, 2010
Strange register attack
by cpena@ststelecom.com
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Nov. 26, 2010
Strange register attack
by ldardini@gmail.com
Hello,
I run a little IP PBX on Linux in my home with a public IP on a cheap DSL
line and often I see this kind of "attack". After having the fail2ban
blocked them at firewall level, they still use several KB/s of my slow
Internet connection and this it really upsetting me.
I end writing to the abuse department of the provider hosting the server and
after one or two days, the flow stops. If you have only few hosts sending
probe, make them stop, the world will be a better place...
For now I have dealed with hosting from Europe and US, never found someone
from china... maybe they haven't an abuse@ email address.
I never had to setup a "fight back" strategy, but I think it will acceptable
to over flow the host sending probes with hundred of megabits of UDP packets
(with a clear payload).
Leandro
2010/11/26 Peter Childs <PChilds at internode.com.au>
>
> sql> select count(ua) from sip_trace where ua = 'friendly-scanner';
> COUNT(UA): 22330
>
> We get thousands of these scans from all over the joint all the time.
>
> That is in the last 8 hours...
>
> sql> select count(fromip), fromip from sip_trace where ua =
> 'friendly-scanner' group by fromip;
> COUNT(FROMIP): 3
> FROMIP : 124.195.52.250
>
> COUNT(FROMIP): 1
> FROMIP : 124.254.44.172
>
> COUNT(FROMIP): 13127
> FROMIP : 202.101.187.66
>
> COUNT(FROMIP): 9199
> FROMIP : 74.218.78.29
> (4 rows, 10201 ms)
>
>
> I occasionally have discussions with others about
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5635 using some thresholds to block some of
> these at the border, with the problem being that one day someone will use
> some cloud platform and we will take out we shouldn't.
>
> The ACME SBCs we use seem to eat this stuff up ok, but some of the issues
> we encounter
> 1. Customers with SIP CPE where a high volume of SIP trash causes
> the CPE to lock
> 2. Customers running Asterisk implementations getting cracked and
> owned
>
> Cheers,
> Peter
>
> On 26/11/2010, at 1:32 PM, Colin wrote:
>
> > Tonight i'm seeing hundreds of register attempts per second to one of my
> SBC's from an IP in china 61.142.250.96.
> >
> > the From: and to: line is always one of these 2 below.
> >
> > \"118\" <sip:118 at my SBC IP>; source port 5063
> > \"qwerty\" <sip:qwerty at my SBC IP>; source port 5067
> >
> >
> >
> > user-agent: friendly-scanner is always.
> >
> > Looks like sipvicious default user agent. Anyone seen a register flood
> like this before?
> >
> >
> >
> > Colin
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > VoiceOps mailing list
> > VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
Nov. 26, 2010
Strange register attack
by d@d-man.org
Are there any other creative blocking strategies?
I'll implement the User-Agent idea immediately. Duh. Hadn't even occurred to me.
- Darren
From: anorexicpoodle <anorexicpoodle at gmail.com<mailto:anorexicpoodle at gmail.com>>
Date: Thu, 25 Nov 2010 22:38:34 -0800
To: Lee Riemer <lriemer at bestline.net<mailto:lriemer at bestline.net>>
Cc: "VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>" <VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>>
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Strange register attack
This is a well-known attack. If you're running an Acme, contact TAC, they have a HMR ruleset that will blackhole this attack based on the user agent, though if your access side is tuned up well enough it should black-hole itself pretty quickly.
On Thu, 2010-11-25 at 23:44 -0600, Lee Riemer wrote:
Yes, this is normal. Just figure out how to deal with it.
On 11/25/2010 11:03 PM, Darren Schreiber wrote:
> We've been suffering from this, too. The SIP headers are hacked and
> completely bogus. They seem to be from only a few select IPs from us.
>
> I'm about ready to abandon port 5060 :-)
>
> - Darren
>
>
> On 11/25/10 9:03 PM, "Peter Childs"<PChilds at internode.com.au<mailto:PChilds at internode.com.au>> wrote:
>
>> sql> select count(ua) from sip_trace where ua = 'friendly-scanner';
>> COUNT(UA): 22330
>>
>> We get thousands of these scans from all over the joint all the time.
>>
>> That is in the last 8 hours...
>>
>> sql> select count(fromip), fromip from sip_trace where ua =
>> 'friendly-scanner' group by fromip;
>> COUNT(FROMIP): 3
>> FROMIP : 124.195.52.250
>>
>> COUNT(FROMIP): 1
>> FROMIP : 124.254.44.172
>>
>> COUNT(FROMIP): 13127
>> FROMIP : 202.101.187.66
>>
>> COUNT(FROMIP): 9199
>> FROMIP : 74.218.78.29
>> (4 rows, 10201 ms)
>>
>>
>> I occasionally have discussions with others about
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5635 using some thresholds to block some of
>> these at the border, with the problem being that one day someone will use
>> some cloud platform and we will take out we shouldn't.
>>
>> The ACME SBCs we use seem to eat this stuff up ok, but some of the issues
>> we encounter
>> 1. Customers with SIP CPE where a high volume of SIP trash causes the
>> CPE to lock
>> 2. Customers running Asterisk implementations getting cracked and
>> owned
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Peter
>>
>> On 26/11/2010, at 1:32 PM, Colin wrote:
>>
>>> Tonight i'm seeing hundreds of register attempts per second to one of
>>> my SBC's from an IP in china 61.142.250.96.
>>>
>>> the From: and to: line is always one of these 2 below.
>>>
>>> \"118\"<sip:118 at my SBC IP>; source port 5063
>>> \"qwerty\"<sip:qwerty at my SBC IP>; source port 5067
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> user-agent: friendly-scanner is always.
>>>
>>> Looks like sipvicious default user agent. Anyone seen a register flood
>>> like this before?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Colin
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> VoiceOps mailing list
>>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
>>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> VoiceOps mailing list
>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
_______________________________________________
VoiceOps mailing list
VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
Nov. 26, 2010
Strange register attack
by anorexicpoodle@gmail.com
This is a well-known attack. If you're running an Acme, contact TAC,
they have a HMR ruleset that will blackhole this attack based on the
user agent, though if your access side is tuned up well enough it should
black-hole itself pretty quickly.
On Thu, 2010-11-25 at 23:44 -0600, Lee Riemer wrote:
> Yes, this is normal. Just figure out how to deal with it.
>
> On 11/25/2010 11:03 PM, Darren Schreiber wrote:
> > We've been suffering from this, too. The SIP headers are hacked and
> > completely bogus. They seem to be from only a few select IPs from us.
> >
> > I'm about ready to abandon port 5060 :-)
> >
> > - Darren
> >
> >
> > On 11/25/10 9:03 PM, "Peter Childs"<PChilds at internode.com.au> wrote:
> >
> >> sql> select count(ua) from sip_trace where ua = 'friendly-scanner';
> >> COUNT(UA): 22330
> >>
> >> We get thousands of these scans from all over the joint all the time.
> >>
> >> That is in the last 8 hours...
> >>
> >> sql> select count(fromip), fromip from sip_trace where ua =
> >> 'friendly-scanner' group by fromip;
> >> COUNT(FROMIP): 3
> >> FROMIP : 124.195.52.250
> >>
> >> COUNT(FROMIP): 1
> >> FROMIP : 124.254.44.172
> >>
> >> COUNT(FROMIP): 13127
> >> FROMIP : 202.101.187.66
> >>
> >> COUNT(FROMIP): 9199
> >> FROMIP : 74.218.78.29
> >> (4 rows, 10201 ms)
> >>
> >>
> >> I occasionally have discussions with others about
> >> http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5635 using some thresholds to block some of
> >> these at the border, with the problem being that one day someone will use
> >> some cloud platform and we will take out we shouldn't.
> >>
> >> The ACME SBCs we use seem to eat this stuff up ok, but some of the issues
> >> we encounter
> >> 1. Customers with SIP CPE where a high volume of SIP trash causes the
> >> CPE to lock
> >> 2. Customers running Asterisk implementations getting cracked and
> >> owned
> >>
> >> Cheers,
> >> Peter
> >>
> >> On 26/11/2010, at 1:32 PM, Colin wrote:
> >>
> >>> Tonight i'm seeing hundreds of register attempts per second to one of
> >>> my SBC's from an IP in china 61.142.250.96.
> >>>
> >>> the From: and to: line is always one of these 2 below.
> >>>
> >>> \"118\"<sip:118 at my SBC IP>; source port 5063
> >>> \"qwerty\"<sip:qwerty at my SBC IP>; source port 5067
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> user-agent: friendly-scanner is always.
> >>>
> >>> Looks like sipvicious default user agent. Anyone seen a register flood
> >>> like this before?
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Colin
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> VoiceOps mailing list
> >>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> >>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> VoiceOps mailing list
> >> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> >> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > VoiceOps mailing list
> > VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
Nov. 26, 2010