April 2010 - VoiceOps - lists.voiceops.org

San Francisco issues?
by hiersd＠gmail.com April 30, 2010

April 30, 2010

Hi, We just had a spate of nasty media issues in the SF area over the last hour or so, anyone else get hit? David

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Switches being flooded by unwanted calls
by cololiberty＠comcast.net April 29, 2010

April 29, 2010

I have a question to pose. If it's not appropriate, please let me know. My switches are currently taking in a large amount of traffic from one particular number destine for multiple terminating numbers across my CLEC users. We're having trouble tracking it down. It's coming into us via SIP and SS7 and I was wondering if anyone else was seeing anything with it as well. We have already confirmed a few other carriers seeing it as well. Originating number is 3074591039. The originating introductory messages appear sculpted and carry no originating info. Internet searches on this number brings up allot of people being bothered by this, chances may be good others out here my have users affected as well.

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Switches being flooded by unwanted calls
by cololiberty＠comcast.net April 28, 2010

April 28, 2010

we're interested in trying to track down the source of the calls and where they are entering the PSTN network. We have no problems seeing the trunks where it is handed off to us. especially due to the large amounts of traffic we are seeing from it. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Colin" <zavoid at gmail.com> To: cololiberty at comcast.net Sent: Wednesday, April 28, 2010 6:43:11 PM GMT -07:00 US/Canada Mountain Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Switches being flooded by unwanted calls Just curious. How are you having issues tracking the trunks(virtual or real) that it is coming from? Sent from my iPhone. On Apr 28, 2010, at 8:35 PM, cololiberty at comcast.net wrote: I have a question to pose. If it's not appropriate, please let me know. My switches are currently taking in a large amount of traffic from one particular number destine for multiple terminating numbers across my CLEC users. We're having trouble tracking it down. It's coming into us via SIP and SS7 and I was wondering if anyone else was seeing anything with it as well. We have already confirmed a few other carriers seeing it as well. Originating number is 3074591039. The originating introductory messages appear sculpted and carry no originating info. Internet searches on this number brings up allot of people being bothered by this, chances may be good others out here my have users affected as well. _______________________________________________ VoiceOps mailing list VoiceOps at voiceops.org https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops

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Switches being flooded by unwanted calls
by cololiberty＠comcast.net April 28, 2010

April 28, 2010

I've actually read that, and other phone number reporting sources like it. there is a lot of guessing going on where this number is coming from. we have even tried to take steps with the intermediate carriers that are delivering the calls to us, but they cannot tell us where the call is coming into them due to agreements. JIP's don't show a home NPA-NXX ----- Original Message ----- From: "Dane Jasper" <dane at corp.sonic.net> To: cololiberty at comcast.net Sent: Wednesday, April 28, 2010 6:47:59 PM GMT -07:00 US/Canada Mountain Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Switches being flooded by unwanted calls This might be helpful: http://800notes.com/Phone.aspx/1-307-459-1039 -Dane cololiberty at comcast.net wrote: > I have a question to pose. If it's not appropriate, please let me know. > > My switches are currently taking in a large amount of traffic from one > particular number destine for multiple terminating numbers across my > CLEC users. > > We're having trouble tracking it down. It's coming into us via SIP and > SS7 and I was wondering if anyone else was seeing anything with it as > well. We have already confirmed a few other carriers seeing it as well. > > > Originating number is 3074591039. > > > > The originating introductory messages appear sculpted and carry no > originating info. > > Internet searches on this number brings up allot of people being > bothered by this, chances may be good others out here my have users > affected as well. > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > VoiceOps mailing list > VoiceOps at voiceops.org > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops

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International Call Termination
by abrahamaabj＠yahoo.com April 28, 2010

April 28, 2010

.style5 {font-size: 9px} .style2 {font-size: 12px} .style3 {font-size: 12px; font-weight: bold; } .l {color: #F00;font-size: 13px;} If you are currently operating a direct route for call termination outside the United States or if you are interested in setting one up, Launch 3 Telecom would like to discuss the opportunity of sending you traffic. Please contact us at voip at launch3telecom.com for details. We can also be reached, during business hours, at 1-877-878-9134.(United States, Eastern Time Zone)

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A question about some international calling fraud to Eritrea
by myaklin＠g4.net April 19, 2010

April 19, 2010

Hey all, I will try to explain this the best I can. We got a call from one of our long distance carriers today telling us that we had a spike of long distance international calls going through their switch. These calls were to Africa and the country name is Eritrea. The originating number is a customer of ours. The trick is that this customer uses resold ILEC POTs lines that has their long distance calls PIC'd to the carrier who called to warn us about the spike of odd call traffic. This customer of ours happens to be a large agency in NH who has the ability to look at CDRs directly from the 5ESS in Concord, NH. A rather special situation to say the least. They can state, with quite a bit of assurance, that these calls were not generated from their PBX/network as they cannot see any records for them. Also, as I checked earlier, these calls did not go through any of my switches/asterisk servers. So the customer and I are left wondering how these calls managed to get to this long distance carrier who warned us about the spike. The calls came into this long distance carrier from the Manchester, NH Fairpoint tandem. Naturally we will try to contact Fairpoint for assistance but I am not very hopeful at this point they will be much help. The long distance carrier who warned us tends to think that the calls were generated by our customer who has something SIP/PBX insecure but when the customer has a link to look at CDR records right from the 5ESS he is rather sure that is not the case. I am trying to figure out creative ways this fraud can be happening if the customer is not at fault. One way is for a person who owns/operates a full blown switch to generate this type of fraud but it does seem unlikely. Any suggestions what I should be asking the long distance carrier who warned us about this? Any suggestions on how this type of fraud can be committed without the customer being the cause? Should I be grilling our customer one more time stating that since the originating number was theirs AND that it was PIC'd to the right long distance carrier... it is hard to imagine that someone could duplicate this fraud that easily? Thank you for your time. I hope I was clear enough to give you an idea of what is going on. matt at g4.net

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International IP blacklist
by ujjval＠simplesignal.com April 18, 2010

April 18, 2010

We have seen a lot Unauthorized attempts from Mid-East, China recently. I wanted to see if there is a blacklist of IPs that is maintained or we as Service Providers should maintain. Maybe a wild idea but worth a shot. I would like to identify whole subnets from even sending traffic to our networks. Here is the IPs we have blocked recently... 188.161.142.151 188.161.135.62 85.114.97.106 113.105.152.137 121.14.149.148 113.105.152.131 113.105.152.135 188.161.130.5 121.14.149.148 188.161.135.62 188.161.155.180 188.225.184.117 95.35.189.89 188.161.241.77 95.35.211.88 188.225.193.97 Shut the buggers out!

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Call recording solutions for Broadsoft
by bethjohnson5060＠gmail.com April 16, 2010

April 16, 2010

Hello all, We'd like to add a call recording solution to our Broadsoft network. Our weighted list of criteria are: stability stability stability features ease of use for end customers ease of use for administrators ease of implementation performance efficiency (whatnots per cpu, murphies per megabyte, etc) cost Yes, we do like our uptime, and we've got the budget to do it right the first time. In general, it seems that the marketplace has developed four different architectures: 1. Network sniffer - SPAN a port and try to make sense out of things by joining the SIP/RTP with configuration information 2. SIP server - Use SIP to redirect the call into a media proxy that captures the traffic 3. CALEA interface - Overload the CALEA function to provide recording services. 4. Dual number forward - Use two telephone numbers and a forwarding scheme to get a call into and out of a recording server at the TN level If you have experience with integrating a call recording solution with broadsoft, or thoughts on the various architectures, I'd be grateful to hear your opinion. Thank you very much.

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Qwest Forbearance
by peter＠4isps.com April 16, 2010

April 16, 2010

Released: 04/15/2010. REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND DATA RELATED TO QWEST CORPORATION'S PETITION FOR FORBEARANCE FROM CERTAIN NETWORK ELEMENT AND OTHER OBLIGATIONS IN THE PHOENIX ARIZONA MSA. (DA No. 10-647). (Dkt No 09-135 ). Comments Due: 04/29/2010. WTB . Contact: Denise Coca at (202) 418-0574 or Tim Stelzig at (202) 418-0942 http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-10-647A1.doc http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-10-647A1.pdf http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-10-647A1.txt

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Truth in CallerID act of 2010
by anorexicpoodle＠gmail.com April 15, 2010

April 15, 2010

While it hasn't been signed into law yet seems like its worth opening up a discussion on the topic since its something we all deal with. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&do… The first questions that come to mind are: Where does the liability lie in a termination/wholesale situation where the termination carrier doesn't own the numbers terminating calls through their network? How does this impact services like SkypeOut or similar that mask all calls with a common number?

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