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February 2014
- 30 participants
- 59 messages
Fraud
by dubedeepak@gmail.com
Hi Alex,
good approach.
one comment though: low-grade fraud traffic to audio text destinations will
go undetected, and over time, it can accumulate more fraud loses than those
who try to burst, get caught, and shut down immediately.
thanks,
dd.
On Mon, Feb 24, 2014 at 4:41 PM, Alex Balashov <abalashov at evaristesys.com>wrote:
> I've said it before and I'll say it again:
>
> We stopped 95-98% of the losses on this sort of thing for a large customer
> who was losing thousands of dollars per day on it, by implementing the
> following approach:
>
> Every trunk group gets a 'high-cost channel limit', which is the X number
> of simultaneous calls that they are allowed to make to destinations that
> cost over $Y/min. The limit was typically something like $0.10, so as to
> exclude domestic US traffic, but certainly catch Somalia and Globalstar.
> Both X and Y are configurable on a per-trunk group basis, so customers who
> have a legitimate need for 50 concurrent calls to Dakar can do that. For
> most typical domestic users, the limit was set to something like $0.10 and
> 2 channels.
>
> When this limit was tripped, typically due to a compromised PBX with some
> extension password of 1234, the following things happen:
>
> (1) All existing calls are terminated;
>
> (2) An alert e-mail is sent out to the customer and to the NOC;
>
> (3) Customer is downgraded to a termination rate plan that only allows for
> domestic calling. That way, they're not totally cut off from calling and,
> in all but the most unusual scenarios, not exceptionally angry. There is no
> reason to cut them off entirely. That's a false dichotomy. Downgrade them
> to a restricted calling plan.
>
> The thinking was that (a) there's only so much exposure that two
> simultaneous calls to rural Chad can create; (2) almost any typical attack
> pattern relies on lighting up as many calls as possible in the shortest
> period of time, since they know they'll get cut off soon. So, almost any
> exploit is going to trip the wire, and do so quickly.
>
> These assumptions proved correct, and the losses virtually disappeared.
>
> Today, this fraud protection feature is integrated into the trunking
> platform that we sell. In our experience, it works very well.
>
> --
> Alex Balashov - Principal
> Evariste Systems LLC
> 235 E Ponce de Leon Ave
> Suite 106
> Decatur, GA 30030
> United States
> Tel: +1-678-954-0670
> Web: http://www.evaristesys.com/, http://www.alexbalashov.com/
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
Feb. 26, 2014
Fraud
by paul@timmins.net
We do something similar in our environment. We have a per-tn blacklist that starts with all country codes except about 20 of them in it. If a customer calls to complain (I think one of them did this so far out of thousands), we remove a specific country from the list (or all of them).
Combined with a system that completely restricts international calling based on the customer's rolling 24 hour cost to us for international calls (we basically rate the calls every few minutes at the rates we're billed for them, and if you use over X amount at our cost over 24 hours, you get your international service shut off until we call you. The system sends a report to the account manager team and NOC and shuts them off instantly, and then the account managers work with the NOC to contact the customer offering technical assistance, and the account managers work with them on the financial side.
This strategy nearly eliminates losses on our side, because the account team knows what that traffic cost us, the NOC helps prevent the customer from further fraud by giving them advice or helping them, and the customer has to pay us maybe $100.
-Paul
On Tue, 02/25/2014 09:34 AM, "My List Account" <mylists at battleop.com> wrote:
>
I?m pretty sure it would ruffle some feathers around here if I sent that list out into the public domain. I can tell you that we basically go thought the rate deck and filter anyone that?s above X amount per minute and then throw in countries where customer?s hacked PBX?s send calls to. It?s not the most scientific method but it?s the most complaint free method.
Richey
From: John Curry [mailto:telecom7 at gmail.com]
> Sent: Monday, February 24, 2014 4:21 PM
> To: 'My List Account'; voiceops at voiceops.org
> Subject: RE: [VoiceOps] Fraud
Would you mind sharing your hi toll rate destination dial plan?
From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of My List Account
> Sent: Monday, February 24, 2014 1:48 PM
> To: voiceops at voiceops.org
> Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Fraud
Maybe I am missing something here but why does the carrier that delivers the fraudulent traffic to the Telco that?s in on the fraud pay the Telco that?s in on the fraud for the calls that are delivered to their network? Seems pretty simple, if you cut off their revenue stream they won?t have a reason to continue.
I guess we all know there is no incentive for them to stop this practice because it?s a big cash cow for everyone except for the poor end user who is left holding the bag.
Our default dial plan won?t let you dial these destinations so we don?t have a real issue with this abusive traffic. Most of our customers who use international go with one of our filtered dial plans that let them dial most of the world except for known fraudulent and high toll rate destinations.
Richey
From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of Ryan Delgrosso
> Sent: Saturday, February 22, 2014 11:48 AM
> To: voiceops at voiceops.org
> Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Fraud
In most cases you will lose this customer. They don't see this as their responsibility (i.e. the credit card fraud defense) but the reality is their equipment was compromised due to their negligence.
>
> If the customer is reasonable offer them your cost on the damages so its just a passthrough. Otherwise you can take them to court or just send them to collections.
>
> BTW while many will advocate fraud detection and mitigation systems here, its been my experience (we wrote our own fraud system that out-performs our upstream carriers by hours) that if you detect fraud on a customer like this, and shut it down in minutes, and mitigate what could have been thousands of dollars in damage due to their mis-configured systems, reducing it to just tens or hundreds they will often still fight that amount and deny responsibility. The fraud system protects you, and by extension the customer, but the customers don't see it that way.
>
> -Ryan
On 02/19/2014 02:09 PM, John Curry wrote:
> I am new to your site. I was looking in the Archives and saw in November 2013 there were some of you who experienced fraud. We had a an Avaya IP Office customers system who got hit pretty bad. The customer is treating the fraudulent calls like credit card fraud and not taking any responsibility. Does anyone have any advice on how to persuade the customer take this issue seriously? His bill was racked up pretty good. Strangely and coincidentally Avaya came out with a security bulletin the end of December 2013 on this same issue. I tried to contact Avaya with no response. It seems as though someone has built a sniffer for the Avaya IP Offices and gleaning their registrations.
_______________________________________________
VoiceOps mailing list
VoiceOps at voiceops.org
https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
_______________________________________________
VoiceOps mailing list
VoiceOps at voiceops.org
https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
Feb. 25, 2014
Fraud
by mylists@battleop.com
I'm pretty sure it would ruffle some feathers around here if I sent that
list out into the public domain. I can tell you that we basically go
thought the rate deck and filter anyone that's above X amount per minute and
then throw in countries where customer's hacked PBX's send calls to. It's
not the most scientific method but it's the most complaint free method.
Richey
From: John Curry [mailto:telecom7 at gmail.com]
Sent: Monday, February 24, 2014 4:21 PM
To: 'My List Account'; voiceops at voiceops.org
Subject: RE: [VoiceOps] Fraud
Would you mind sharing your hi toll rate destination dial plan?
From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of My List
Account
Sent: Monday, February 24, 2014 1:48 PM
To: voiceops at voiceops.org
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Fraud
Maybe I am missing something here but why does the carrier that delivers the
fraudulent traffic to the Telco that's in on the fraud pay the Telco that's
in on the fraud for the calls that are delivered to their network? Seems
pretty simple, if you cut off their revenue stream they won't have a reason
to continue.
I guess we all know there is no incentive for them to stop this practice
because it's a big cash cow for everyone except for the poor end user who is
left holding the bag.
Our default dial plan won't let you dial these destinations so we don't have
a real issue with this abusive traffic. Most of our customers who use
international go with one of our filtered dial plans that let them dial most
of the world except for known fraudulent and high toll rate destinations.
Richey
From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of Ryan
Delgrosso
Sent: Saturday, February 22, 2014 11:48 AM
To: voiceops at voiceops.org
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Fraud
In most cases you will lose this customer. They don't see this as their
responsibility (i.e. the credit card fraud defense) but the reality is their
equipment was compromised due to their negligence.
If the customer is reasonable offer them your cost on the damages so its
just a passthrough. Otherwise you can take them to court or just send them
to collections.
BTW while many will advocate fraud detection and mitigation systems here,
its been my experience (we wrote our own fraud system that out-performs our
upstream carriers by hours) that if you detect fraud on a customer like
this, and shut it down in minutes, and mitigate what could have been
thousands of dollars in damage due to their mis-configured systems, reducing
it to just tens or hundreds they will often still fight that amount and deny
responsibility. The fraud system protects you, and by extension the
customer, but the customers don't see it that way.
-Ryan
On 02/19/2014 02:09 PM, John Curry wrote:
I am new to your site. I was looking in the Archives and saw in November
2013 there were some of you who experienced fraud. We had a an Avaya IP
Office customers system who got hit pretty bad. The customer is treating the
fraudulent calls like credit card fraud and not taking any responsibility.
Does anyone have any advice on how to persuade the customer take this issue
seriously? His bill was racked up pretty good. Strangely and
coincidentally Avaya came out with a security bulletin the end of December
2013 on this same issue. I tried to contact Avaya with no response. It
seems as though someone has built a sniffer for the Avaya IP Offices and
gleaning their registrations.
_______________________________________________
VoiceOps mailing list
VoiceOps at voiceops.org
https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
Feb. 25, 2014
VoIP passive monitoring appliances or software - any recommendations?
by richard@teraquant.com
Hello Brian
If you would like to take a closer look at Palladion [Oracle COM], as
suggested by ujjval & Keith, then give us a call. We are the specialists
who've been working with Palladion since 2008.
If you want to pass the tool off to Customer Service Agents, NOC and
operations, as well as engineering, then Palladion is going to be worth
looking at.
Many Thanks & Best Regards
Richard
Answers <http://www.teraquant.com/> Not Data
Richard Jobson
PresidentTeraquant Corporation
2400 Central Ave, Suite P-2
Boulder, CO 80301 USA
E-mail: richard at teraquant.com
Web: www.teraquant.com <http://www.teraquant.com/>
<skype:richard.jobsontq?call>
<http://www.linkedin.com/company/1279446?trk=pro_other_cmpy>
<http://www.facebook.com/posted.php?id=1200528310#!/pages/Teraquant-Corporat
ion/179834408720842> <http://twitter.com/#!/Teraquant>
Phone:
Fax:
Mobile:
Skype:+1 719-488-1003 x101
+1 303-547-3248
+1 719-304-4000
richard.jobsontq
From: Brian Knight <ml at knight-networks.com>
Date: Friday, February 14, 2014 11:50 AM
To: <voiceops at voiceops.org>
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] VoIP passive monitoring appliances or software -
any recommendations?
> Thank you to everyone who replied with suggestions on and off list - much
> appreciated.
>
> We're going to take a closer look at Voipmonitor.org - seems like a majority
> of folks liked that, and the demo looked good. We'll also get in touch with
> vendors on some of the other software mentioned to get more details.
>
> Thanks again!
>
> -Brian
>
> _______________________________________________ VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
Feb. 25, 2014
Fraud
by John@InteleChoice.us
Would you mind sharing your hi toll rate destination dial plan?
From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of My List
Account
Sent: Monday, February 24, 2014 1:48 PM
To: voiceops at voiceops.org
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Fraud
Maybe I am missing something here but why does the carrier that delivers the
fraudulent traffic to the Telco that's in on the fraud pay the Telco that's
in on the fraud for the calls that are delivered to their network? Seems
pretty simple, if you cut off their revenue stream they won't have a reason
to continue.
I guess we all know there is no incentive for them to stop this practice
because it's a big cash cow for everyone except for the poor end user who is
left holding the bag.
Our default dial plan won't let you dial these destinations so we don't have
a real issue with this abusive traffic. Most of our customers who use
international go with one of our filtered dial plans that let them dial most
of the world except for known fraudulent and high toll rate destinations.
Richey
From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of Ryan
Delgrosso
Sent: Saturday, February 22, 2014 11:48 AM
To: voiceops at voiceops.org
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Fraud
In most cases you will lose this customer. They don't see this as their
responsibility (i.e. the credit card fraud defense) but the reality is their
equipment was compromised due to their negligence.
If the customer is reasonable offer them your cost on the damages so its
just a passthrough. Otherwise you can take them to court or just send them
to collections.
BTW while many will advocate fraud detection and mitigation systems here,
its been my experience (we wrote our own fraud system that out-performs our
upstream carriers by hours) that if you detect fraud on a customer like
this, and shut it down in minutes, and mitigate what could have been
thousands of dollars in damage due to their mis-configured systems, reducing
it to just tens or hundreds they will often still fight that amount and deny
responsibility. The fraud system protects you, and by extension the
customer, but the customers don't see it that way.
-Ryan
On 02/19/2014 02:09 PM, John Curry wrote:
I am new to your site. I was looking in the Archives and saw in November
2013 there were some of you who experienced fraud. We had a an Avaya IP
Office customers system who got hit pretty bad. The customer is treating the
fraudulent calls like credit card fraud and not taking any responsibility.
Does anyone have any advice on how to persuade the customer take this issue
seriously? His bill was racked up pretty good. Strangely and
coincidentally Avaya came out with a security bulletin the end of December
2013 on this same issue. I tried to contact Avaya with no response. It
seems as though someone has built a sniffer for the Avaya IP Offices and
gleaning their registrations.
_______________________________________________
VoiceOps mailing list
VoiceOps at voiceops.org
https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
Feb. 24, 2014
[VOIPSEC] Tackling VoIP fraud, new idea
by ctaloi@gmail.com
ha ! Wow - Actual cats on the internet !!
// my bad.. Correct - http://www.cfca.org
On 24 Feb 2014, at 14:14, Jay Hennigan wrote:
> On 2/24/14 7:50 AM, Christopher Aloi wrote:
>>
>> What does the "International Revenue Fraud Number Database" on cfa.org
>> <http://cfa.org> contain?
>
> It's the internet. Pictures of cats, of course.
>
> Cats are always on-topic.
>
> Or did you mean http://www.cfca.org ?
>
> <emily litella>
>
> Never mind.
>
> </emily>
>
> --
> Jay Hennigan - CCIE #7880 - Network Engineering - jay at impulse.net
> Impulse Internet Service - http://www.impulse.net/
> Your local telephone and internet company - 805 884-6323 - WB6RDV
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
Feb. 24, 2014
Fraud
by abalashov@evaristesys.com
I've said it before and I'll say it again:
We stopped 95-98% of the losses on this sort of thing for a large
customer who was losing thousands of dollars per day on it, by
implementing the following approach:
Every trunk group gets a 'high-cost channel limit', which is the X
number of simultaneous calls that they are allowed to make to
destinations that cost over $Y/min. The limit was typically something
like $0.10, so as to exclude domestic US traffic, but certainly catch
Somalia and Globalstar. Both X and Y are configurable on a per-trunk
group basis, so customers who have a legitimate need for 50 concurrent
calls to Dakar can do that. For most typical domestic users, the limit
was set to something like $0.10 and 2 channels.
When this limit was tripped, typically due to a compromised PBX with
some extension password of 1234, the following things happen:
(1) All existing calls are terminated;
(2) An alert e-mail is sent out to the customer and to the NOC;
(3) Customer is downgraded to a termination rate plan that only allows
for domestic calling. That way, they're not totally cut off from calling
and, in all but the most unusual scenarios, not exceptionally angry.
There is no reason to cut them off entirely. That's a false dichotomy.
Downgrade them to a restricted calling plan.
The thinking was that (a) there's only so much exposure that two
simultaneous calls to rural Chad can create; (2) almost any typical
attack pattern relies on lighting up as many calls as possible in the
shortest period of time, since they know they'll get cut off soon. So,
almost any exploit is going to trip the wire, and do so quickly.
These assumptions proved correct, and the losses virtually disappeared.
Today, this fraud protection feature is integrated into the trunking
platform that we sell. In our experience, it works very well.
--
Alex Balashov - Principal
Evariste Systems LLC
235 E Ponce de Leon Ave
Suite 106
Decatur, GA 30030
United States
Tel: +1-678-954-0670
Web: http://www.evaristesys.com/, http://www.alexbalashov.com/
Feb. 24, 2014
Fraud
by jay@west.net
On 2/24/14 10:48 AM, My List Account wrote:
> Maybe I am missing something here but why does the carrier that delivers
> the fraudulent traffic to the Telco that?s in on the fraud pay the Telco
> that?s in on the fraud for the calls that are delivered to their
> network? Seems pretty simple, if you cut off their revenue stream they
> won?t have a reason to continue.
The telco that terminates the high rate calls is making money on them,
the carrier that is next-in-line makes money, and there are sufficient
non-fraudulent calls to that carrier that refusing to complete the calls
isn't possible without impacting legitimate service.
This is similar to the 900/976 arrangement in the US a few years back.
Assume that the fraudulent "information service" gets paid the
equivalent of 50 US cents per minute. The national telco which may or
may not be in on the deal gets another 50 cents. Big international rate
deck for million-minute delivery might be $1.25 and you might pay $1.50
and bill your customers $2.00.
Your customer's PBX gets owned, and racks up 5000 minutes for a bill of
$10K. Everyone upstream wants their bite of the apple, none of them is
responsible for making the calls, or at least can't be proven to be.
If you're a really nice guy and knock the bill down to the $7500 that it
costs you, your customer still thinks you're the bad guy.
> I guess we all know there is no incentive for them to stop this practice
> because it?s a big cash cow for everyone except for the poor end user
> who is left holding the bag.
Precisely, but it's the end user who left the barn door open. Nobody in
the revenue stream forced your customer to enable offsite international
forwarding and set the DTMF voice portal password to 1234.
> Our default dial plan won?t let you dial these destinations so we don?t
> have a real issue with this abusive traffic. Most of our customers who
> use international go with one of our filtered dial plans that let them
> dial most of the world except for known fraudulent and high toll rate
> destinations.
And/or require verified auth codes and disable offsite forwarding, rate
limit, put in monitoring and alerting/shutdown, and spend a lot of time,
effort, and money protecting your customers from themselves.
But, just as ISP customers want the whole Internet without filtering,
most voice customers don't want "The Phone Company" telling them where
they're allowed to call. Until they get the bill. Then they care.
And if you do put in an alerting system, there's this dilemma:
"My pager just went of at 4:00 AM Sunday morning - do I call the CEO of
my biggest customer and ask if they are deliberately placing 50
simultaneous calls to Somalia, shut the trunk down, or just send them
the bill and hope they pay it?"
--
Jay Hennigan - CCIE #7880 - Network Engineering - jay at impulse.net
Impulse Internet Service - http://www.impulse.net/
Your local telephone and internet company - 805 884-6323 - WB6RDV
Feb. 24, 2014
Fraud
by dthompson@esi-estech.com
Most of the countries that are generating the fraud are so corrupt that
the only way you'll see justice is by sending in a team of Navy Seals.
David Thompson
Network Services Support Technician
(O) 858.357.8794
(F) 858-225-1882
(E) dthompson at esi-estech.com
(W)?www.esi-estech.com
-----Original Message-----
From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of Matt
Yaklin
Sent: Monday, February 24, 2014 1:31 PM
To: My List Account
Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Fraud
On Mon, 24 Feb 2014, My List Account wrote:
>
> Maybe I am missing something here but why does the carrier that
> delivers the fraudulent traffic to the Telco that?s in on the fraud pay
the Telco that?s in on the fraud for the calls that are delivered to their
network??? Seems pretty simple, if you cut off their revenue stream they
won?t have a reason to continue.
>
I would also like to add into this question:
I realize it can be very difficult to track down the hacker generating
these SIP calls from stolen credentials because they can hide behind TOR
or other proxies... (Somehow I doubt they all do. Some are probably
terribly stupid and doing it from their home internet conncetion).
But where the calls are going can be tracked right to the switch that has
the CDN on it. Thus you have the owners of the numbers nailed down as well
as the telephone company providing the service. Why are they not grilled
as to why hackers are generating calls to their numbers and if determined
to be part of the fraud arrested and taken to court?
Is it because these telephone companies are in countries where corruption
is rampant and they are greasing the right palms to stay out of trouble?
matt
>
>
> I guess we all know there is no incentive for them to stop this practice
because it?s a big cash cow for everyone except for the poor end user who
is left holding the bag.
>
>
>
> Our default dial plan won?t let you dial these destinations so we
> don?t have a real issue with this abusive traffic.? ?Most of our
customers who use international go with one of our filtered dial plans
that let them dial most of the world except for known fraudulent and high
toll rate destinations.
>
>
>
>
>
> Richey
>
>
>
> From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of
> Ryan Delgrosso
> Sent: Saturday, February 22, 2014 11:48 AM
> To: voiceops at voiceops.org
> Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Fraud
>
>
>
> In most cases you will lose this customer. They don't see this as their
responsibility (i.e. the credit card fraud defense) but the reality is
their equipment was compromised due to their negligence.
>
> If the customer is reasonable offer them your cost on the damages so its
just a passthrough. Otherwise you can take them to court or just send them
to collections.
>
> BTW while many will advocate fraud detection and mitigation systems
> here, its been my experience (we wrote our own fraud system that
> out-performs our upstream carriers by hours) that if you detect fraud on
a customer like this, and shut it down in minutes, and mitigate what could
have been thousands of dollars in damage due to their mis-configured
systems, reducing it to just tens or hundreds they will often still fight
that amount and deny responsibility. The fraud system protects you, and by
extension the customer, but the customers don't see it that way.
>
> -Ryan
>
>
> On 02/19/2014 02:09 PM, John Curry wrote:
>
> I am new to your site. I was looking in the Archives and saw in
November 2013 there were some of you who experienced fraud. We had a an
Avaya IP Office customers system who got hit pretty bad. The
> customer is treating the fraudulent calls like credit card fraud
and not taking any responsibility. Does anyone have any advice on how to
persuade the customer take this issue seriously?? His bill was
> racked up pretty good. ?Strangely and coincidentally Avaya came
out with a security bulletin the end of December 2013 on this same issue.
I tried to contact Avaya with no response. It seems as though
> someone has built a sniffer for the Avaya IP Offices and gleaning
their registrations.
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
>
> VoiceOps mailing list
>
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
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>
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Feb. 24, 2014
Fraud
by ujjval@simplesignal.com
That is what our experience has been. The call origination IP is in
countries that the Abuse email isn't even monitored.
We have had reports to FBI, our upstream carriers, but no luck getting
anywhere with these investigations.
-----Original Message-----
From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of Matt
Yaklin
Sent: Monday, February 24, 2014 12:31 PM
To: My List Account
Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Fraud
On Mon, 24 Feb 2014, My List Account wrote:
>
> Maybe I am missing something here but why does the carrier that
> delivers the fraudulent traffic to the Telco that?s in on the fraud pay
the Telco that?s in on the fraud for the calls that are delivered to their
network? Seems pretty simple, if you cut off their revenue stream they
won?t have a reason to continue.
>
I would also like to add into this question:
I realize it can be very difficult to track down the hacker generating
these SIP calls from stolen credentials because they can hide behind TOR
or other proxies... (Somehow I doubt they all do. Some are probably
terribly stupid and doing it from their home internet conncetion).
But where the calls are going can be tracked right to the switch that has
the CDN on it. Thus you have the owners of the numbers nailed down as well
as the telephone company providing the service. Why are they not grilled
as to why hackers are generating calls to their numbers and if determined
to be part of the fraud arrested and taken to court?
Is it because these telephone companies are in countries where corruption
is rampant and they are greasing the right palms to stay out of trouble?
matt
>
>
> I guess we all know there is no incentive for them to stop this practice
because it?s a big cash cow for everyone except for the poor end user who
is left holding the bag.
>
>
>
> Our default dial plan won?t let you dial these destinations so we
> don?t have a real issue with this abusive traffic. Most of our
customers who use international go with one of our filtered dial plans
that let them dial most of the world except for known fraudulent and high
toll rate destinations.
>
>
>
>
>
> Richey
>
>
>
> From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of
> Ryan Delgrosso
> Sent: Saturday, February 22, 2014 11:48 AM
> To: voiceops at voiceops.org
> Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Fraud
>
>
>
> In most cases you will lose this customer. They don't see this as their
responsibility (i.e. the credit card fraud defense) but the reality is
their equipment was compromised due to their negligence.
>
> If the customer is reasonable offer them your cost on the damages so its
just a passthrough. Otherwise you can take them to court or just send them
to collections.
>
> BTW while many will advocate fraud detection and mitigation systems
> here, its been my experience (we wrote our own fraud system that
> out-performs our upstream carriers by hours) that if you detect fraud on
a customer like this, and shut it down in minutes, and mitigate what could
have been thousands of dollars in damage due to their mis-configured
systems, reducing it to just tens or hundreds they will often still fight
that amount and deny responsibility. The fraud system protects you, and by
extension the customer, but the customers don't see it that way.
>
> -Ryan
>
>
> On 02/19/2014 02:09 PM, John Curry wrote:
>
> I am new to your site. I was looking in the Archives and saw in
November 2013 there were some of you who experienced fraud. We had a an
Avaya IP Office customers system who got hit pretty bad. The
> customer is treating the fraudulent calls like credit card fraud
and not taking any responsibility. Does anyone have any advice on how to
persuade the customer take this issue seriously? His bill was
> racked up pretty good. Strangely and coincidentally Avaya came
out with a security bulletin the end of December 2013 on this same issue.
I tried to contact Avaya with no response. It seems as though
> someone has built a sniffer for the Avaya IP Offices and gleaning
their registrations.
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
>
> VoiceOps mailing list
>
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
>
>
>
Feb. 24, 2014