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August 2014
- 50 participants
- 130 messages
Broadsoft MoH
by abalashov@evaristesys.com
The idea that Broadsoft is "the most advanced softswitch out there" is woefully misguided. It is "the most expensive softswitch out there".
Otherwise, its feature set is geared toward generic, cookie-cutter POTS replacement.
On 18 August 2014 22:32:25 GMT-04:00, Colton Conor <colton.conor at gmail.com> wrote:
>I was talking with a friend about their broadsoft implementation, and
>they
>mentioned that the had a client complaining about Broadsoft's music on
>hold's features. Basically, the said you could only upload one music
>file
>at a time, and it would only play the beginning of that file every
>time.
>Plus you can only upload a .wav file, and broadsoft won't convert a
>.mp3 or
>other audio file for you.
>
>Sure enough I checked out Wholesalers implementation, and found the
>same
>thing. Is this true for all Broadsoft installations? This seems like
>quite
>a feature limitation for the most advanced softswitch out there.
>
>
>------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>_______________________________________________
>VoiceOps mailing list
>VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
--
Sent from my mobile, and thus lacking in the refinement one might expect from a fully fledged keyboard.
Alex Balashov - Principal
Evariste Systems LLC
235 E Ponce de Leon Ave
Suite 106
Decatur, GA 30030
United States
Tel: +1-678-954-0671
Web: http://www.evaristesys.com/, http://www.alexbalashov.com
Aug. 19, 2014
Hackers Crash Clay Co. Phones ...
by ryandelgrosso@gmail.com
Discuss away, were all riveted with antici......
:)
On 8/18/2014 7:52 PM, Anthony Orlando via VoiceOps wrote:
> All
> I might have a solution that I'd like to talk to the group about. It
> can not only detect but could use your switch API to take action.
> Who's interested in discussing it!
>
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> On Aug 18, 2014, at 9:59 PM, Tim Jackson <jackson.tim at gmail.com
> <mailto:jackson.tim at gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>> I think Ryan's point here is getting data on in-progress calls into
>> it instead of completed calls..
>>
>> AFAIK CPM basically watches the real time call logs from the CFS, and
>> only knows about calls once they complete.
>>
>> On Aug 18, 2014 6:04 PM, "Simon Dredge" <Simon.Dredge at metaswitch.com
>> <mailto:Simon.Dredge at metaswitch.com>> wrote:
>>
>> Heya, Ryan - It's SAS-like - But proactive analysis rather than
>> reactive analytics. It'll trigger immediately (in real-time) on
>> an anomaly, informing the operator that action is required so
>> they can take necessary action.
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>>
>> Simon.
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Ryan Delgrosso [mailto:ryandelgrosso at gmail.com
>> <mailto:ryandelgrosso at gmail.com>]
>> Sent: Monday, August 18, 2014 4:32 PM
>> To: Simon Dredge
>> Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org <mailto:voiceops at voiceops.org>
>> Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Hackers Crash Clay Co. Phones ...
>>
>> Simon,
>> I think the gotcha with CPM in this scenario is its a great tool
>> for determining "this has happened" but not so great for building
>> a mitigation solution.
>>
>> Is CPM driven off of CDR's or off of the SAS datastream or some
>> other source?
>>
>> If its CDR driven you will be blind to this problem because you
>> wont be measuring calls that are rejected due to lack of
>> capacity(no cdr cut).
>> If its driven off of SAS data you will get the missed/incomplete
>> call stats but at the cost of speed (multiple orders of magnitude
>> more data than CDR's)
>>
>> It would be interesting to hear if this perhaps uses a different
>> datasource. Perhaps there is a facility in perimeta that informs
>> this better than CFS data sources.
>>
>> -Ryan
>>
>> On 8/18/2014 3:36 PM, Simon Dredge wrote:
>> > I know many meta-users like the new-ish call pattern monitor.
>> It uses weighted profiling benchmarking algos similar to NBAD:
>> >
>> >
>> http://www.metaswitch.com/sites/default/files/Metaswitch-Call-Pattern-
>> > Monitor.pdf
>> >
>> > Cheers,
>> >
>> >
>> > Simon.
>> >
>> >
>> > -----Original Message-----
>> > From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org
>> <mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org>] On Behalf Of
>> > Ryan Delgrosso
>> > Sent: Monday, August 18, 2014 1:53 PM
>> > To: ECG - Mark Lindsey
>> > Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org <mailto:voiceops at voiceops.org>
>> > Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Hackers Crash Clay Co. Phones ...
>> >
>> > I dunno that's a slippery slope. Im not a proponent of putting
>> management of your network services into someone elses hands,
>> especially things like this where the service provider should
>> have visibility into what they are or are not admitting.
>> >
>> > Agreed on your synopsis of call admission control, the border
>> should be able to make these decisions rapidly, freeing up
>> softswitch resources to actually serve customers.
>> >
>> > This sounds like good territory for an acme SPL plugin, possibly in
>> > conjunction with this enum extension
>> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kaplan-enum-source-uri-00
>> unfortunately i dont see a clear path for this in the TDM world
>> but my exposure there is limited. It would seem like a good
>> solution might be using ENUM (with source URI) to build
>> statistics centrally based on calling/called numbers and then
>> forcing the ENUM response once thresholds are hit to illicit an
>> appropriate decline message for flagged invites with a
>> retry-after interval allowing you to effectively throttle
>> specific call scenarios assuming your origination carriers will
>> behave correctly.
>> >
>> > 2 of the examples we discussed previously were:
>> >
>> > 1: Social media death star. Justin biebers (or anyone else with
>> millions of rabid followers) twitter account (53.7M followers)
>> gets hacked and attacker tweets "Call this number for free
>> tickets" or similar.
>> >
>> > 2: T-DOS using stolen sip accounts effectively turning other
>> service providers into a death star. More damage per source
>> number (higher CPS than social media per attacker but less
>> distributed source). This one seems much easier to create given
>> the ease with which stolen sip accounts can be acquired, and
>> harder to mitigate if the stolen accounts support callerID spoofing.
>> >
>> > Both of these situations are exacerbated by LCR resellers
>> creating at times 10-20 invites from 1 due to route advancing
>> when the destination is truly congested, which gets worse when
>> the LCR resellers in turn have resellers in route etc etc.
>> >
>> > Of course any solution needs to have provisions for conveying
>> congestion control to the originating network so they stop route
>> advancing.
>> >
>> >
>> > I think this has commercial viability for access providers
>> protecting
>> > their customers business interests and for implementers designing
>> > solutions but perhaps not so much in a carrier to carrier capacity
>> > (beyond appropriate support of signaling congestion control).
>> >
>> >
>> > On 8/18/2014 12:48 PM, Mark R Lindsey wrote:
>> >> Ryan, does it seem as though TDoS will be most effectively
>> addressed by the origination companies? i.e., the guys with the
>> TDM trunks to the local tandems, such as incumbents, Verizon,
>> Level(3).
>> >>
>> >> It seems to me that some use of statistics could probably make
>> reasonable guesses about whether a given PSTN origination call is
>> likely to be legitimate (for a call from A to B). For example,
>> I'll bet you could make a good start looking at numbers and
>> geographic areas:
>> >>
>> >> -- Has telephone number A called to telephone number B
>> before? Or B->A ?
>> >>
>> >> -- Has GeographicArea(A) called to telephone number B
>> before? Or GeographicArea(B) -> A?
>> >>
>> >> The more you know about telephone numbers A and B, the more
>> you could guess about the likelihood that a given call is legitimate.
>> >>
>> >> And getting good at this should be a competitive advantage,
>> just as effective anti-spam is an advantage elsewhere. Vendors
>> that build the edge gear -- in particular, the SBC and TDM SS7
>> gateway vendors -- should be leading the way.
>> >>
>> >> And wholesale carriers could take some advantage and make it
>> broadly available. For example, let's say Verizon came along and
>> said, "Here's a reason to port your numbers from Level(3) to us:
>> When you're under attack, we're going to be smart about the ways
>> we selectively admit calls to your network."
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>>>> mark at ecg.co <mailto:mark at ecg.co> +1-229-316-0013
>> <tel:%2B1-229-316-0013> http://ecg.co/lindsey
>> >> On Aug 18, 2014, at 13:52 , Ryan Delgrosso
>> <ryandelgrosso at gmail.com <mailto:ryandelgrosso at gmail.com>> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>> IP DDOS and TDOS are really two different problems but yes we
>> as ITSP's and CLECs living in the IP space are absolutely
>> susceptible to both.
>> >>>
>> >>> Ive done a fair amount of research into both of these topics
>> and we have seen varying cases of both, but usually IP DDOS
>> steals the spotlight because the numbers are bigger and the
>> effects are usually more widespread whereas a TDOS attack is
>> rarely felt by anyone that doesn't live in the affected region or
>> isn't actively trying to call the victim, and usually telcos keep
>> these issues pretty close to the chest.
>> >>>
>> >>> I expect this sort of attack is going to increase in
>> magnitude in the coming 24-36 months as attackers figure out how
>> to wield it. Mark Collier gave a very interesting talk at one of
>> the CFCA events on this topic, though the focus was on the
>> enterprise victim, but the lessons are really the same. There
>> just arent really any good tools to mitigate this sort of attack
>> today, especially at the carrier level.
>> >>>
>> >>> -Ryan
>> >>>
>> >>> On 8/18/2014 6:30 AM, Matt Yaklin wrote:
>> >>>> It seems like almost every telephone company can be hit like
>> that
>> >>>> except the ?largest?...
>> >>>>
>> >>>> A denial of service attack by simply calling so many times
>> it fills
>> >>>> up their main trunks.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> And we saw how the large IP colo providers handle this for
>> >>>> customers who get dos'd. The amount of bandwidth they have is
>> >>>> staggering and they still cannot guarantee you will stay up if a
>> >>>> ?skilled? attacker wants you down. So you keep throwing
>> money at it
>> >>>> until you are so well established online that you look at your
>> >>>> monthly bill and want to puke.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> matt
>> >>>>
>> >>>> On Mon, 18 Aug 2014, Frank Bulk wrote:
>> >>>>
>> >>>>>
>> http://www.wibw.com/home/headlines/Hackers-Behind-Phone-Outage-In-
>> >>>>> Clay-County-271463051.html?ref=051
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> Painful issue for Big River Telephone!
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> Frank
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>
>> >>>> _______________________________________________
>> >>>> VoiceOps mailing list
>> >>>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org <mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
>> >>>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>> >>> _______________________________________________
>> >>> VoiceOps mailing list
>> >>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org <mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
>> >>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > VoiceOps mailing list
>> > VoiceOps at voiceops.org <mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
>> > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> VoiceOps mailing list
>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org <mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> VoiceOps mailing list
>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org <mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
Aug. 19, 2014
Hackers Crash Clay Co. Phones ...
by avorlando@yahoo.com
All
I might have a solution that I'd like to talk to the group about. It can not only detect but could use your switch API to take action. Who's interested in discussing it!
Sent from my iPhone
> On Aug 18, 2014, at 9:59 PM, Tim Jackson <jackson.tim at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> I think Ryan's point here is getting data on in-progress calls into it instead of completed calls..
>
> AFAIK CPM basically watches the real time call logs from the CFS, and only knows about calls once they complete.
>
>> On Aug 18, 2014 6:04 PM, "Simon Dredge" <Simon.Dredge at metaswitch.com> wrote:
>> Heya, Ryan - It's SAS-like - But proactive analysis rather than reactive analytics. It'll trigger immediately (in real-time) on an anomaly, informing the operator that action is required so they can take necessary action.
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>>
>> Simon.
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Ryan Delgrosso [mailto:ryandelgrosso at gmail.com]
>> Sent: Monday, August 18, 2014 4:32 PM
>> To: Simon Dredge
>> Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org
>> Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Hackers Crash Clay Co. Phones ...
>>
>> Simon,
>> I think the gotcha with CPM in this scenario is its a great tool for determining "this has happened" but not so great for building a mitigation solution.
>>
>> Is CPM driven off of CDR's or off of the SAS datastream or some other source?
>>
>> If its CDR driven you will be blind to this problem because you wont be measuring calls that are rejected due to lack of capacity(no cdr cut).
>> If its driven off of SAS data you will get the missed/incomplete call stats but at the cost of speed (multiple orders of magnitude more data than CDR's)
>>
>> It would be interesting to hear if this perhaps uses a different datasource. Perhaps there is a facility in perimeta that informs this better than CFS data sources.
>>
>> -Ryan
>>
>> On 8/18/2014 3:36 PM, Simon Dredge wrote:
>> > I know many meta-users like the new-ish call pattern monitor. It uses weighted profiling benchmarking algos similar to NBAD:
>> >
>> > http://www.metaswitch.com/sites/default/files/Metaswitch-Call-Pattern-
>> > Monitor.pdf
>> >
>> > Cheers,
>> >
>> >
>> > Simon.
>> >
>> >
>> > -----Original Message-----
>> > From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of
>> > Ryan Delgrosso
>> > Sent: Monday, August 18, 2014 1:53 PM
>> > To: ECG - Mark Lindsey
>> > Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org
>> > Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Hackers Crash Clay Co. Phones ...
>> >
>> > I dunno that's a slippery slope. Im not a proponent of putting management of your network services into someone elses hands, especially things like this where the service provider should have visibility into what they are or are not admitting.
>> >
>> > Agreed on your synopsis of call admission control, the border should be able to make these decisions rapidly, freeing up softswitch resources to actually serve customers.
>> >
>> > This sounds like good territory for an acme SPL plugin, possibly in
>> > conjunction with this enum extension
>> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kaplan-enum-source-uri-00 unfortunately i dont see a clear path for this in the TDM world but my exposure there is limited. It would seem like a good solution might be using ENUM (with source URI) to build statistics centrally based on calling/called numbers and then forcing the ENUM response once thresholds are hit to illicit an appropriate decline message for flagged invites with a retry-after interval allowing you to effectively throttle specific call scenarios assuming your origination carriers will behave correctly.
>> >
>> > 2 of the examples we discussed previously were:
>> >
>> > 1: Social media death star. Justin biebers (or anyone else with millions of rabid followers) twitter account (53.7M followers) gets hacked and attacker tweets "Call this number for free tickets" or similar.
>> >
>> > 2: T-DOS using stolen sip accounts effectively turning other service providers into a death star. More damage per source number (higher CPS than social media per attacker but less distributed source). This one seems much easier to create given the ease with which stolen sip accounts can be acquired, and harder to mitigate if the stolen accounts support callerID spoofing.
>> >
>> > Both of these situations are exacerbated by LCR resellers creating at times 10-20 invites from 1 due to route advancing when the destination is truly congested, which gets worse when the LCR resellers in turn have resellers in route etc etc.
>> >
>> > Of course any solution needs to have provisions for conveying congestion control to the originating network so they stop route advancing.
>> >
>> >
>> > I think this has commercial viability for access providers protecting
>> > their customers business interests and for implementers designing
>> > solutions but perhaps not so much in a carrier to carrier capacity
>> > (beyond appropriate support of signaling congestion control).
>> >
>> >
>> > On 8/18/2014 12:48 PM, Mark R Lindsey wrote:
>> >> Ryan, does it seem as though TDoS will be most effectively addressed by the origination companies? i.e., the guys with the TDM trunks to the local tandems, such as incumbents, Verizon, Level(3).
>> >>
>> >> It seems to me that some use of statistics could probably make reasonable guesses about whether a given PSTN origination call is likely to be legitimate (for a call from A to B). For example, I'll bet you could make a good start looking at numbers and geographic areas:
>> >>
>> >> -- Has telephone number A called to telephone number B before? Or B->A ?
>> >>
>> >> -- Has GeographicArea(A) called to telephone number B before? Or GeographicArea(B) -> A?
>> >>
>> >> The more you know about telephone numbers A and B, the more you could guess about the likelihood that a given call is legitimate.
>> >>
>> >> And getting good at this should be a competitive advantage, just as effective anti-spam is an advantage elsewhere. Vendors that build the edge gear -- in particular, the SBC and TDM SS7 gateway vendors -- should be leading the way.
>> >>
>> >> And wholesale carriers could take some advantage and make it broadly available. For example, let's say Verizon came along and said, "Here's a reason to port your numbers from Level(3) to us: When you're under attack, we're going to be smart about the ways we selectively admit calls to your network."
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>>>> mark at ecg.co +1-229-316-0013 http://ecg.co/lindsey
>> >> On Aug 18, 2014, at 13:52 , Ryan Delgrosso <ryandelgrosso at gmail.com> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>> IP DDOS and TDOS are really two different problems but yes we as ITSP's and CLECs living in the IP space are absolutely susceptible to both.
>> >>>
>> >>> Ive done a fair amount of research into both of these topics and we have seen varying cases of both, but usually IP DDOS steals the spotlight because the numbers are bigger and the effects are usually more widespread whereas a TDOS attack is rarely felt by anyone that doesn't live in the affected region or isn't actively trying to call the victim, and usually telcos keep these issues pretty close to the chest.
>> >>>
>> >>> I expect this sort of attack is going to increase in magnitude in the coming 24-36 months as attackers figure out how to wield it. Mark Collier gave a very interesting talk at one of the CFCA events on this topic, though the focus was on the enterprise victim, but the lessons are really the same. There just arent really any good tools to mitigate this sort of attack today, especially at the carrier level.
>> >>>
>> >>> -Ryan
>> >>>
>> >>> On 8/18/2014 6:30 AM, Matt Yaklin wrote:
>> >>>> It seems like almost every telephone company can be hit like that
>> >>>> except the ?largest?...
>> >>>>
>> >>>> A denial of service attack by simply calling so many times it fills
>> >>>> up their main trunks.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> And we saw how the large IP colo providers handle this for
>> >>>> customers who get dos'd. The amount of bandwidth they have is
>> >>>> staggering and they still cannot guarantee you will stay up if a
>> >>>> ?skilled? attacker wants you down. So you keep throwing money at it
>> >>>> until you are so well established online that you look at your
>> >>>> monthly bill and want to puke.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> matt
>> >>>>
>> >>>> On Mon, 18 Aug 2014, Frank Bulk wrote:
>> >>>>
>> >>>>> http://www.wibw.com/home/headlines/Hackers-Behind-Phone-Outage-In-
>> >>>>> Clay-County-271463051.html?ref=051
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> Painful issue for Big River Telephone!
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> Frank
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>
>> >>>> _______________________________________________
>> >>>> VoiceOps mailing list
>> >>>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>> >>>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>> >>> _______________________________________________
>> >>> VoiceOps mailing list
>> >>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>> >>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > VoiceOps mailing list
>> > VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>> > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> VoiceOps mailing list
>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
Aug. 19, 2014
Key System Using Polycom VVX
by peter@4isps.com
Key system emulation with paging, door buzzers and/or shared line
appearance are a BITCH on most any hosted platform. Add in the
Polycom VVX's, which are not super stable yet, and you have a
dissatisfied customer.
I agree with the MITEL/Aastra suggestion of the AstraLink 160
Regards,
Peter Radizeski
RAD-INFO INC
813.963.5884
> *From:*VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] *On Behalf Of
> *Colton Conor
> *Sent:* Monday, August 18, 2014 9:59 PM
> *To:* voiceops at voiceops.org
> *Subject:* [VoiceOps] Key System Using Polycom VVX
>
> Can anyone recommend an onsite IP PBX that fully supports the Polycom
> VVX series of phones? When I say support I mean auto configure, do
> firmware updates, etc...I know most all IP PBX's will at least be able
> to use the VVX as a SIP extension.
>
> The clients wants to emulate a key system. The IP PBX should support
> SIP trunks of course for connection to the PSTN. The client also wants
> the ability to use a local MoH source, paging, and other common key
> system features that hosted systems don't do very well.
>
> I was thinking switchvox, but they don't have phone feature packs for
> the VVX line only the older phones.
>
> Adtran has the 7060, but according to the latest release notes:
>
> ADTRAN branded VVX phones (model names ADTRAN VVX 300, ADTRAN VVX 310,
> ADTRAN
>
> VVX 400, ADTRAN VVX 410, ADTRAN VVX 500, and ADTRAN VVX 600) work with
> NetVanta
>
> 7000 series AOS release version R10.8.0 and beyond without requiring
> an additional license key purchase.
>
> The equivalent Polycom branded phones will not work with release
> R10.8.0. If you are currently using the
>
> equivalent Polycom branded phones with the NetVanta 7000 series, you
> will need to either remain on a
>
> pre-R10.8 release version or use the ADTRAN branded version of the VVX
> phones until a licensing
>
> mechanism can be added to allow the use of Polycom branded VVX models.
>
> Looks like that won't be a good option since the client already has
> regular Polycom VVX phones not the ones with Adtran's badge on them.
>
> Any recommendations?
>
Aug. 19, 2014
Key System Using Polycom VVX
by colton.conor@gmail.com
Josh,
I have seen the same problems with the VVX series, but we not have a couple
hundred deployed. What phones do your recommend then? What softswitch are
you using?
On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 5:24 PM, Joshua Elson <joshelson at gmail.com> wrote:
> SLA/SCA functionality, if that's what desired, on the VVX line is spotty
> at best and is not supported at all on Asterisk/Switchvox, at least not in
> the way your users will likely expect. At worst, it just simply doesn't
> work. Not to mention that the VVX phone performance has been... let's call
> it "questionable," to put it mildly. We've deployed many hundreds of them
> and we see pretty consistent complaints about laggy touchscreen performance
> and we get random reboots followed by core dumps from the phones on our
> provisioning infrastructure dozens of times every week. If you're looking
> for key system features and thinking of using the VVX expansions, they
> barely work (and ONLY on the latest 5.x software), and really don't work as
> advertised with provisioning.
>
> If "true" SCA/SLA type functionality is a must, you're pretty much stuck
> with Linksys SPA, Snom, or legacy Polycom Soundpoint lines on a
> Broadsoft-based switch. Of course, there's almost no real need for the key
> system if people are willing to holistically look at how they use the
> phones, but that's a whole different batle...
>
> Just my $.02.
>
> Josh
>
>
> On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 3:58 PM, Colton Conor <colton.conor at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Can anyone recommend an onsite IP PBX that fully supports the Polycom VVX
>> series of phones? When I say support I mean auto configure, do firmware
>> updates, etc...I know most all IP PBX's will at least be able to use the
>> VVX as a SIP extension.
>>
>> The clients wants to emulate a key system. The IP PBX should support SIP
>> trunks of course for connection to the PSTN. The client also wants the
>> ability to use a local MoH source, paging, and other common key system
>> features that hosted systems don't do very well.
>>
>> I was thinking switchvox, but they don't have phone feature packs for the
>> VVX line only the older phones.
>>
>> Adtran has the 7060, but according to the latest release notes:
>>
>> ADTRAN branded VVX phones (model names ADTRAN VVX 300, ADTRAN VVX 310,
>> ADTRAN
>> VVX 400, ADTRAN VVX 410, ADTRAN VVX 500, and ADTRAN VVX 600) work with
>> NetVanta
>> 7000 series AOS release version R10.8.0 and beyond without requiring an
>> additional license key purchase.
>> The equivalent Polycom branded phones will not work with release R10.8.0.
>> If you are currently using the
>> equivalent Polycom branded phones with the NetVanta 7000 series, you will
>> need to either remain on a
>> pre-R10.8 release version or use the ADTRAN branded version of the VVX
>> phones until a licensing
>> mechanism can be added to allow the use of Polycom branded VVX models.
>>
>> Looks like that won't be a good option since the client already has
>> regular Polycom VVX phones not the ones with Adtran's badge on them.
>>
>> Any recommendations?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> VoiceOps mailing list
>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>>
>>
>
Aug. 19, 2014
Key System Using Polycom VVX
by colton.conor@gmail.com
The client is small only 20 seats. We sold them a hosted broadsoft service
with fancy VVX 500 phones, only to find they want to use it as a key
system. We have setup the VVX 500's all with SCA's on each and every phone,
but the amount of registrations (12 SCA's per phone times 20 phones) is
quite excessive.
We have tried to get the client to come around to the idea of not using a
key system, but they just are too old school to change.
So which of the options mentioned would have the best key system
functionality?
On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 9:11 PM, Mark R Lindsey <lindsey at e-c-group.com>
wrote:
> Colton the OP used the term "fully supports Polycom VVX series of phones".
> Others have mentioned SCA. To me, fully supporting the modern Polycom
> phones means:
>
> -- Shared Call Appearance
>
> -- Busy Lamp Field (presence monitoring)
>
> -- DND synchronization (so the call server and phone agree)
>
> -- Call Forwarding synchronization
>
> -- Agent signin/signout for ACD
>
> -- N-Way Conferencing (ad-hoc conferencing managed on the phone but mixed
> on elsewhere)
>
> -- Call recording (activated on the phone but recorded on a server
> elsewhere)
>
>
> *>>> mark at ecg.co <mark at ecg.co> +1-229-316-0013 <%2B1-229-316-0013>
> http://ecg.co/lindsey <http://ecg.co/lindsey>*
>
> On Aug 18, 2014, at 18:11 , Adam Vocks <Adam.Vocks at cticomputers.com>
> wrote:
>
> Switchvox 5.8.5 supports VVX phones.
>
>
> http://www.digium.com/en/products/switchvox/support/switchvox-smb-585-relea…
>
> We have a 150 user installation of switchvox 5.8.5 and vvx-410 phones.
>
> Adam
>
> *From:* VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org
> <voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org>] *On Behalf Of *Colton Conor
> *Sent:* Monday, August 18, 2014 4:59 PM
> *To:* voiceops at voiceops.org
> *Subject:* [VoiceOps] Key System Using Polycom VVX
>
> Can anyone recommend an onsite IP PBX that fully supports the Polycom VVX
> series of phones? When I say support I mean auto configure, do firmware
> updates, etc...I know most all IP PBX's will at least be able to use the
> VVX as a SIP extension.
>
> The clients wants to emulate a key system. The IP PBX should support SIP
> trunks of course for connection to the PSTN. The client also wants the
> ability to use a local MoH source, paging, and other common key system
> features that hosted systems don't do very well.
>
> I was thinking switchvox, but they don't have phone feature packs for the
> VVX line only the older phones.
>
> Adtran has the 7060, but according to the latest release notes:
>
> ADTRAN branded VVX phones (model names ADTRAN VVX 300, ADTRAN VVX 310,
> ADTRAN
> VVX 400, ADTRAN VVX 410, ADTRAN VVX 500, and ADTRAN VVX 600) work with
> NetVanta
> 7000 series AOS release version R10.8.0 and beyond without requiring an
> additional license key purchase.
> The equivalent Polycom branded phones will not work with release R10.8..0.
> If you are currently using the
> equivalent Polycom branded phones with the NetVanta 7000 series, you will
> need to either remain on a
> pre-R10.8 release version or use the ADTRAN branded version of the VVX
> phones until a licensing
> mechanism can be added to allow the use of Polycom branded VVX models.
>
> Looks like that won't be a good option since the client already has
> regular Polycom VVX phones not the ones with Adtran's badge on them.
>
> Any recommendations?
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
>
Aug. 19, 2014
Broadsoft MoH
by colton.conor@gmail.com
I was talking with a friend about their broadsoft implementation, and they
mentioned that the had a client complaining about Broadsoft's music on
hold's features. Basically, the said you could only upload one music file
at a time, and it would only play the beginning of that file every time.
Plus you can only upload a .wav file, and broadsoft won't convert a .mp3 or
other audio file for you.
Sure enough I checked out Wholesalers implementation, and found the same
thing. Is this true for all Broadsoft installations? This seems like quite
a feature limitation for the most advanced softswitch out there.
Aug. 19, 2014
Key System Using Polycom VVX
by lindsey@e-c-group.com
Colton the OP used the term "fully supports Polycom VVX series of phones". Others have mentioned SCA. To me, fully supporting the modern Polycom phones means:
-- Shared Call Appearance
-- Busy Lamp Field (presence monitoring)
-- DND synchronization (so the call server and phone agree)
-- Call Forwarding synchronization
-- Agent signin/signout for ACD
-- N-Way Conferencing (ad-hoc conferencing managed on the phone but mixed on elsewhere)
-- Call recording (activated on the phone but recorded on a server elsewhere)
>>> mark at ecg.co +1-229-316-0013 http://ecg.co/lindsey
On Aug 18, 2014, at 18:11 , Adam Vocks <Adam.Vocks at cticomputers.com> wrote:
> Switchvox 5.8.5 supports VVX phones.
>
> http://www.digium.com/en/products/switchvox/support/switchvox-smb-585-relea…
>
> We have a 150 user installation of switchvox 5.8.5 and vvx-410 phones.
>
> Adam
>
> From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of Colton Conor
> Sent: Monday, August 18, 2014 4:59 PM
> To: voiceops at voiceops.org
> Subject: [VoiceOps] Key System Using Polycom VVX
>
> Can anyone recommend an onsite IP PBX that fully supports the Polycom VVX series of phones? When I say support I mean auto configure, do firmware updates, etc...I know most all IP PBX's will at least be able to use the VVX as a SIP extension.
>
> The clients wants to emulate a key system. The IP PBX should support SIP trunks of course for connection to the PSTN. The client also wants the ability to use a local MoH source, paging, and other common key system features that hosted systems don't do very well.
>
> I was thinking switchvox, but they don't have phone feature packs for the VVX line only the older phones.
>
> Adtran has the 7060, but according to the latest release notes:
>
> ADTRAN branded VVX phones (model names ADTRAN VVX 300, ADTRAN VVX 310, ADTRAN
> VVX 400, ADTRAN VVX 410, ADTRAN VVX 500, and ADTRAN VVX 600) work with NetVanta
> 7000 series AOS release version R10.8.0 and beyond without requiring an additional license key purchase.
> The equivalent Polycom branded phones will not work with release R10.8..0. If you are currently using the
> equivalent Polycom branded phones with the NetVanta 7000 series, you will need to either remain on a
> pre-R10.8 release version or use the ADTRAN branded version of the VVX phones until a licensing
> mechanism can be added to allow the use of Polycom branded VVX models.
>
> Looks like that won't be a good option since the client already has regular Polycom VVX phones not the ones with Adtran's badge on them.
>
> Any recommendations?
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
Aug. 19, 2014
Hackers Crash Clay Co. Phones ...
by jackson.tim@gmail.com
I think Ryan's point here is getting data on in-progress calls into it
instead of completed calls..
AFAIK CPM basically watches the real time call logs from the CFS, and only
knows about calls once they complete.
On Aug 18, 2014 6:04 PM, "Simon Dredge" <Simon.Dredge at metaswitch.com> wrote:
> Heya, Ryan - It's SAS-like - But proactive analysis rather than reactive
> analytics. It'll trigger immediately (in real-time) on an anomaly,
> informing the operator that action is required so they can take necessary
> action.
>
> Cheers,
>
>
> Simon.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ryan Delgrosso [mailto:ryandelgrosso at gmail.com]
> Sent: Monday, August 18, 2014 4:32 PM
> To: Simon Dredge
> Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org
> Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Hackers Crash Clay Co. Phones ...
>
> Simon,
> I think the gotcha with CPM in this scenario is its a great tool for
> determining "this has happened" but not so great for building a mitigation
> solution.
>
> Is CPM driven off of CDR's or off of the SAS datastream or some other
> source?
>
> If its CDR driven you will be blind to this problem because you wont be
> measuring calls that are rejected due to lack of capacity(no cdr cut).
> If its driven off of SAS data you will get the missed/incomplete call
> stats but at the cost of speed (multiple orders of magnitude more data than
> CDR's)
>
> It would be interesting to hear if this perhaps uses a different
> datasource. Perhaps there is a facility in perimeta that informs this
> better than CFS data sources.
>
> -Ryan
>
> On 8/18/2014 3:36 PM, Simon Dredge wrote:
> > I know many meta-users like the new-ish call pattern monitor. It uses
> weighted profiling benchmarking algos similar to NBAD:
> >
> > http://www.metaswitch.com/sites/default/files/Metaswitch-Call-Pattern-
> > Monitor.pdf
> >
> > Cheers,
> >
> >
> > Simon.
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of
> > Ryan Delgrosso
> > Sent: Monday, August 18, 2014 1:53 PM
> > To: ECG - Mark Lindsey
> > Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org
> > Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Hackers Crash Clay Co. Phones ...
> >
> > I dunno that's a slippery slope. Im not a proponent of putting
> management of your network services into someone elses hands, especially
> things like this where the service provider should have visibility into
> what they are or are not admitting.
> >
> > Agreed on your synopsis of call admission control, the border should be
> able to make these decisions rapidly, freeing up softswitch resources to
> actually serve customers.
> >
> > This sounds like good territory for an acme SPL plugin, possibly in
> > conjunction with this enum extension
> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kaplan-enum-source-uri-00
> unfortunately i dont see a clear path for this in the TDM world but my
> exposure there is limited. It would seem like a good solution might be
> using ENUM (with source URI) to build statistics centrally based on
> calling/called numbers and then forcing the ENUM response once thresholds
> are hit to illicit an appropriate decline message for flagged invites with
> a retry-after interval allowing you to effectively throttle specific call
> scenarios assuming your origination carriers will behave correctly.
> >
> > 2 of the examples we discussed previously were:
> >
> > 1: Social media death star. Justin biebers (or anyone else with millions
> of rabid followers) twitter account (53.7M followers) gets hacked and
> attacker tweets "Call this number for free tickets" or similar.
> >
> > 2: T-DOS using stolen sip accounts effectively turning other service
> providers into a death star. More damage per source number (higher CPS than
> social media per attacker but less distributed source). This one seems much
> easier to create given the ease with which stolen sip accounts can be
> acquired, and harder to mitigate if the stolen accounts support callerID
> spoofing.
> >
> > Both of these situations are exacerbated by LCR resellers creating at
> times 10-20 invites from 1 due to route advancing when the destination is
> truly congested, which gets worse when the LCR resellers in turn have
> resellers in route etc etc.
> >
> > Of course any solution needs to have provisions for conveying congestion
> control to the originating network so they stop route advancing.
> >
> >
> > I think this has commercial viability for access providers protecting
> > their customers business interests and for implementers designing
> > solutions but perhaps not so much in a carrier to carrier capacity
> > (beyond appropriate support of signaling congestion control).
> >
> >
> > On 8/18/2014 12:48 PM, Mark R Lindsey wrote:
> >> Ryan, does it seem as though TDoS will be most effectively addressed by
> the origination companies? i.e., the guys with the TDM trunks to the local
> tandems, such as incumbents, Verizon, Level(3).
> >>
> >> It seems to me that some use of statistics could probably make
> reasonable guesses about whether a given PSTN origination call is likely to
> be legitimate (for a call from A to B). For example, I'll bet you could
> make a good start looking at numbers and geographic areas:
> >>
> >> -- Has telephone number A called to telephone number B before? Or
> B->A ?
> >>
> >> -- Has GeographicArea(A) called to telephone number B before? Or
> GeographicArea(B) -> A?
> >>
> >> The more you know about telephone numbers A and B, the more you could
> guess about the likelihood that a given call is legitimate.
> >>
> >> And getting good at this should be a competitive advantage, just as
> effective anti-spam is an advantage elsewhere. Vendors that build the edge
> gear -- in particular, the SBC and TDM SS7 gateway vendors -- should be
> leading the way.
> >>
> >> And wholesale carriers could take some advantage and make it broadly
> available. For example, let's say Verizon came along and said, "Here's a
> reason to port your numbers from Level(3) to us: When you're under attack,
> we're going to be smart about the ways we selectively admit calls to your
> network."
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>>>> mark at ecg.co +1-229-316-0013 http://ecg.co/lindsey
> >> On Aug 18, 2014, at 13:52 , Ryan Delgrosso <ryandelgrosso at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>
> >>> IP DDOS and TDOS are really two different problems but yes we as
> ITSP's and CLECs living in the IP space are absolutely susceptible to both.
> >>>
> >>> Ive done a fair amount of research into both of these topics and we
> have seen varying cases of both, but usually IP DDOS steals the spotlight
> because the numbers are bigger and the effects are usually more widespread
> whereas a TDOS attack is rarely felt by anyone that doesn't live in the
> affected region or isn't actively trying to call the victim, and usually
> telcos keep these issues pretty close to the chest.
> >>>
> >>> I expect this sort of attack is going to increase in magnitude in the
> coming 24-36 months as attackers figure out how to wield it. Mark Collier
> gave a very interesting talk at one of the CFCA events on this topic,
> though the focus was on the enterprise victim, but the lessons are really
> the same. There just arent really any good tools to mitigate this sort of
> attack today, especially at the carrier level.
> >>>
> >>> -Ryan
> >>>
> >>> On 8/18/2014 6:30 AM, Matt Yaklin wrote:
> >>>> It seems like almost every telephone company can be hit like that
> >>>> except the ?largest?...
> >>>>
> >>>> A denial of service attack by simply calling so many times it fills
> >>>> up their main trunks.
> >>>>
> >>>> And we saw how the large IP colo providers handle this for
> >>>> customers who get dos'd. The amount of bandwidth they have is
> >>>> staggering and they still cannot guarantee you will stay up if a
> >>>> ?skilled? attacker wants you down. So you keep throwing money at it
> >>>> until you are so well established online that you look at your
> >>>> monthly bill and want to puke.
> >>>>
> >>>> matt
> >>>>
> >>>> On Mon, 18 Aug 2014, Frank Bulk wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> http://www.wibw.com/home/headlines/Hackers-Behind-Phone-Outage-In-
> >>>>> Clay-County-271463051.html?ref=051
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Painful issue for Big River Telephone!
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Frank
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>> VoiceOps mailing list
> >>>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> >>>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> VoiceOps mailing list
> >>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> >>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> > _______________________________________________
> > VoiceOps mailing list
> > VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
Aug. 19, 2014
Hackers Crash Clay Co. Phones ...
by Simon.Dredge@metaswitch.com
Heya, Ryan - It's SAS-like - But proactive analysis rather than reactive analytics. It'll trigger immediately (in real-time) on an anomaly, informing the operator that action is required so they can take necessary action.
Cheers,
Simon.
-----Original Message-----
From: Ryan Delgrosso [mailto:ryandelgrosso at gmail.com]
Sent: Monday, August 18, 2014 4:32 PM
To: Simon Dredge
Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Hackers Crash Clay Co. Phones ...
Simon,
I think the gotcha with CPM in this scenario is its a great tool for determining "this has happened" but not so great for building a mitigation solution.
Is CPM driven off of CDR's or off of the SAS datastream or some other source?
If its CDR driven you will be blind to this problem because you wont be measuring calls that are rejected due to lack of capacity(no cdr cut).
If its driven off of SAS data you will get the missed/incomplete call stats but at the cost of speed (multiple orders of magnitude more data than CDR's)
It would be interesting to hear if this perhaps uses a different datasource. Perhaps there is a facility in perimeta that informs this better than CFS data sources.
-Ryan
On 8/18/2014 3:36 PM, Simon Dredge wrote:
> I know many meta-users like the new-ish call pattern monitor. It uses weighted profiling benchmarking algos similar to NBAD:
>
> http://www.metaswitch.com/sites/default/files/Metaswitch-Call-Pattern-
> Monitor.pdf
>
> Cheers,
>
>
> Simon.
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of
> Ryan Delgrosso
> Sent: Monday, August 18, 2014 1:53 PM
> To: ECG - Mark Lindsey
> Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org
> Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Hackers Crash Clay Co. Phones ...
>
> I dunno that's a slippery slope. Im not a proponent of putting management of your network services into someone elses hands, especially things like this where the service provider should have visibility into what they are or are not admitting.
>
> Agreed on your synopsis of call admission control, the border should be able to make these decisions rapidly, freeing up softswitch resources to actually serve customers.
>
> This sounds like good territory for an acme SPL plugin, possibly in
> conjunction with this enum extension
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kaplan-enum-source-uri-00 unfortunately i dont see a clear path for this in the TDM world but my exposure there is limited. It would seem like a good solution might be using ENUM (with source URI) to build statistics centrally based on calling/called numbers and then forcing the ENUM response once thresholds are hit to illicit an appropriate decline message for flagged invites with a retry-after interval allowing you to effectively throttle specific call scenarios assuming your origination carriers will behave correctly.
>
> 2 of the examples we discussed previously were:
>
> 1: Social media death star. Justin biebers (or anyone else with millions of rabid followers) twitter account (53.7M followers) gets hacked and attacker tweets "Call this number for free tickets" or similar.
>
> 2: T-DOS using stolen sip accounts effectively turning other service providers into a death star. More damage per source number (higher CPS than social media per attacker but less distributed source). This one seems much easier to create given the ease with which stolen sip accounts can be acquired, and harder to mitigate if the stolen accounts support callerID spoofing.
>
> Both of these situations are exacerbated by LCR resellers creating at times 10-20 invites from 1 due to route advancing when the destination is truly congested, which gets worse when the LCR resellers in turn have resellers in route etc etc.
>
> Of course any solution needs to have provisions for conveying congestion control to the originating network so they stop route advancing.
>
>
> I think this has commercial viability for access providers protecting
> their customers business interests and for implementers designing
> solutions but perhaps not so much in a carrier to carrier capacity
> (beyond appropriate support of signaling congestion control).
>
>
> On 8/18/2014 12:48 PM, Mark R Lindsey wrote:
>> Ryan, does it seem as though TDoS will be most effectively addressed by the origination companies? i.e., the guys with the TDM trunks to the local tandems, such as incumbents, Verizon, Level(3).
>>
>> It seems to me that some use of statistics could probably make reasonable guesses about whether a given PSTN origination call is likely to be legitimate (for a call from A to B). For example, I'll bet you could make a good start looking at numbers and geographic areas:
>>
>> -- Has telephone number A called to telephone number B before? Or B->A ?
>>
>> -- Has GeographicArea(A) called to telephone number B before? Or GeographicArea(B) -> A?
>>
>> The more you know about telephone numbers A and B, the more you could guess about the likelihood that a given call is legitimate.
>>
>> And getting good at this should be a competitive advantage, just as effective anti-spam is an advantage elsewhere. Vendors that build the edge gear -- in particular, the SBC and TDM SS7 gateway vendors -- should be leading the way.
>>
>> And wholesale carriers could take some advantage and make it broadly available. For example, let's say Verizon came along and said, "Here's a reason to port your numbers from Level(3) to us: When you're under attack, we're going to be smart about the ways we selectively admit calls to your network."
>>
>>
>>
>>>>> mark at ecg.co +1-229-316-0013 http://ecg.co/lindsey
>> On Aug 18, 2014, at 13:52 , Ryan Delgrosso <ryandelgrosso at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> IP DDOS and TDOS are really two different problems but yes we as ITSP's and CLECs living in the IP space are absolutely susceptible to both.
>>>
>>> Ive done a fair amount of research into both of these topics and we have seen varying cases of both, but usually IP DDOS steals the spotlight because the numbers are bigger and the effects are usually more widespread whereas a TDOS attack is rarely felt by anyone that doesn't live in the affected region or isn't actively trying to call the victim, and usually telcos keep these issues pretty close to the chest.
>>>
>>> I expect this sort of attack is going to increase in magnitude in the coming 24-36 months as attackers figure out how to wield it. Mark Collier gave a very interesting talk at one of the CFCA events on this topic, though the focus was on the enterprise victim, but the lessons are really the same. There just arent really any good tools to mitigate this sort of attack today, especially at the carrier level.
>>>
>>> -Ryan
>>>
>>> On 8/18/2014 6:30 AM, Matt Yaklin wrote:
>>>> It seems like almost every telephone company can be hit like that
>>>> except the ?largest?...
>>>>
>>>> A denial of service attack by simply calling so many times it fills
>>>> up their main trunks.
>>>>
>>>> And we saw how the large IP colo providers handle this for
>>>> customers who get dos'd. The amount of bandwidth they have is
>>>> staggering and they still cannot guarantee you will stay up if a
>>>> ?skilled? attacker wants you down. So you keep throwing money at it
>>>> until you are so well established online that you look at your
>>>> monthly bill and want to puke.
>>>>
>>>> matt
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, 18 Aug 2014, Frank Bulk wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> http://www.wibw.com/home/headlines/Hackers-Behind-Phone-Outage-In-
>>>>> Clay-County-271463051.html?ref=051
>>>>>
>>>>> Painful issue for Big River Telephone!
>>>>>
>>>>> Frank
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> VoiceOps mailing list
>>>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>>>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> VoiceOps mailing list
>>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
Aug. 19, 2014