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August 2014
- 50 participants
- 130 messages
Key System Using Polycom VVX
by ryandelgrosso@gmail.com
Yep that was a sip-b call flow.
sip-b (sip for business) was a series of call flows sylantro had
authored into an open standard to bridge the feature gap between sip and
key system / mgcp systems. It sort-of worked but never got industry
adoption. Pretty much useless now unless you happen to be doing hosted
PBX on a Synergy platform which i doubt many people are (we still have a
small number of legacy customers on our synergy platform).
-Ryan
On 8/18/2014 4:55 PM, Eric Wieling wrote:
>
> I get the impression from the thread below that Polycom has something
> special with "BroadSoft? Synergy (used to be Sylantro)". Stumbled
> across it a couple of years ago when I was trying to make Asterisk set
> the Polycom CF and DND screen indications. If they have done special
> support for CF and DND on Sylantro platform, maybe they have done
> something similar for key system types of features on that platform.
>
> http://community.polycom.com/t5/VoIP/ServerMissedCall/td-p/1334
>
> *From:*VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] *On Behalf Of
> *Colton Conor
> *Sent:* Monday, August 18, 2014 9:59 PM
> *To:* voiceops at voiceops.org
> *Subject:* [VoiceOps] Key System Using Polycom VVX
>
> Can anyone recommend an onsite IP PBX that fully supports the Polycom
> VVX series of phones? When I say support I mean auto configure, do
> firmware updates, etc...I know most all IP PBX's will at least be able
> to use the VVX as a SIP extension.
>
> The clients wants to emulate a key system. The IP PBX should support
> SIP trunks of course for connection to the PSTN. The client also wants
> the ability to use a local MoH source, paging, and other common key
> system features that hosted systems don't do very well.
>
> I was thinking switchvox, but they don't have phone feature packs for
> the VVX line only the older phones.
>
> Adtran has the 7060, but according to the latest release notes:
>
> ADTRAN branded VVX phones (model names ADTRAN VVX 300, ADTRAN VVX 310,
> ADTRAN
>
> VVX 400, ADTRAN VVX 410, ADTRAN VVX 500, and ADTRAN VVX 600) work with
> NetVanta
>
> 7000 series AOS release version R10.8.0 and beyond without requiring
> an additional license key purchase.
>
> The equivalent Polycom branded phones will not work with release
> R10.8.0. If you are currently using the
>
> equivalent Polycom branded phones with the NetVanta 7000 series, you
> will need to either remain on a
>
> pre-R10.8 release version or use the ADTRAN branded version of the VVX
> phones until a licensing
>
> mechanism can be added to allow the use of Polycom branded VVX models.
>
> Looks like that won't be a good option since the client already has
> regular Polycom VVX phones not the ones with Adtran's badge on them.
>
> Any recommendations?
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
Aug. 19, 2014
Key System Using Polycom VVX
by EWieling@nyigc.com
I get the impression from the thread below that Polycom has something special with ?BroadSoft? Synergy (used to be Sylantro)?. Stumbled across it a couple of years ago when I was trying to make Asterisk set the Polycom CF and DND screen indications. If they have done special support for CF and DND on Sylantro platform, maybe they have done something similar for key system types of features on that platform.
http://community.polycom.com/t5/VoIP/ServerMissedCall/td-p/1334
From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of Colton Conor
Sent: Monday, August 18, 2014 9:59 PM
To: voiceops at voiceops.org
Subject: [VoiceOps] Key System Using Polycom VVX
Can anyone recommend an onsite IP PBX that fully supports the Polycom VVX series of phones? When I say support I mean auto configure, do firmware updates, etc...I know most all IP PBX's will at least be able to use the VVX as a SIP extension.
The clients wants to emulate a key system. The IP PBX should support SIP trunks of course for connection to the PSTN. The client also wants the ability to use a local MoH source, paging, and other common key system features that hosted systems don't do very well.
I was thinking switchvox, but they don't have phone feature packs for the VVX line only the older phones.
Adtran has the 7060, but according to the latest release notes:
ADTRAN branded VVX phones (model names ADTRAN VVX 300, ADTRAN VVX 310, ADTRAN
VVX 400, ADTRAN VVX 410, ADTRAN VVX 500, and ADTRAN VVX 600) work with NetVanta
7000 series AOS release version R10.8.0 and beyond without requiring an additional license key purchase.
The equivalent Polycom branded phones will not work with release R10.8.0. If you are currently using the
equivalent Polycom branded phones with the NetVanta 7000 series, you will need to either remain on a
pre-R10.8 release version or use the ADTRAN branded version of the VVX phones until a licensing
mechanism can be added to allow the use of Polycom branded VVX models.
Looks like that won't be a good option since the client already has regular Polycom VVX phones not the ones with Adtran's badge on them.
Any recommendations?
Aug. 18, 2014
Hackers Crash Clay Co. Phones ...
by ryandelgrosso@gmail.com
Simon,
I think the gotcha with CPM in this scenario is its a great tool for
determining "this has happened" but not so great for building a
mitigation solution.
Is CPM driven off of CDR's or off of the SAS datastream or some other
source?
If its CDR driven you will be blind to this problem because you wont be
measuring calls that are rejected due to lack of capacity(no cdr cut).
If its driven off of SAS data you will get the missed/incomplete call
stats but at the cost of speed (multiple orders of magnitude more data
than CDR's)
It would be interesting to hear if this perhaps uses a different
datasource. Perhaps there is a facility in perimeta that informs this
better than CFS data sources.
-Ryan
On 8/18/2014 3:36 PM, Simon Dredge wrote:
> I know many meta-users like the new-ish call pattern monitor. It uses weighted profiling benchmarking algos similar to NBAD:
>
> http://www.metaswitch.com/sites/default/files/Metaswitch-Call-Pattern-Monit…
>
> Cheers,
>
>
> Simon.
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of Ryan Delgrosso
> Sent: Monday, August 18, 2014 1:53 PM
> To: ECG - Mark Lindsey
> Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org
> Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Hackers Crash Clay Co. Phones ...
>
> I dunno that's a slippery slope. Im not a proponent of putting management of your network services into someone elses hands, especially things like this where the service provider should have visibility into what they are or are not admitting.
>
> Agreed on your synopsis of call admission control, the border should be able to make these decisions rapidly, freeing up softswitch resources to actually serve customers.
>
> This sounds like good territory for an acme SPL plugin, possibly in conjunction with this enum extension
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kaplan-enum-source-uri-00 unfortunately i dont see a clear path for this in the TDM world but my exposure there is limited. It would seem like a good solution might be using ENUM (with source URI) to build statistics centrally based on calling/called numbers and then forcing the ENUM response once thresholds are hit to illicit an appropriate decline message for flagged invites with a retry-after interval allowing you to effectively throttle specific call scenarios assuming your origination carriers will behave correctly.
>
> 2 of the examples we discussed previously were:
>
> 1: Social media death star. Justin biebers (or anyone else with millions of rabid followers) twitter account (53.7M followers) gets hacked and attacker tweets "Call this number for free tickets" or similar.
>
> 2: T-DOS using stolen sip accounts effectively turning other service providers into a death star. More damage per source number (higher CPS than social media per attacker but less distributed source). This one seems much easier to create given the ease with which stolen sip accounts can be acquired, and harder to mitigate if the stolen accounts support callerID spoofing.
>
> Both of these situations are exacerbated by LCR resellers creating at times 10-20 invites from 1 due to route advancing when the destination is truly congested, which gets worse when the LCR resellers in turn have resellers in route etc etc.
>
> Of course any solution needs to have provisions for conveying congestion control to the originating network so they stop route advancing.
>
>
> I think this has commercial viability for access providers protecting
> their customers business interests and for implementers designing
> solutions but perhaps not so much in a carrier to carrier capacity
> (beyond appropriate support of signaling congestion control).
>
>
> On 8/18/2014 12:48 PM, Mark R Lindsey wrote:
>> Ryan, does it seem as though TDoS will be most effectively addressed by the origination companies? i.e., the guys with the TDM trunks to the local tandems, such as incumbents, Verizon, Level(3).
>>
>> It seems to me that some use of statistics could probably make reasonable guesses about whether a given PSTN origination call is likely to be legitimate (for a call from A to B). For example, I'll bet you could make a good start looking at numbers and geographic areas:
>>
>> -- Has telephone number A called to telephone number B before? Or B->A ?
>>
>> -- Has GeographicArea(A) called to telephone number B before? Or GeographicArea(B) -> A?
>>
>> The more you know about telephone numbers A and B, the more you could guess about the likelihood that a given call is legitimate.
>>
>> And getting good at this should be a competitive advantage, just as effective anti-spam is an advantage elsewhere. Vendors that build the edge gear -- in particular, the SBC and TDM SS7 gateway vendors -- should be leading the way.
>>
>> And wholesale carriers could take some advantage and make it broadly available. For example, let's say Verizon came along and said, "Here's a reason to port your numbers from Level(3) to us: When you're under attack, we're going to be smart about the ways we selectively admit calls to your network."
>>
>>
>>
>>>>> mark at ecg.co +1-229-316-0013 http://ecg.co/lindsey
>> On Aug 18, 2014, at 13:52 , Ryan Delgrosso <ryandelgrosso at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> IP DDOS and TDOS are really two different problems but yes we as ITSP's and CLECs living in the IP space are absolutely susceptible to both.
>>>
>>> Ive done a fair amount of research into both of these topics and we have seen varying cases of both, but usually IP DDOS steals the spotlight because the numbers are bigger and the effects are usually more widespread whereas a TDOS attack is rarely felt by anyone that doesn't live in the affected region or isn't actively trying to call the victim, and usually telcos keep these issues pretty close to the chest.
>>>
>>> I expect this sort of attack is going to increase in magnitude in the coming 24-36 months as attackers figure out how to wield it. Mark Collier gave a very interesting talk at one of the CFCA events on this topic, though the focus was on the enterprise victim, but the lessons are really the same. There just arent really any good tools to mitigate this sort of attack today, especially at the carrier level.
>>>
>>> -Ryan
>>>
>>> On 8/18/2014 6:30 AM, Matt Yaklin wrote:
>>>> It seems like almost every telephone company can be hit like that
>>>> except the ?largest?...
>>>>
>>>> A denial of service attack by simply calling so many times it
>>>> fills up their main trunks.
>>>>
>>>> And we saw how the large IP colo providers handle this for customers
>>>> who get dos'd. The amount of bandwidth they have is staggering and
>>>> they still cannot guarantee you will stay up if a ?skilled? attacker
>>>> wants you down. So you keep throwing money at it until you are
>>>> so well established online that you look at your monthly bill and
>>>> want to puke.
>>>>
>>>> matt
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, 18 Aug 2014, Frank Bulk wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> http://www.wibw.com/home/headlines/Hackers-Behind-Phone-Outage-In-Clay-Coun…
>>>>>
>>>>> Painful issue for Big River Telephone!
>>>>>
>>>>> Frank
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> VoiceOps mailing list
>>>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>>>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> VoiceOps mailing list
>>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
Aug. 18, 2014
Key System Using Polycom VVX
by nick.crocker@gmail.com
We have several hundred 500+ VVX provisioned on Netsapiens so far without
issue. Provisioning, firmware and config are all controlled by Netsapiens.
On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 4:58 PM, Colton Conor <colton.conor at gmail.com>
wrote:
> Can anyone recommend an onsite IP PBX that fully supports the Polycom VVX
> series of phones? When I say support I mean auto configure, do firmware
> updates, etc...I know most all IP PBX's will at least be able to use the
> VVX as a SIP extension.
>
> The clients wants to emulate a key system. The IP PBX should support SIP
> trunks of course for connection to the PSTN. The client also wants the
> ability to use a local MoH source, paging, and other common key system
> features that hosted systems don't do very well.
>
> I was thinking switchvox, but they don't have phone feature packs for the
> VVX line only the older phones.
>
> Adtran has the 7060, but according to the latest release notes:
>
> ADTRAN branded VVX phones (model names ADTRAN VVX 300, ADTRAN VVX 310,
> ADTRAN
> VVX 400, ADTRAN VVX 410, ADTRAN VVX 500, and ADTRAN VVX 600) work with
> NetVanta
> 7000 series AOS release version R10.8.0 and beyond without requiring an
> additional license key purchase.
> The equivalent Polycom branded phones will not work with release R10.8.0.
> If you are currently using the
> equivalent Polycom branded phones with the NetVanta 7000 series, you will
> need to either remain on a
> pre-R10.8 release version or use the ADTRAN branded version of the VVX
> phones until a licensing
> mechanism can be added to allow the use of Polycom branded VVX models.
>
> Looks like that won't be a good option since the client already has
> regular Polycom VVX phones not the ones with Adtran's badge on them.
>
> Any recommendations?
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
Aug. 18, 2014
Key System Using Polycom VVX
by jay@west.net
On 8/18/14, 2:58 PM, Colton Conor wrote:
> Can anyone recommend an onsite IP PBX that fully supports the Polycom
> VVX series of phones? When I say support I mean auto configure, do
> firmware updates, etc...I know most all IP PBX's will at least be able
> to use the VVX as a SIP extension.
> The clients wants to emulate a key system. The IP PBX should support SIP
> trunks of course for connection to the PSTN. The client also wants the
> ability to use a local MoH source, paging, and other common key system
> features that hosted systems don't do very well.
Adtran 7100 series should do it all just fine.
--
Jay Hennigan - CCIE #7880 - Network Engineering - jay at impulse.net
Impulse Internet Service - http://www.impulse.net/
Your local telephone and internet company - 805 884-6323 - WB6RDV
Aug. 18, 2014
Hackers Crash Clay Co. Phones ...
by Simon.Dredge@metaswitch.com
I know many meta-users like the new-ish call pattern monitor. It uses weighted profiling benchmarking algos similar to NBAD:
http://www.metaswitch.com/sites/default/files/Metaswitch-Call-Pattern-Monit…
Cheers,
Simon.
-----Original Message-----
From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of Ryan Delgrosso
Sent: Monday, August 18, 2014 1:53 PM
To: ECG - Mark Lindsey
Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Hackers Crash Clay Co. Phones ...
I dunno that's a slippery slope. Im not a proponent of putting management of your network services into someone elses hands, especially things like this where the service provider should have visibility into what they are or are not admitting.
Agreed on your synopsis of call admission control, the border should be able to make these decisions rapidly, freeing up softswitch resources to actually serve customers.
This sounds like good territory for an acme SPL plugin, possibly in conjunction with this enum extension
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kaplan-enum-source-uri-00 unfortunately i dont see a clear path for this in the TDM world but my exposure there is limited. It would seem like a good solution might be using ENUM (with source URI) to build statistics centrally based on calling/called numbers and then forcing the ENUM response once thresholds are hit to illicit an appropriate decline message for flagged invites with a retry-after interval allowing you to effectively throttle specific call scenarios assuming your origination carriers will behave correctly.
2 of the examples we discussed previously were:
1: Social media death star. Justin biebers (or anyone else with millions of rabid followers) twitter account (53.7M followers) gets hacked and attacker tweets "Call this number for free tickets" or similar.
2: T-DOS using stolen sip accounts effectively turning other service providers into a death star. More damage per source number (higher CPS than social media per attacker but less distributed source). This one seems much easier to create given the ease with which stolen sip accounts can be acquired, and harder to mitigate if the stolen accounts support callerID spoofing.
Both of these situations are exacerbated by LCR resellers creating at times 10-20 invites from 1 due to route advancing when the destination is truly congested, which gets worse when the LCR resellers in turn have resellers in route etc etc.
Of course any solution needs to have provisions for conveying congestion control to the originating network so they stop route advancing.
I think this has commercial viability for access providers protecting
their customers business interests and for implementers designing
solutions but perhaps not so much in a carrier to carrier capacity
(beyond appropriate support of signaling congestion control).
On 8/18/2014 12:48 PM, Mark R Lindsey wrote:
> Ryan, does it seem as though TDoS will be most effectively addressed by the origination companies? i.e., the guys with the TDM trunks to the local tandems, such as incumbents, Verizon, Level(3).
>
> It seems to me that some use of statistics could probably make reasonable guesses about whether a given PSTN origination call is likely to be legitimate (for a call from A to B). For example, I'll bet you could make a good start looking at numbers and geographic areas:
>
> -- Has telephone number A called to telephone number B before? Or B->A ?
>
> -- Has GeographicArea(A) called to telephone number B before? Or GeographicArea(B) -> A?
>
> The more you know about telephone numbers A and B, the more you could guess about the likelihood that a given call is legitimate.
>
> And getting good at this should be a competitive advantage, just as effective anti-spam is an advantage elsewhere. Vendors that build the edge gear -- in particular, the SBC and TDM SS7 gateway vendors -- should be leading the way.
>
> And wholesale carriers could take some advantage and make it broadly available. For example, let's say Verizon came along and said, "Here's a reason to port your numbers from Level(3) to us: When you're under attack, we're going to be smart about the ways we selectively admit calls to your network."
>
>
>
>>>> mark at ecg.co +1-229-316-0013 http://ecg.co/lindsey
> On Aug 18, 2014, at 13:52 , Ryan Delgrosso <ryandelgrosso at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> IP DDOS and TDOS are really two different problems but yes we as ITSP's and CLECs living in the IP space are absolutely susceptible to both.
>>
>> Ive done a fair amount of research into both of these topics and we have seen varying cases of both, but usually IP DDOS steals the spotlight because the numbers are bigger and the effects are usually more widespread whereas a TDOS attack is rarely felt by anyone that doesn't live in the affected region or isn't actively trying to call the victim, and usually telcos keep these issues pretty close to the chest.
>>
>> I expect this sort of attack is going to increase in magnitude in the coming 24-36 months as attackers figure out how to wield it. Mark Collier gave a very interesting talk at one of the CFCA events on this topic, though the focus was on the enterprise victim, but the lessons are really the same. There just arent really any good tools to mitigate this sort of attack today, especially at the carrier level.
>>
>> -Ryan
>>
>> On 8/18/2014 6:30 AM, Matt Yaklin wrote:
>>> It seems like almost every telephone company can be hit like that
>>> except the ?largest?...
>>>
>>> A denial of service attack by simply calling so many times it
>>> fills up their main trunks.
>>>
>>> And we saw how the large IP colo providers handle this for customers
>>> who get dos'd. The amount of bandwidth they have is staggering and
>>> they still cannot guarantee you will stay up if a ?skilled? attacker
>>> wants you down. So you keep throwing money at it until you are
>>> so well established online that you look at your monthly bill and
>>> want to puke.
>>>
>>> matt
>>>
>>> On Mon, 18 Aug 2014, Frank Bulk wrote:
>>>
>>>> http://www.wibw.com/home/headlines/Hackers-Behind-Phone-Outage-In-Clay-Coun…
>>>>
>>>> Painful issue for Big River Telephone!
>>>>
>>>> Frank
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> VoiceOps mailing list
>>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>> _______________________________________________
>> VoiceOps mailing list
>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
_______________________________________________
VoiceOps mailing list
VoiceOps at voiceops.org
https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
Aug. 18, 2014
Key System Using Polycom VVX
by twolf@unifiedtechnologies.com
Aastra/Mitel work well in a key mode emulation.. 9 line keys and support for SCA .. Thousands deployed and work great
Sent from my iPhone
Todd Wolf
President / COO
Unified Technologies
212 Canco Road
Portland, ME 04103
(207) 956-6402
On Aug 18, 2014, at 5:26 PM, "Joshua Elson" <joshelson at gmail.com<mailto:joshelson at gmail.com>> wrote:
SLA/SCA functionality, if that's what desired, on the VVX line is spotty at best and is not supported at all on Asterisk/Switchvox, at least not in the way your users will likely expect. At worst, it just simply doesn't work. Not to mention that the VVX phone performance has been... let's call it "questionable," to put it mildly. We've deployed many hundreds of them and we see pretty consistent complaints about laggy touchscreen performance and we get random reboots followed by core dumps from the phones on our provisioning infrastructure dozens of times every week. If you're looking for key system features and thinking of using the VVX expansions, they barely work (and ONLY on the latest 5.x software), and really don't work as advertised with provisioning.
If "true" SCA/SLA type functionality is a must, you're pretty much stuck with Linksys SPA, Snom, or legacy Polycom Soundpoint lines on a Broadsoft-based switch. Of course, there's almost no real need for the key system if people are willing to holistically look at how they use the phones, but that's a whole different batle...
Just my $.02.
Josh
On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 3:58 PM, Colton Conor <colton.conor at gmail.com<mailto:colton.conor at gmail.com>> wrote:
Can anyone recommend an onsite IP PBX that fully supports the Polycom VVX series of phones? When I say support I mean auto configure, do firmware updates, etc...I know most all IP PBX's will at least be able to use the VVX as a SIP extension.
The clients wants to emulate a key system. The IP PBX should support SIP trunks of course for connection to the PSTN. The client also wants the ability to use a local MoH source, paging, and other common key system features that hosted systems don't do very well.
I was thinking switchvox, but they don't have phone feature packs for the VVX line only the older phones.
Adtran has the 7060, but according to the latest release notes:
ADTRAN branded VVX phones (model names ADTRAN VVX 300, ADTRAN VVX 310, ADTRAN
VVX 400, ADTRAN VVX 410, ADTRAN VVX 500, and ADTRAN VVX 600) work with NetVanta
7000 series AOS release version R10.8.0 and beyond without requiring an additional license key purchase.
The equivalent Polycom branded phones will not work with release R10.8.0. If you are currently using the
equivalent Polycom branded phones with the NetVanta 7000 series, you will need to either remain on a
pre-R10.8 release version or use the ADTRAN branded version of the VVX phones until a licensing
mechanism can be added to allow the use of Polycom branded VVX models.
Looks like that won't be a good option since the client already has regular Polycom VVX phones not the ones with Adtran's badge on them.
Any recommendations?
_______________________________________________
VoiceOps mailing list
VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
_______________________________________________
VoiceOps mailing list
VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
Aug. 18, 2014
Key System Using Polycom VVX
by joshelson@gmail.com
SLA/SCA functionality, if that's what desired, on the VVX line is spotty at
best and is not supported at all on Asterisk/Switchvox, at least not in the
way your users will likely expect. At worst, it just simply doesn't work.
Not to mention that the VVX phone performance has been... let's call it
"questionable," to put it mildly. We've deployed many hundreds of them and
we see pretty consistent complaints about laggy touchscreen performance and
we get random reboots followed by core dumps from the phones on our
provisioning infrastructure dozens of times every week. If you're looking
for key system features and thinking of using the VVX expansions, they
barely work (and ONLY on the latest 5.x software), and really don't work as
advertised with provisioning.
If "true" SCA/SLA type functionality is a must, you're pretty much stuck
with Linksys SPA, Snom, or legacy Polycom Soundpoint lines on a
Broadsoft-based switch. Of course, there's almost no real need for the key
system if people are willing to holistically look at how they use the
phones, but that's a whole different batle...
Just my $.02.
Josh
On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 3:58 PM, Colton Conor <colton.conor at gmail.com>
wrote:
> Can anyone recommend an onsite IP PBX that fully supports the Polycom VVX
> series of phones? When I say support I mean auto configure, do firmware
> updates, etc...I know most all IP PBX's will at least be able to use the
> VVX as a SIP extension.
>
> The clients wants to emulate a key system. The IP PBX should support SIP
> trunks of course for connection to the PSTN. The client also wants the
> ability to use a local MoH source, paging, and other common key system
> features that hosted systems don't do very well.
>
> I was thinking switchvox, but they don't have phone feature packs for the
> VVX line only the older phones.
>
> Adtran has the 7060, but according to the latest release notes:
>
> ADTRAN branded VVX phones (model names ADTRAN VVX 300, ADTRAN VVX 310,
> ADTRAN
> VVX 400, ADTRAN VVX 410, ADTRAN VVX 500, and ADTRAN VVX 600) work with
> NetVanta
> 7000 series AOS release version R10.8.0 and beyond without requiring an
> additional license key purchase.
> The equivalent Polycom branded phones will not work with release R10.8.0.
> If you are currently using the
> equivalent Polycom branded phones with the NetVanta 7000 series, you will
> need to either remain on a
> pre-R10.8 release version or use the ADTRAN branded version of the VVX
> phones until a licensing
> mechanism can be added to allow the use of Polycom branded VVX models.
>
> Looks like that won't be a good option since the client already has
> regular Polycom VVX phones not the ones with Adtran's badge on them.
>
> Any recommendations?
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
Aug. 18, 2014
Hackers Crash Clay Co. Phones ...
by jim.gast@tdstelecom.com
Hi, Team -
Mathematically, an interesting algorithm to apply here would be a Bloom Filter, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bloom_filter. The concept is that each call is hashed 3 ways. Let's just assume there are 32,000,000 bits that start out as 0. Concatenate the FROM and TO E.164 addresses. Then hash that string 3 ways (yielding 3 numbers, X(c1), Y(c1), Z(c1)). To record the fact that call c1 has happened, we light bits X(c1), Y(c1), and Z(c1). If, later on, an incoming call, c(n), hashes and receives false from (X(cn) AND Y(cn) AND Z(cn)), then call cn is definitely a call that has not been seen before. (If it had been a repeat, all three of those bits would be lit!) There is a chance that a TRUE will result from bad luck . . . but we can compute the chance of a false positive and accept that "risk". (If 10% of the bits in the Bloom Filter have been lit, there is a 0.1 * 0.1 * 0.1 = 0.001 chance of mistakenly thinking .)
The algorithm requires only 32,000,000 bits of RAM.
Over time, the Bloom Filter will begin to fill up. When the Bloom Filter becomes close to full (let's say 3,000,000 bits lit or after some arbitrary amount of time), simply zero out all of the bits and start all over.
So . . . keep statistics on the ratio of recognized calls versus unrecognized calls over a given time period. If there are wildly too many recognized calls, you might have a small set of numbers flooding (TDoS) a small set of numbers. If there are wildly too few recognized calls, you might have a spoofer pretending to be a large number of different (fake) FROM numbers.
I just wanted to throw out a new algorithm because I know you guys will like to read about it in wikipedia,
/ Jim
-----Original Message-----
From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of Ryan Delgrosso
Sent: Monday, August 18, 2014 3:53 PM
To: Mark R Lindsey
Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Hackers Crash Clay Co. Phones ...
I dunno that's a slippery slope. Im not a proponent of putting management of your network services into someone elses hands, especially things like this where the service provider should have visibility into what they are or are not admitting.
Agreed on your synopsis of call admission control, the border should be able to make these decisions rapidly, freeing up softswitch resources to actually serve customers.
This sounds like good territory for an acme SPL plugin, possibly in conjunction with this enum extension
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kaplan-enum-source-uri-00 unfortunately i dont see a clear path for this in the TDM world but my exposure there is limited. It would seem like a good solution might be using ENUM (with source URI) to build statistics centrally based on calling/called numbers and then forcing the ENUM response once thresholds are hit to illicit an appropriate decline message for flagged invites with a retry-after interval allowing you to effectively throttle specific call scenarios assuming your origination carriers will behave correctly.
2 of the examples we discussed previously were:
1: Social media death star. Justin biebers (or anyone else with millions of rabid followers) twitter account (53.7M followers) gets hacked and attacker tweets "Call this number for free tickets" or similar.
2: T-DOS using stolen sip accounts effectively turning other service providers into a death star. More damage per source number (higher CPS than social media per attacker but less distributed source). This one seems much easier to create given the ease with which stolen sip accounts can be acquired, and harder to mitigate if the stolen accounts support callerID spoofing.
Both of these situations are exacerbated by LCR resellers creating at times 10-20 invites from 1 due to route advancing when the destination is truly congested, which gets worse when the LCR resellers in turn have resellers in route etc etc.
Of course any solution needs to have provisions for conveying congestion control to the originating network so they stop route advancing.
I think this has commercial viability for access providers protecting
their customers business interests and for implementers designing
solutions but perhaps not so much in a carrier to carrier capacity
(beyond appropriate support of signaling congestion control).
On 8/18/2014 12:48 PM, Mark R Lindsey wrote:
> Ryan, does it seem as though TDoS will be most effectively addressed by the origination companies? i.e., the guys with the TDM trunks to the local tandems, such as incumbents, Verizon, Level(3).
>
> It seems to me that some use of statistics could probably make reasonable guesses about whether a given PSTN origination call is likely to be legitimate (for a call from A to B). For example, I'll bet you could make a good start looking at numbers and geographic areas:
>
> -- Has telephone number A called to telephone number B before? Or B->A ?
>
> -- Has GeographicArea(A) called to telephone number B before? Or GeographicArea(B) -> A?
>
> The more you know about telephone numbers A and B, the more you could guess about the likelihood that a given call is legitimate.
>
> And getting good at this should be a competitive advantage, just as effective anti-spam is an advantage elsewhere. Vendors that build the edge gear -- in particular, the SBC and TDM SS7 gateway vendors -- should be leading the way.
>
> And wholesale carriers could take some advantage and make it broadly available. For example, let's say Verizon came along and said, "Here's a reason to port your numbers from Level(3) to us: When you're under attack, we're going to be smart about the ways we selectively admit calls to your network."
>
>
>
>>>> mark at ecg.co +1-229-316-0013 http://ecg.co/lindsey
> On Aug 18, 2014, at 13:52 , Ryan Delgrosso <ryandelgrosso at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> IP DDOS and TDOS are really two different problems but yes we as ITSP's and CLECs living in the IP space are absolutely susceptible to both.
>>
>> Ive done a fair amount of research into both of these topics and we have seen varying cases of both, but usually IP DDOS steals the spotlight because the numbers are bigger and the effects are usually more widespread whereas a TDOS attack is rarely felt by anyone that doesn't live in the affected region or isn't actively trying to call the victim, and usually telcos keep these issues pretty close to the chest.
>>
>> I expect this sort of attack is going to increase in magnitude in the coming 24-36 months as attackers figure out how to wield it. Mark Collier gave a very interesting talk at one of the CFCA events on this topic, though the focus was on the enterprise victim, but the lessons are really the same. There just arent really any good tools to mitigate this sort of attack today, especially at the carrier level.
>>
>> -Ryan
>>
>> On 8/18/2014 6:30 AM, Matt Yaklin wrote:
>>> It seems like almost every telephone company can be hit like that
>>> except the ?largest?...
>>>
>>> A denial of service attack by simply calling so many times it
>>> fills up their main trunks.
>>>
>>> And we saw how the large IP colo providers handle this for customers
>>> who get dos'd. The amount of bandwidth they have is staggering and
>>> they still cannot guarantee you will stay up if a ?skilled? attacker
>>> wants you down. So you keep throwing money at it until you are
>>> so well established online that you look at your monthly bill and
>>> want to puke.
>>>
>>> matt
>>>
>>> On Mon, 18 Aug 2014, Frank Bulk wrote:
>>>
>>>> http://www.wibw.com/home/headlines/Hackers-Behind-Phone-Outage-In-Clay-Coun…
>>>>
>>>> Painful issue for Big River Telephone!
>>>>
>>>> Frank
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> VoiceOps mailing list
>>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>> _______________________________________________
>> VoiceOps mailing list
>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
_______________________________________________
VoiceOps mailing list
VoiceOps at voiceops.org
https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
Aug. 18, 2014
Key System Using Polycom VVX
by Adam.Vocks@cticomputers.com
Switchvox 5.8.5 supports VVX phones.
http://www.digium.com/en/products/switchvox/support/switchvox-smb-585-relea…
We have a 150 user installation of switchvox 5.8.5 and vvx-410 phones.
Adam
From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of Colton Conor
Sent: Monday, August 18, 2014 4:59 PM
To: voiceops at voiceops.org
Subject: [VoiceOps] Key System Using Polycom VVX
Can anyone recommend an onsite IP PBX that fully supports the Polycom VVX series of phones? When I say support I mean auto configure, do firmware updates, etc...I know most all IP PBX's will at least be able to use the VVX as a SIP extension.
The clients wants to emulate a key system. The IP PBX should support SIP trunks of course for connection to the PSTN. The client also wants the ability to use a local MoH source, paging, and other common key system features that hosted systems don't do very well.
I was thinking switchvox, but they don't have phone feature packs for the VVX line only the older phones.
Adtran has the 7060, but according to the latest release notes:
ADTRAN branded VVX phones (model names ADTRAN VVX 300, ADTRAN VVX 310, ADTRAN
VVX 400, ADTRAN VVX 410, ADTRAN VVX 500, and ADTRAN VVX 600) work with NetVanta
7000 series AOS release version R10.8.0 and beyond without requiring an additional license key purchase.
The equivalent Polycom branded phones will not work with release R10.8..0. If you are currently using the
equivalent Polycom branded phones with the NetVanta 7000 series, you will need to either remain on a
pre-R10.8 release version or use the ADTRAN branded version of the VVX phones until a licensing
mechanism can be added to allow the use of Polycom branded VVX models.
Looks like that won't be a good option since the client already has regular Polycom VVX phones not the ones with Adtran's badge on them.
Any recommendations?
Aug. 18, 2014