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April 2016
- 51 participants
- 128 messages
FCC grant writing.
by clecny@gmail.com
I apologize in advance if you find this off topic.
I am looking for some consultant who can help with grant writing for
broadband initiative program from US Govt. any referrals?
Thanks in advance.
April 27, 2016
SS7
by marylou@backuptelecom.com
I am by no means an expert on who offers what and at what price. Just sharing my
experience as a consultant who helps carriers get their networks turned up. If
you have a list of smaller SS7 providers that are not re-sellers of the big ones
I would love to get a list from you! Having as many options to give out as
possible is always a good thing!
Mary Lou Carey
BackUP Telecom Consulting
Marylou at backuptelecom.com
Office: 615-791-9969
Cell: 615-796-1111
> On April 24, 2016 at 7:43 AM Jay Patel <clecny at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> This is not 100% accurate, there are other small STP operators who can offer
> you cheaper option ( < $500/month price point) for Sigtran connectivity. Feel
> free to contact me off list.
>
> On Sat, Apr 23, 2016 at 2:59 PM, Mary Lou Carey <marylou at backuptelecom.com
> <mailto:marylou at backuptelecom.com> > wrote:
> > > There are really only two large companies that will do SS7 via
> > > SigTran and they are Syniverse and Neustar (formerly TNSi / Verisign /
> > > Illuminet), They don't really like to give out their pricing publicly
> > > so you have to sign an NDA to get it, but I would budget about $1,000
> > > per month to be safe. You pay for each ISUP route as well so that price
> > > depends on how many routes you have.
> >
> > Are you asking which carriers provide SS7 links or which ones will do the
> > host switch product?
> >
> > Mary Lou Carey
> > BackUP Telecom Consulting
> > Marylou at backuptelecom.com <mailto:Marylou at backuptelecom.com>
> > Office: 615-791-9969
> > Cell: 615-796-1111
> >
> >
> > > > > On April 23, 2016 at 1:21 PM Erik Flournoy <erik at eespro.com
> > > > > <mailto:erik at eespro.com> > wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > Hey since we're on this topic what's the average cost for SigTran and
> > > who would you guys recommend? Who actually has SS7 and would be interested
> > > in interconnecting.
> > >
> > > On Apr 23, 2016 7:21 AM, "Kidd Filby" <kiddfilby at gmail.com
> > > <mailto:kiddfilby at gmail.com> > wrote:
> > > > > > > ABSOLUTELY!!!!
> > > >
> > > > On Sat, Apr 23, 2016 at 9:28 AM, Hiers, David <David.Hiers at cdk.com
> > > > <mailto:David.Hiers at cdk.com> > wrote:
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > People tend forget the existence and benefit of physical and
> > > > > administrative security controls until they disable them. Sure, they
> > > > > are an expensive speedbump at times, but you can?t hack what you can?t
> > > > > touch.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > David
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org
> > > > > <mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org> ] On Behalf Of Mike Ray, MBA,
> > > > > CNE, CTE
> > > > > Sent: Friday, April 22, 2016 11:28
> > > > > To: voiceops at voiceops.org <mailto:voiceops at voiceops.org>
> > > > > Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] SS7
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > It seems to me that this SS7 vulnerability issue is just the
> > > > > latest result of all of the de-regulation that?s been going on for the
> > > > > past? two decades or so. There was a time that you could not buy
> > > > > commercial access to the SS7 network; to get that access you had to be
> > > > > a real carrier. Also, back at that time, inter-company SS7 signalling
> > > > > could only occur on established, ordered signaling routes where both
> > > > > parties placed an order to open the route between them. Therefore,
> > > > > this would not have been possible back then because the carrier would
> > > > > not have ordered a route to the hacker?s point code(s) and it
> > > > > therefore would not exist.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > If I am a US local carrier in 2001, I have no need to order a
> > > > > signaling route to a German carrier either so even the hacker having
> > > > > full access to a German carrier?s network would not compromise my
> > > > > network. (in response to the nation-state issue) To get a call to
> > > > > Germany, I signal to the access tandem or IXC switch I?ve chosen to
> > > > > interconnect with in the US and that switch signals upstream, etc.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > If we were not on this path of de-regulation where whatever
> > > > > makes commercial sense for one company can open up the whole SS7
> > > > > network to un-trusted parties, we likely wouldn?t be here. At some
> > > > > point, a decision was made somewhere to allow this loosy-goosy
> > > > > inter-company signaling over the SS7 network between two point codes
> > > > > that would not, under the original implementation of SS7, be able to
> > > > > talk to each other in the first place.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > If the drumbeat of ?solve everything with IP!? continues, I
> > > > > hope that at least it gets solved by establishing something close to
> > > > > what the VPF was supposed to be, and not just a general dumping of all
> > > > > voice traffic across the internet between carriers. That certainly
> > > > > wouldn?t bode well for reliability or security.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Mike
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
> > > > >
> > > > > Astro Companies, LLC
> > > > >
> > > > > 11523 Palm Brush Trail #401
> > > > >
> > > > > Lakewood Ranch, FL 34202
> > > > >
> > > > > DIRECT: call or text 941 600-0207
> > > > >
> > > > > http://www.astrocompanies.com
> > > > > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.astrocompanies.com&…>
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On
> > > > > Behalf Of Dan York
> > > > > Sent: Thursday, April 21, 2016 3:45 PM
> > > > > To: Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com
> > > > > <mailto:kiddfilby at gmail.com> >
> > > > > Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org <mailto:voiceops at voiceops.org>
> > > > > Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] SS7
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > This is generally true if the calls are *unencrypted* on
> > > > > VoIP...
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 2:20 PM, Kidd Filby
> > > > > <kiddfilby at gmail.com <mailto:kiddfilby at gmail.com> > wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Also folks, don't forget, the same outcome of recording
> > > > > > someone's call is MUCH easier to accomplish once it is VoIP. IMHO,
> > > > > > of course. ;-)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > ... BUT... what's fascinating is the recent rise in end-to-end
> > > > > (e2e) encryption among IP-based communications platforms that include
> > > > > voice.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > WhatsApp, for instance, just completed the rollout of e2e
> > > > > encryption on April 5, and not just for messaging, but also for voice
> > > > > and video calls as well as file transfers (
> > > > > https://blog.whatsapp.com/10000618/end-to-end-encryption
> > > > > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__blog.whatsapp.com_1000…>
> > > > > ). Just yesterday the team behind Viber announced that they will soon
> > > > > have e2e encryption for all clients. The app Wire ( http://wire.com
> > > > > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__wire.com&d=CwMFaQ&c=N13…>
> > > > > ) also does e2e encryption for voice, video and group chats.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > In a US Congress hearing this week, a Congressman asked a Dept
> > > > > of Homeland Security representative if e2e encryption available in
> > > > > apps would have prevented this interception that happened via SS7. The
> > > > > DHS answer was that it would mitigate the interception of the content,
> > > > > although the location meta-data would still be available. (You can
> > > > > view the exchange via the link in this tweet:
> > > > > https://twitter.com/csoghoian/status/722854012567969794
> > > > > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__twitter.com_csoghoian_…>
> > > > > )
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > The end result is that we're definitely moving to a space
> > > > > where the communication over IP-based solutions will wind up being far
> > > > > more secure than what we had before.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Interesting times,
> > > > >
> > > > > Dan
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > --
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Dan York
> > > > >
> > > > > dyork at lodestar2.com <mailto:dyork at lodestar2.com>
> > > > > +1-802-735-1624 Skype:danyork
> > > > >
> > > > > My writing -> http://www.danyork.me/
> > > > > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.danyork.me_&d=CwMFa…>
> > > > >
> > > > > http://www.danyork.com/
> > > > > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.danyork.com_&d=CwMF…>
> > > > >
> > > > > http://twitter.com/danyork
> > > > > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_danyork&d=C…>
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > ---------------------------------------------
> > > > > This message and any attachments are intended only for the use
> > > > > of the addressee and may contain information that is privileged and
> > > > > confidential. If the reader of the message is not the intended
> > > > > recipient or an authorized representative of the intended recipient,
> > > > > you are hereby notified that any dissemination of this communication
> > > > > is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in
> > > > > error, notify the sender immediately by return email and delete the
> > > > > message and any attachments from your system.
> > > > >
> > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > VoiceOps mailing list
> > > > > VoiceOps at voiceops.org <mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
> > > > > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> > > > > > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > > Kidd Filby
> > > > 661.557.5640 (C)
> > > > http://www.linkedin.com/in/kiddfilby
> > > >
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > VoiceOps mailing list
> > > > VoiceOps at voiceops.org <mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
> > > > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> > > > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > VoiceOps mailing list
> > > VoiceOps at voiceops.org <mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
> > > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> > >
> > > > >
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > VoiceOps mailing list
> > VoiceOps at voiceops.org <mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
> > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> > >
April 25, 2016
Open source roaming server -stp gateway
by alhakeem@gmail.com
Hello,
Does anyone have a link for an open source roaming server ?.
Cheers,
AH
April 24, 2016
SS7
by clecny@gmail.com
This is not 100% accurate, there are other small STP operators who can
offer you cheaper option ( < $500/month price point) for Sigtran
connectivity. Feel free to contact me off list.
On Sat, Apr 23, 2016 at 2:59 PM, Mary Lou Carey <marylou at backuptelecom.com>
wrote:
> There are really only two large companies that will do SS7 via SigTran and
> they are Syniverse and Neustar (formerly TNSi / Verisign / Illuminet), They
> don't really like to give out their pricing publicly so you have to sign an
> NDA to get it, but I would budget about $1,000 per month to be safe. You
> pay for each ISUP route as well so that price depends on how many routes
> you have.
>
> Are you asking which carriers provide SS7 links or which ones will do the
> host switch product?
>
> Mary Lou Carey
> BackUP Telecom Consulting
> Marylou at backuptelecom.com
> Office: 615-791-9969
> Cell: 615-796-1111
>
>
> On April 23, 2016 at 1:21 PM Erik Flournoy <erik at eespro.com> wrote:
>
> Hey since we're on this topic what's the average cost for SigTran and who
> would you guys recommend? Who actually has SS7 and would be interested in
> interconnecting.
> On Apr 23, 2016 7:21 AM, "Kidd Filby" <kiddfilby at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> ABSOLUTELY!!!!
>
> On Sat, Apr 23, 2016 at 9:28 AM, Hiers, David <David.Hiers at cdk.com> wrote:
>
> People tend forget the existence and benefit of physical and
> administrative security controls until they disable them. Sure, they are
> an expensive speedbump at times, but you can?t hack what you can?t touch.
>
>
>
>
>
> David
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] *On Behalf Of *Mike
> Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
> *Sent:* Friday, April 22, 2016 11:28
> *To:* voiceops at voiceops.org
> *Subject:* Re: [VoiceOps] SS7
>
>
>
> It seems to me that this SS7 vulnerability issue is just the latest result
> of all of the de-regulation that?s been going on for the past? two decades
> or so. There was a time that you could not buy commercial access to the
> SS7 network; to get that access you had to be a real carrier. Also, back
> at that time, inter-company SS7 signalling could only occur on established,
> ordered signaling routes where both parties placed an order to open the
> route between them. Therefore, this would not have been possible back then
> because the carrier would not have ordered a route to the hacker?s point
> code(s) and it therefore would not exist.
>
>
>
> If I am a US local carrier in 2001, I have no need to order a signaling
> route to a German carrier either so even the hacker having full access to a
> German carrier?s network would not compromise my network. (in response to
> the nation-state issue) To get a call to Germany, I signal to the access
> tandem or IXC switch I?ve chosen to interconnect with in the US and that
> switch signals upstream, etc.
>
>
>
> If we were not on this path of de-regulation where whatever makes
> commercial sense for one company can open up the whole SS7 network to
> un-trusted parties, we likely wouldn?t be here. At some point, a decision
> was made somewhere to allow this loosy-goosy inter-company signaling over
> the SS7 network between two point codes that would not, under the original
> implementation of SS7, be able to talk to each other in the first place.
>
>
>
> If the drumbeat of ?solve everything with IP!? continues, I hope that at
> least it gets solved by establishing something close to what the VPF was
> supposed to be, and not just a general dumping of all voice traffic across
> the internet between carriers. That certainly wouldn?t bode well for
> reliability or security.
>
>
>
> Mike
>
>
>
> Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
>
> Astro Companies, LLC
>
> 11523 Palm Brush Trail #401
>
> Lakewood Ranch, FL 34202
>
> DIRECT: call or text 941 600-0207
>
> http://www.astrocompanies.com
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.astrocompanies.com&…>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org
> <voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org>] *On Behalf Of *Dan York
> *Sent:* Thursday, April 21, 2016 3:45 PM
> *To:* Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com>
> *Cc:* voiceops at voiceops.org
> *Subject:* Re: [VoiceOps] SS7
>
>
>
> This is generally true if the calls are *unencrypted* on VoIP...
>
>
>
> On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 2:20 PM, Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> Also folks, don't forget, the same outcome of recording someone's call is
> MUCH easier to accomplish once it is VoIP. IMHO, of course. ;-)
>
>
>
> ... BUT... what's fascinating is the recent rise in end-to-end (e2e)
> encryption among IP-based communications platforms that include voice.
>
>
>
> WhatsApp, for instance, just completed the rollout of e2e encryption on
> April 5, and not just for messaging, but also for voice and video calls as
> well as file transfers (
> https://blog.whatsapp.com/10000618/end-to-end-encryption
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__blog.whatsapp.com_1000…>
> ). Just yesterday the team behind Viber announced that they will soon have
> e2e encryption for all clients. The app Wire ( http://wire.com
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__wire.com&d=CwMFaQ&c=N13…>
> ) also does e2e encryption for voice, video and group chats.
>
>
>
> In a US Congress hearing this week, a Congressman asked a Dept of Homeland
> Security representative if e2e encryption available in apps would have
> prevented this interception that happened via SS7. The DHS answer was that
> it would mitigate the interception of the content, although the location
> meta-data would still be available. (You can view the exchange via the
> link in this tweet:
> https://twitter.com/csoghoian/status/722854012567969794
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__twitter.com_csoghoian_…>
> )
>
>
>
> The end result is that we're definitely moving to a space where the
> communication over IP-based solutions will wind up being far more secure
> than what we had before.
>
>
>
> Interesting times,
>
> Dan
>
>
>
> --
>
>
>
> Dan York
>
> dyork at lodestar2.com +1-802-735-1624 Skype:danyork
>
> My writing -> http://www.danyork.me/
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.danyork.me_&d=CwMFa…>
>
> http://www.danyork.com/
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.danyork.com_&d=CwMF…>
>
> http://twitter.com/danyork
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_danyork&d=C…>
> ------------------------------
> This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the
> addressee and may contain information that is privileged and confidential.
> If the reader of the message is not the intended recipient or an authorized
> representative of the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any
> dissemination of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have
> received this communication in error, notify the sender immediately by
> return email and delete the message and any attachments from your system.
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
>
>
> --
> Kidd Filby
> 661.557.5640 (C)
> http://www.linkedin.com/in/kiddfilby
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
April 24, 2016
SS7
by marylou@backuptelecom.com
You can get SS7 through any of the ILECs as well but there are two things to
remember with them.
1. They don't usually offer SigTran so in addition to the SS7 ports, you also
have to pay for the transport to the STPs.
2. They will usually only cover routes in their territory so if you go into
another LEC territory they will tell you that you need a second set of links for
those areas. Companies like Syniverse and Neustar are connected to pretty much
everyone and while some routes are off-net and cost more, they will only require
one set of SS7 links.
Mary Lou Carey
BackUP Telecom Consulting
Marylou at backuptelecom.com
Office: 615-791-9969
Cell: 615-796-1111
> On April 23, 2016 at 12:15 PM Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> It is now possible to do it. I'm not sure when it started but, I know
> PB/SBC/ATT in CA. offered me SS7 connectivity many years ago. I'm pretty sure
> all of the Baby Bells now offer the service. I am sure SNET does as well.
> Now the choice is up to you if you want them to see all of your PSTN-bound
> traffic. The technology still holds true that your SS7 provider is all or
> nothing. You can't have multiple SS7 providers yet.
>
> Kidd
>
> On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 7:28 PM, Christopher Aloi <ctaloi at gmail.com
> <mailto:ctaloi at gmail.com> > wrote:
> > > I didn't realize you can now connect to another company without
> > > ordering the route-set from a third party. How does this work ? I feel
> > > old !
> >
> > On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 2:40 PM Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com
> > <mailto:kiddfilby at gmail.com> > wrote:
> > > > > Very well said Mike.
> > >
> > > Back In The Day... Interconnection between 2 companies had to occur
> > > via a 3rd party, like Illuminet. Their had to be SS7 gateway providers
> > > and that's all they were allowed to do. Route SS7 traffic between
> > > LEC/ILEC/CLEC networks. Oh... do I remember the pains...
> > > Gateway-Screened... CNAM database corruption, LIDB services not
> > > provided.... Still makes my head hurt.
> > >
> > > Kidd
> > >
> > > On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 12:28 PM, Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
> > > <mike at astrocompanies.com <mailto:mike at astrocompanies.com> > wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > It seems to me that this SS7 vulnerability issue is just the
> > > > latest result of all of the de-regulation that?s been going on for the
> > > > past? two decades or so. There was a time that you could not buy
> > > > commercial access to the SS7 network; to get that access you had to be a
> > > > real carrier. Also, back at that time, inter-company SS7 signalling
> > > > could only occur on established, ordered signaling routes where both
> > > > parties placed an order to open the route between them. Therefore, this
> > > > would not have been possible back then because the carrier would not
> > > > have ordered a route to the hacker?s point code(s) and it therefore
> > > > would not exist.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > If I am a US local carrier in 2001, I have no need to order a
> > > > signaling route to a German carrier either so even the hacker having
> > > > full access to a German carrier?s network would not compromise my
> > > > network. (in response to the nation-state issue) To get a call to
> > > > Germany, I signal to the access tandem or IXC switch I?ve chosen to
> > > > interconnect with in the US and that switch signals upstream, etc.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > If we were not on this path of de-regulation where whatever makes
> > > > commercial sense for one company can open up the whole SS7 network to
> > > > un-trusted parties, we likely wouldn?t be here. At some point, a
> > > > decision was made somewhere to allow this loosy-goosy inter-company
> > > > signaling over the SS7 network between two point codes that would not,
> > > > under the original implementation of SS7, be able to talk to each other
> > > > in the first place.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > If the drumbeat of ?solve everything with IP!? continues, I hope
> > > > that at least it gets solved by establishing something close to what the
> > > > VPF was supposed to be, and not just a general dumping of all voice
> > > > traffic across the internet between carriers. That certainly wouldn?t
> > > > bode well for reliability or security.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Mike
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
> > > >
> > > > Astro Companies, LLC
> > > >
> > > > 11523 Palm Brush Trail #401
> > > >
> > > > Lakewood Ranch, FL 34202
> > > >
> > > > DIRECT: call or text 941 600-0207
> > > >
> > > > http://www.astrocompanies.com <http://www.astrocompanies.com>
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org
> > > > <mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org> ] On Behalf Of Dan York
> > > > Sent: Thursday, April 21, 2016 3:45 PM
> > > > To: Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com <mailto:kiddfilby at gmail.com>
> > > > >
> > > > Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org <mailto:voiceops at voiceops.org>
> > > > Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] SS7
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > This is generally true if the calls are *unencrypted* on VoIP...
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 2:20 PM, Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com
> > > > <mailto:kiddfilby at gmail.com> > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Also folks, don't forget, the same outcome of recording
> > > > > someone's call is MUCH easier to accomplish once it is VoIP. IMHO, of
> > > > > course. ;-)
> > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > ... BUT... what's fascinating is the recent rise in end-to-end
> > > > (e2e) encryption among IP-based communications platforms that include
> > > > voice.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > WhatsApp, for instance, just completed the rollout of e2e
> > > > encryption on April 5, and not just for messaging, but also for voice
> > > > and video calls as well as file transfers (
> > > > https://blog.whatsapp.com/10000618/end-to-end-encryption ). Just
> > > > yesterday the team behind Viber announced that they will soon have e2e
> > > > encryption for all clients. The app Wire ( http://wire.com ) also does
> > > > e2e encryption for voice, video and group chats.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > In a US Congress hearing this week, a Congressman asked a Dept of
> > > > Homeland Security representative if e2e encryption available in apps
> > > > would have prevented this interception that happened via SS7. The DHS
> > > > answer was that it would mitigate the interception of the content,
> > > > although the location meta-data would still be available. (You can view
> > > > the exchange via the link in this tweet:
> > > > https://twitter.com/csoghoian/status/722854012567969794 )
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > The end result is that we're definitely moving to a space where
> > > > the communication over IP-based solutions will wind up being far more
> > > > secure than what we had before.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Interesting times,
> > > >
> > > > Dan
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Dan York
> > > >
> > > > dyork at lodestar2.com <mailto:dyork at lodestar2.com>
> > > > +1-802-735-1624 Skype:danyork
> > > >
> > > > My writing -> http://www.danyork.me/
> > > >
> > > > http://www.danyork.com/ <http://www.danyork.com/>
> > > >
> > > > http://twitter.com/danyork <http://twitter.com/danyork>
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > VoiceOps mailing list
> > > > VoiceOps at voiceops.org <mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
> > > > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> > > > > > >
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > Kidd Filby
> > > 661.557.5640 (C)
> > > http://www.linkedin.com/in/kiddfilby
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > VoiceOps mailing list
> > > VoiceOps at voiceops.org <mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
> > > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> > > > > >
>
>
> --
> Kidd Filby
> 661.557.5640 (C)
> http://www.linkedin.com/in/kiddfilby
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
Mary Lou Carey
BackUP Telecom Consulting
Marylou at backuptelecom.com
Office: 615-791-9969
Cell: 615-796-1111
April 23, 2016
SS7
by marylou@backuptelecom.com
There are really only two large companies that will do SS7 via SigTran and they
are Syniverse and Neustar (formerly TNSi / Verisign / Illuminet), They don't
really like to give out their pricing publicly so you have to sign an NDA to get
it, but I would budget about $1,000 per month to be safe. You pay for each ISUP
route as well so that price depends on how many routes you have.
Are you asking which carriers provide SS7 links or which ones will do the host
switch product?
Mary Lou Carey
BackUP Telecom Consulting
Marylou at backuptelecom.com
Office: 615-791-9969
Cell: 615-796-1111
> On April 23, 2016 at 1:21 PM Erik Flournoy <erik at eespro.com> wrote:
>
>
> Hey since we're on this topic what's the average cost for SigTran and who
> would you guys recommend? Who actually has SS7 and would be interested in
> interconnecting.
>
> On Apr 23, 2016 7:21 AM, "Kidd Filby" <kiddfilby at gmail.com
> <mailto:kiddfilby at gmail.com> > wrote:
> > > ABSOLUTELY!!!!
> >
> > On Sat, Apr 23, 2016 at 9:28 AM, Hiers, David <David.Hiers at cdk.com
> > <mailto:David.Hiers at cdk.com> > wrote:
> > > > >
> > > People tend forget the existence and benefit of physical and
> > > administrative security controls until they disable them. Sure, they are
> > > an expensive speedbump at times, but you can?t hack what you can?t touch.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > David
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org
> > > <mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org> ] On Behalf Of Mike Ray, MBA, CNE,
> > > CTE
> > > Sent: Friday, April 22, 2016 11:28
> > > To: voiceops at voiceops.org <mailto:voiceops at voiceops.org>
> > > Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] SS7
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > It seems to me that this SS7 vulnerability issue is just the latest
> > > result of all of the de-regulation that?s been going on for the past? two
> > > decades or so. There was a time that you could not buy commercial access
> > > to the SS7 network; to get that access you had to be a real carrier.
> > > Also, back at that time, inter-company SS7 signalling could only occur on
> > > established, ordered signaling routes where both parties placed an order
> > > to open the route between them. Therefore, this would not have been
> > > possible back then because the carrier would not have ordered a route to
> > > the hacker?s point code(s) and it therefore would not exist.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > If I am a US local carrier in 2001, I have no need to order a
> > > signaling route to a German carrier either so even the hacker having full
> > > access to a German carrier?s network would not compromise my network. (in
> > > response to the nation-state issue) To get a call to Germany, I signal to
> > > the access tandem or IXC switch I?ve chosen to interconnect with in the US
> > > and that switch signals upstream, etc.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > If we were not on this path of de-regulation where whatever makes
> > > commercial sense for one company can open up the whole SS7 network to
> > > un-trusted parties, we likely wouldn?t be here. At some point, a decision
> > > was made somewhere to allow this loosy-goosy inter-company signaling over
> > > the SS7 network between two point codes that would not, under the original
> > > implementation of SS7, be able to talk to each other in the first place.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > If the drumbeat of ?solve everything with IP!? continues, I hope that
> > > at least it gets solved by establishing something close to what the VPF
> > > was supposed to be, and not just a general dumping of all voice traffic
> > > across the internet between carriers. That certainly wouldn?t bode well
> > > for reliability or security.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Mike
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
> > >
> > > Astro Companies, LLC
> > >
> > > 11523 Palm Brush Trail #401
> > >
> > > Lakewood Ranch, FL 34202
> > >
> > > DIRECT: call or text 941 600-0207
> > >
> > > http://www.astrocompanies.com
> > > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.astrocompanies.com&…>
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of
> > > Dan York
> > > Sent: Thursday, April 21, 2016 3:45 PM
> > > To: Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com <mailto:kiddfilby at gmail.com> >
> > > Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org <mailto:voiceops at voiceops.org>
> > > Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] SS7
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > This is generally true if the calls are *unencrypted* on VoIP...
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 2:20 PM, Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com
> > > <mailto:kiddfilby at gmail.com> > wrote:
> > >
> > > > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Also folks, don't forget, the same outcome of recording someone's
> > > > call is MUCH easier to accomplish once it is VoIP. IMHO, of course.
> > > > ;-)
> > > >
> > > > > > >
> > >
> > >
> > > ... BUT... what's fascinating is the recent rise in end-to-end (e2e)
> > > encryption among IP-based communications platforms that include voice.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > WhatsApp, for instance, just completed the rollout of e2e encryption
> > > on April 5, and not just for messaging, but also for voice and video calls
> > > as well as file transfers (
> > > https://blog.whatsapp.com/10000618/end-to-end-encryption
> > > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__blog.whatsapp.com_1000…>
> > > ). Just yesterday the team behind Viber announced that they will soon
> > > have e2e encryption for all clients. The app Wire ( http://wire.com
> > > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__wire.com&d=CwMFaQ&c=N13…>
> > > ) also does e2e encryption for voice, video and group chats.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > In a US Congress hearing this week, a Congressman asked a Dept of
> > > Homeland Security representative if e2e encryption available in apps would
> > > have prevented this interception that happened via SS7. The DHS answer was
> > > that it would mitigate the interception of the content, although the
> > > location meta-data would still be available. (You can view the exchange
> > > via the link in this tweet:
> > > https://twitter.com/csoghoian/status/722854012567969794
> > > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__twitter.com_csoghoian_…>
> > > )
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > The end result is that we're definitely moving to a space where the
> > > communication over IP-based solutions will wind up being far more secure
> > > than what we had before.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Interesting times,
> > >
> > > Dan
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Dan York
> > >
> > > dyork at lodestar2.com <mailto:dyork at lodestar2.com> +1-802-735-1624
> > > Skype:danyork
> > >
> > > My writing -> http://www.danyork.me/
> > > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.danyork.me_&d=CwMFa…>
> > >
> > > http://www.danyork.com/
> > > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.danyork.com_&d=CwMF…>
> > >
> > > http://twitter.com/danyork
> > > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_danyork&d=C…>
> > >
> > >
> > > ---------------------------------------------
> > > This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the
> > > addressee and may contain information that is privileged and confidential.
> > > If the reader of the message is not the intended recipient or an
> > > authorized representative of the intended recipient, you are hereby
> > > notified that any dissemination of this communication is strictly
> > > prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, notify the
> > > sender immediately by return email and delete the message and any
> > > attachments from your system.
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > VoiceOps mailing list
> > > VoiceOps at voiceops.org <mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
> > > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> > > > >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Kidd Filby
> > 661.557.5640 (C)
> > http://www.linkedin.com/in/kiddfilby
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > VoiceOps mailing list
> > VoiceOps at voiceops.org <mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
> > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> > > _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
April 23, 2016
SS7
by erik@eespro.com
Hey since we're on this topic what's the average cost for SigTran and who
would you guys recommend? Who actually has SS7 and would be interested in
interconnecting.
On Apr 23, 2016 7:21 AM, "Kidd Filby" <kiddfilby at gmail.com> wrote:
> ABSOLUTELY!!!!
>
> On Sat, Apr 23, 2016 at 9:28 AM, Hiers, David <David.Hiers at cdk.com> wrote:
>
>> People tend forget the existence and benefit of physical and
>> administrative security controls until they disable them. Sure, they are
>> an expensive speedbump at times, but you can?t hack what you can?t touch.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] *On Behalf Of *Mike
>> Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
>> *Sent:* Friday, April 22, 2016 11:28
>> *To:* voiceops at voiceops.org
>> *Subject:* Re: [VoiceOps] SS7
>>
>>
>>
>> It seems to me that this SS7 vulnerability issue is just the latest
>> result of all of the de-regulation that?s been going on for the past? two
>> decades or so. There was a time that you could not buy commercial access
>> to the SS7 network; to get that access you had to be a real carrier. Also,
>> back at that time, inter-company SS7 signalling could only occur on
>> established, ordered signaling routes where both parties placed an order to
>> open the route between them. Therefore, this would not have been possible
>> back then because the carrier would not have ordered a route to the
>> hacker?s point code(s) and it therefore would not exist.
>>
>>
>>
>> If I am a US local carrier in 2001, I have no need to order a signaling
>> route to a German carrier either so even the hacker having full access to a
>> German carrier?s network would not compromise my network. (in response to
>> the nation-state issue) To get a call to Germany, I signal to the access
>> tandem or IXC switch I?ve chosen to interconnect with in the US and that
>> switch signals upstream, etc.
>>
>>
>>
>> If we were not on this path of de-regulation where whatever makes
>> commercial sense for one company can open up the whole SS7 network to
>> un-trusted parties, we likely wouldn?t be here. At some point, a decision
>> was made somewhere to allow this loosy-goosy inter-company signaling over
>> the SS7 network between two point codes that would not, under the original
>> implementation of SS7, be able to talk to each other in the first place.
>>
>>
>>
>> If the drumbeat of ?solve everything with IP!? continues, I hope that at
>> least it gets solved by establishing something close to what the VPF was
>> supposed to be, and not just a general dumping of all voice traffic across
>> the internet between carriers. That certainly wouldn?t bode well for
>> reliability or security.
>>
>>
>>
>> Mike
>>
>>
>>
>> Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
>>
>> Astro Companies, LLC
>>
>> 11523 Palm Brush Trail #401
>>
>> Lakewood Ranch, FL 34202
>>
>> DIRECT: call or text 941 600-0207
>>
>> http://www.astrocompanies.com
>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.astrocompanies.com&…>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org
>> <voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org>] *On Behalf Of *Dan York
>> *Sent:* Thursday, April 21, 2016 3:45 PM
>> *To:* Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com>
>> *Cc:* voiceops at voiceops.org
>> *Subject:* Re: [VoiceOps] SS7
>>
>>
>>
>> This is generally true if the calls are *unencrypted* on VoIP...
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 2:20 PM, Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Also folks, don't forget, the same outcome of recording someone's call is
>> MUCH easier to accomplish once it is VoIP. IMHO, of course. ;-)
>>
>>
>>
>> ... BUT... what's fascinating is the recent rise in end-to-end (e2e)
>> encryption among IP-based communications platforms that include voice.
>>
>>
>>
>> WhatsApp, for instance, just completed the rollout of e2e encryption on
>> April 5, and not just for messaging, but also for voice and video calls as
>> well as file transfers (
>> https://blog.whatsapp.com/10000618/end-to-end-encryption
>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__blog.whatsapp.com_1000…>
>> ). Just yesterday the team behind Viber announced that they will soon have
>> e2e encryption for all clients. The app Wire ( http://wire.com
>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__wire.com&d=CwMFaQ&c=N13…>
>> ) also does e2e encryption for voice, video and group chats.
>>
>>
>>
>> In a US Congress hearing this week, a Congressman asked a Dept of
>> Homeland Security representative if e2e encryption available in apps would
>> have prevented this interception that happened via SS7. The DHS answer was
>> that it would mitigate the interception of the content, although the
>> location meta-data would still be available. (You can view the exchange
>> via the link in this tweet:
>> https://twitter.com/csoghoian/status/722854012567969794
>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__twitter.com_csoghoian_…>
>> )
>>
>>
>>
>> The end result is that we're definitely moving to a space where the
>> communication over IP-based solutions will wind up being far more secure
>> than what we had before.
>>
>>
>>
>> Interesting times,
>>
>> Dan
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>>
>>
>>
>> Dan York
>>
>> dyork at lodestar2.com +1-802-735-1624 Skype:danyork
>>
>> My writing -> http://www.danyork.me/
>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.danyork.me_&d=CwMFa…>
>>
>> http://www.danyork.com/
>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.danyork.com_&d=CwMF…>
>>
>> http://twitter.com/danyork
>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_danyork&d=C…>
>> ------------------------------
>> This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the
>> addressee and may contain information that is privileged and confidential.
>> If the reader of the message is not the intended recipient or an authorized
>> representative of the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any
>> dissemination of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have
>> received this communication in error, notify the sender immediately by
>> return email and delete the message and any attachments from your system.
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> VoiceOps mailing list
>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>>
>>
>
>
> --
> Kidd Filby
> 661.557.5640 (C)
> http://www.linkedin.com/in/kiddfilby
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
April 23, 2016
SS7
by kiddfilby@gmail.com
ABSOLUTELY!!!!
On Sat, Apr 23, 2016 at 9:28 AM, Hiers, David <David.Hiers at cdk.com> wrote:
> People tend forget the existence and benefit of physical and
> administrative security controls until they disable them. Sure, they are
> an expensive speedbump at times, but you can?t hack what you can?t touch.
>
>
>
>
>
> David
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] *On Behalf Of *Mike
> Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
> *Sent:* Friday, April 22, 2016 11:28
> *To:* voiceops at voiceops.org
> *Subject:* Re: [VoiceOps] SS7
>
>
>
> It seems to me that this SS7 vulnerability issue is just the latest result
> of all of the de-regulation that?s been going on for the past? two decades
> or so. There was a time that you could not buy commercial access to the
> SS7 network; to get that access you had to be a real carrier. Also, back
> at that time, inter-company SS7 signalling could only occur on established,
> ordered signaling routes where both parties placed an order to open the
> route between them. Therefore, this would not have been possible back then
> because the carrier would not have ordered a route to the hacker?s point
> code(s) and it therefore would not exist.
>
>
>
> If I am a US local carrier in 2001, I have no need to order a signaling
> route to a German carrier either so even the hacker having full access to a
> German carrier?s network would not compromise my network. (in response to
> the nation-state issue) To get a call to Germany, I signal to the access
> tandem or IXC switch I?ve chosen to interconnect with in the US and that
> switch signals upstream, etc.
>
>
>
> If we were not on this path of de-regulation where whatever makes
> commercial sense for one company can open up the whole SS7 network to
> un-trusted parties, we likely wouldn?t be here. At some point, a decision
> was made somewhere to allow this loosy-goosy inter-company signaling over
> the SS7 network between two point codes that would not, under the original
> implementation of SS7, be able to talk to each other in the first place.
>
>
>
> If the drumbeat of ?solve everything with IP!? continues, I hope that at
> least it gets solved by establishing something close to what the VPF was
> supposed to be, and not just a general dumping of all voice traffic across
> the internet between carriers. That certainly wouldn?t bode well for
> reliability or security.
>
>
>
> Mike
>
>
>
> Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
>
> Astro Companies, LLC
>
> 11523 Palm Brush Trail #401
>
> Lakewood Ranch, FL 34202
>
> DIRECT: call or text 941 600-0207
>
> http://www.astrocompanies.com
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.astrocompanies.com&…>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org
> <voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org>] *On Behalf Of *Dan York
> *Sent:* Thursday, April 21, 2016 3:45 PM
> *To:* Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com>
> *Cc:* voiceops at voiceops.org
> *Subject:* Re: [VoiceOps] SS7
>
>
>
> This is generally true if the calls are *unencrypted* on VoIP...
>
>
>
> On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 2:20 PM, Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> Also folks, don't forget, the same outcome of recording someone's call is
> MUCH easier to accomplish once it is VoIP. IMHO, of course. ;-)
>
>
>
> ... BUT... what's fascinating is the recent rise in end-to-end (e2e)
> encryption among IP-based communications platforms that include voice.
>
>
>
> WhatsApp, for instance, just completed the rollout of e2e encryption on
> April 5, and not just for messaging, but also for voice and video calls as
> well as file transfers (
> https://blog.whatsapp.com/10000618/end-to-end-encryption
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__blog.whatsapp.com_1000…>
> ). Just yesterday the team behind Viber announced that they will soon have
> e2e encryption for all clients. The app Wire ( http://wire.com
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__wire.com&d=CwMFaQ&c=N13…>
> ) also does e2e encryption for voice, video and group chats.
>
>
>
> In a US Congress hearing this week, a Congressman asked a Dept of Homeland
> Security representative if e2e encryption available in apps would have
> prevented this interception that happened via SS7. The DHS answer was that
> it would mitigate the interception of the content, although the location
> meta-data would still be available. (You can view the exchange via the
> link in this tweet:
> https://twitter.com/csoghoian/status/722854012567969794
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__twitter.com_csoghoian_…>
> )
>
>
>
> The end result is that we're definitely moving to a space where the
> communication over IP-based solutions will wind up being far more secure
> than what we had before.
>
>
>
> Interesting times,
>
> Dan
>
>
>
> --
>
>
>
> Dan York
>
> dyork at lodestar2.com +1-802-735-1624 Skype:danyork
>
> My writing -> http://www.danyork.me/
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.danyork.me_&d=CwMFa…>
>
> http://www.danyork.com/
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.danyork.com_&d=CwMF…>
>
> http://twitter.com/danyork
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_danyork&d=C…>
> ------------------------------
> This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the
> addressee and may contain information that is privileged and confidential.
> If the reader of the message is not the intended recipient or an authorized
> representative of the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any
> dissemination of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have
> received this communication in error, notify the sender immediately by
> return email and delete the message and any attachments from your system.
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
--
Kidd Filby
661.557.5640 (C)
http://www.linkedin.com/in/kiddfilby
April 23, 2016
SS7
by kiddfilby@gmail.com
Mike;
HOLY smokes... they let anything thru??? The it way scary. Does the word *RUN
*come to mind.
Kidd
On Sat, Apr 23, 2016 at 6:54 AM, Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE <
mike at astrocompanies.com> wrote:
> I didn?t realize that either until we switched SS7 providers recently.
> Our former one (Whom I am beginning to miss, truth be told) made it
> impossible to exchange signaling traffic with anything that you didn?t have
> a route built (and paid) for, which is how it?s been as far as I know since
> I got into this biz nearly two decades ago.
>
>
>
> However, our new SS7 provider apparently lets any SS7 point code
> communicate with ours, as we started seeing random traffic from unknown
> point codes shortly after we switched providers. We reported it and they
> blocked that traffic, but in the process it became clear that they let
> anything through until and unless we ask them to block it. There?s also
> language in our ICA with them that says that if we are communicating with
> any point code that we haven?t purchased a route for, they have the right
> to back-bill it one they discover it.
>
>
>
> We?re in a contract now for three years, but at the end of it we may
> switch back to the original provider for this and other reasons. SS7
> certainly feels a lot less secure than it did before. Luckily, our Class 5
> End Office switch does not provide any data nor redirection capabilities
> over SS7 such as those exploited in the article. We also found that while
> we received the traffic from the unknown point code, our switch did not
> respond because we did not have a route built for it on the switch. But it
> still means that a DOS attack may be possible, and it feels like assigning
> our switch a public IP without a firewall in place, which makes me crazy.
>
>
>
> Mike
>
>
>
> Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
>
> Astro Companies, LLC
>
> 11523 Palm Brush Trail #401
>
> Lakewood Ranch, FL 34202
>
> DIRECT: call or text 941 600-0207
>
> http://www.astrocompanies.com
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Christopher Aloi [mailto:ctaloi at gmail.com]
> *Sent:* Friday, April 22, 2016 9:28 PM
> *To:* Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com>; Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE <
> mike at astrocompanies.com>
> *Cc:* VoiceOps <voiceops at voiceops.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [VoiceOps] SS7
>
>
>
> I didn't realize you can now connect to another company without ordering
> the route-set from a third party. How does this work ? I feel old !
>
> On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 2:40 PM Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Very well said Mike.
>
> Back In The Day... Interconnection between 2 companies had to occur via a
> 3rd party, like Illuminet. Their had to be SS7 gateway providers and
> that's all they were allowed to do. Route SS7 traffic between
> LEC/ILEC/CLEC networks. Oh... do I remember the pains...
> Gateway-Screened... CNAM database corruption, LIDB services not
> provided.... Still makes my head hurt.
>
> Kidd
>
>
>
> On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 12:28 PM, Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE <
> mike at astrocompanies.com> wrote:
>
> It seems to me that this SS7 vulnerability issue is just the latest result
> of all of the de-regulation that?s been going on for the past? two decades
> or so. There was a time that you could not buy commercial access to the
> SS7 network; to get that access you had to be a real carrier. Also, back
> at that time, inter-company SS7 signalling could only occur on established,
> ordered signaling routes where both parties placed an order to open the
> route between them. Therefore, this would not have been possible back then
> because the carrier would not have ordered a route to the hacker?s point
> code(s) and it therefore would not exist.
>
>
>
> If I am a US local carrier in 2001, I have no need to order a signaling
> route to a German carrier either so even the hacker having full access to a
> German carrier?s network would not compromise my network. (in response to
> the nation-state issue) To get a call to Germany, I signal to the access
> tandem or IXC switch I?ve chosen to interconnect with in the US and that
> switch signals upstream, etc.
>
>
>
> If we were not on this path of de-regulation where whatever makes
> commercial sense for one company can open up the whole SS7 network to
> un-trusted parties, we likely wouldn?t be here. At some point, a decision
> was made somewhere to allow this loosy-goosy inter-company signaling over
> the SS7 network between two point codes that would not, under the original
> implementation of SS7, be able to talk to each other in the first place.
>
>
>
> If the drumbeat of ?solve everything with IP!? continues, I hope that at
> least it gets solved by establishing something close to what the VPF was
> supposed to be, and not just a general dumping of all voice traffic across
> the internet between carriers. That certainly wouldn?t bode well for
> reliability or security.
>
>
>
> Mike
>
>
>
> Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
>
> Astro Companies, LLC
>
> 11523 Palm Brush Trail #401
>
> Lakewood Ranch, FL 34202
>
> DIRECT: call or text 941 600-0207
>
> http://www.astrocompanies.com
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] *On Behalf Of *Dan
> York
> *Sent:* Thursday, April 21, 2016 3:45 PM
> *To:* Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com>
> *Cc:* voiceops at voiceops.org
> *Subject:* Re: [VoiceOps] SS7
>
>
>
> This is generally true if the calls are *unencrypted* on VoIP...
>
>
>
> On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 2:20 PM, Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> Also folks, don't forget, the same outcome of recording someone's call is
> MUCH easier to accomplish once it is VoIP. IMHO, of course. ;-)
>
>
>
> ... BUT... what's fascinating is the recent rise in end-to-end (e2e)
> encryption among IP-based communications platforms that include voice.
>
>
>
> WhatsApp, for instance, just completed the rollout of e2e encryption on
> April 5, and not just for messaging, but also for voice and video calls as
> well as file transfers (
> https://blog.whatsapp.com/10000618/end-to-end-encryption ). Just
> yesterday the team behind Viber announced that they will soon have e2e
> encryption for all clients. The app Wire ( http://wire.com ) also does
> e2e encryption for voice, video and group chats.
>
>
>
> In a US Congress hearing this week, a Congressman asked a Dept of Homeland
> Security representative if e2e encryption available in apps would have
> prevented this interception that happened via SS7. The DHS answer was that
> it would mitigate the interception of the content, although the location
> meta-data would still be available. (You can view the exchange via the
> link in this tweet:
> https://twitter.com/csoghoian/status/722854012567969794 )
>
>
>
> The end result is that we're definitely moving to a space where the
> communication over IP-based solutions will wind up being far more secure
> than what we had before.
>
>
>
> Interesting times,
>
> Dan
>
>
>
> --
>
>
>
> Dan York
>
> dyork at lodestar2.com +1-802-735-1624 Skype:danyork
>
> My writing -> http://www.danyork.me/
>
> http://www.danyork.com/
>
> http://twitter.com/danyork
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
>
> --
>
> Kidd Filby
> 661.557.5640 (C)
> http://www.linkedin.com/in/kiddfilby
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
--
Kidd Filby
661.557.5640 (C)
http://www.linkedin.com/in/kiddfilby
April 23, 2016
SS7
by kiddfilby@gmail.com
It is now possible to do it. I'm not sure when it started but, I know
PB/SBC/ATT in CA. offered me SS7 connectivity many years ago. I'm pretty
sure all of the Baby Bells now offer the service. I am sure SNET does as
well. Now the choice is up to you if you want them to see all of your
PSTN-bound traffic. The technology still holds true that your SS7 provider
is all or nothing. You can't have multiple SS7 providers yet.
Kidd
On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 7:28 PM, Christopher Aloi <ctaloi at gmail.com> wrote:
> I didn't realize you can now connect to another company without ordering
> the route-set from a third party. How does this work ? I feel old !
>
> On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 2:40 PM Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Very well said Mike.
>>
>> Back In The Day... Interconnection between 2 companies had to occur via a
>> 3rd party, like Illuminet. Their had to be SS7 gateway providers and
>> that's all they were allowed to do. Route SS7 traffic between
>> LEC/ILEC/CLEC networks. Oh... do I remember the pains...
>> Gateway-Screened... CNAM database corruption, LIDB services not
>> provided.... Still makes my head hurt.
>>
>> Kidd
>>
>> On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 12:28 PM, Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE <
>> mike at astrocompanies.com> wrote:
>>
>>> It seems to me that this SS7 vulnerability issue is just the latest
>>> result of all of the de-regulation that?s been going on for the past? two
>>> decades or so. There was a time that you could not buy commercial access
>>> to the SS7 network; to get that access you had to be a real carrier. Also,
>>> back at that time, inter-company SS7 signalling could only occur on
>>> established, ordered signaling routes where both parties placed an order to
>>> open the route between them. Therefore, this would not have been possible
>>> back then because the carrier would not have ordered a route to the
>>> hacker?s point code(s) and it therefore would not exist.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If I am a US local carrier in 2001, I have no need to order a signaling
>>> route to a German carrier either so even the hacker having full access to a
>>> German carrier?s network would not compromise my network. (in response to
>>> the nation-state issue) To get a call to Germany, I signal to the access
>>> tandem or IXC switch I?ve chosen to interconnect with in the US and that
>>> switch signals upstream, etc.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If we were not on this path of de-regulation where whatever makes
>>> commercial sense for one company can open up the whole SS7 network to
>>> un-trusted parties, we likely wouldn?t be here. At some point, a decision
>>> was made somewhere to allow this loosy-goosy inter-company signaling over
>>> the SS7 network between two point codes that would not, under the original
>>> implementation of SS7, be able to talk to each other in the first place.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If the drumbeat of ?solve everything with IP!? continues, I hope that at
>>> least it gets solved by establishing something close to what the VPF was
>>> supposed to be, and not just a general dumping of all voice traffic across
>>> the internet between carriers. That certainly wouldn?t bode well for
>>> reliability or security.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Mike
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
>>>
>>> Astro Companies, LLC
>>>
>>> 11523 Palm Brush Trail #401
>>>
>>> Lakewood Ranch, FL 34202
>>>
>>> DIRECT: call or text 941 600-0207
>>>
>>> http://www.astrocompanies.com
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From:* VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] *On Behalf Of *Dan
>>> York
>>> *Sent:* Thursday, April 21, 2016 3:45 PM
>>> *To:* Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com>
>>> *Cc:* voiceops at voiceops.org
>>> *Subject:* Re: [VoiceOps] SS7
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> This is generally true if the calls are *unencrypted* on VoIP...
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 2:20 PM, Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Also folks, don't forget, the same outcome of recording someone's call
>>> is MUCH easier to accomplish once it is VoIP. IMHO, of course. ;-)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ... BUT... what's fascinating is the recent rise in end-to-end (e2e)
>>> encryption among IP-based communications platforms that include voice.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> WhatsApp, for instance, just completed the rollout of e2e encryption on
>>> April 5, and not just for messaging, but also for voice and video calls as
>>> well as file transfers (
>>> https://blog.whatsapp.com/10000618/end-to-end-encryption ). Just
>>> yesterday the team behind Viber announced that they will soon have e2e
>>> encryption for all clients. The app Wire ( http://wire.com ) also does
>>> e2e encryption for voice, video and group chats.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In a US Congress hearing this week, a Congressman asked a Dept of
>>> Homeland Security representative if e2e encryption available in apps would
>>> have prevented this interception that happened via SS7. The DHS answer was
>>> that it would mitigate the interception of the content, although the
>>> location meta-data would still be available. (You can view the exchange
>>> via the link in this tweet:
>>> https://twitter.com/csoghoian/status/722854012567969794 )
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The end result is that we're definitely moving to a space where the
>>> communication over IP-based solutions will wind up being far more secure
>>> than what we had before.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Interesting times,
>>>
>>> Dan
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Dan York
>>>
>>> dyork at lodestar2.com +1-802-735-1624 Skype:danyork
>>>
>>> My writing -> http://www.danyork.me/
>>>
>>> http://www.danyork.com/
>>>
>>> http://twitter.com/danyork
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> VoiceOps mailing list
>>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Kidd Filby
>> 661.557.5640 (C)
>> http://www.linkedin.com/in/kiddfilby
>> _______________________________________________
>> VoiceOps mailing list
>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>>
>
--
Kidd Filby
661.557.5640 (C)
http://www.linkedin.com/in/kiddfilby
April 23, 2016