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April 2016
- 51 participants
- 128 messages
SS7
by David.Hiers@cdk.com
People tend forget the existence and benefit of physical and administrative security controls until they disable them. Sure, they are an expensive speedbump at times, but you can?t hack what you can?t touch.
David
From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
Sent: Friday, April 22, 2016 11:28
To: voiceops at voiceops.org
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] SS7
It seems to me that this SS7 vulnerability issue is just the latest result of all of the de-regulation that?s been going on for the past? two decades or so. There was a time that you could not buy commercial access to the SS7 network; to get that access you had to be a real carrier. Also, back at that time, inter-company SS7 signalling could only occur on established, ordered signaling routes where both parties placed an order to open the route between them. Therefore, this would not have been possible back then because the carrier would not have ordered a route to the hacker?s point code(s) and it therefore would not exist.
If I am a US local carrier in 2001, I have no need to order a signaling route to a German carrier either so even the hacker having full access to a German carrier?s network would not compromise my network. (in response to the nation-state issue) To get a call to Germany, I signal to the access tandem or IXC switch I?ve chosen to interconnect with in the US and that switch signals upstream, etc.
If we were not on this path of de-regulation where whatever makes commercial sense for one company can open up the whole SS7 network to un-trusted parties, we likely wouldn?t be here. At some point, a decision was made somewhere to allow this loosy-goosy inter-company signaling over the SS7 network between two point codes that would not, under the original implementation of SS7, be able to talk to each other in the first place.
If the drumbeat of ?solve everything with IP!? continues, I hope that at least it gets solved by establishing something close to what the VPF was supposed to be, and not just a general dumping of all voice traffic across the internet between carriers. That certainly wouldn?t bode well for reliability or security.
Mike
Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
Astro Companies, LLC
11523 Palm Brush Trail #401
Lakewood Ranch, FL 34202
DIRECT: call or text 941 600-0207
http://www.astrocompanies.com<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.astrocompanies.com&…>
From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of Dan York
Sent: Thursday, April 21, 2016 3:45 PM
To: Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com<mailto:kiddfilby at gmail.com>>
Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org<mailto:voiceops at voiceops.org>
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] SS7
This is generally true if the calls are *unencrypted* on VoIP...
On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 2:20 PM, Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com<mailto:kiddfilby at gmail.com>> wrote:
Also folks, don't forget, the same outcome of recording someone's call is MUCH easier to accomplish once it is VoIP. IMHO, of course. ;-)
... BUT... what's fascinating is the recent rise in end-to-end (e2e) encryption among IP-based communications platforms that include voice.
WhatsApp, for instance, just completed the rollout of e2e encryption on April 5, and not just for messaging, but also for voice and video calls as well as file transfers ( https://blog.whatsapp.com/10000618/end-to-end-encryption<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__blog.whatsapp.com_1000…> ). Just yesterday the team behind Viber announced that they will soon have e2e encryption for all clients. The app Wire ( http://wire.com<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__wire.com&d=CwMFaQ&c=N13…> ) also does e2e encryption for voice, video and group chats.
In a US Congress hearing this week, a Congressman asked a Dept of Homeland Security representative if e2e encryption available in apps would have prevented this interception that happened via SS7. The DHS answer was that it would mitigate the interception of the content, although the location meta-data would still be available. (You can view the exchange via the link in this tweet: https://twitter.com/csoghoian/status/722854012567969794<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__twitter.com_csoghoian_…> )
The end result is that we're definitely moving to a space where the communication over IP-based solutions will wind up being far more secure than what we had before.
Interesting times,
Dan
--
Dan York
dyork at lodestar2.com<mailto:dyork at lodestar2.com> +1-802-735-1624 Skype:danyork
My writing -> http://www.danyork.me/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.danyork.me_&d=CwMFa…>
http://www.danyork.com/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.danyork.com_&d=CwMF…>
http://twitter.com/danyork<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_danyork&d=C…>
----------------------------------------------------------------------
This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the addressee and may contain information that is privileged and confidential. If the reader of the message is not the intended recipient or an authorized representative of the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, notify the sender immediately by return email and delete the message and any attachments from your system.
April 23, 2016
SS7
by marylou@backuptelecom.com
It works because the party you're connected to is the one that provides the PSTN
switching. Trunks and Point Code routes are ordered to their switch and they're
just letting you home your NXXs on their switch so you are an underlying
carrier.
Mary Lou Carey
BackUP Telecom Consulting
Marylou at backuptelecom.com
Office: 615-791-9969
Cell: 615-796-1111
> On April 22, 2016 at 8:28 PM Christopher Aloi <ctaloi at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> I didn't realize you can now connect to another company without ordering the
> route-set from a third party. How does this work ? I feel old !
>
> On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 2:40 PM Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com
> <mailto:kiddfilby at gmail.com> > wrote:
> > > Very well said Mike.
> >
> > Back In The Day... Interconnection between 2 companies had to occur via a
> > 3rd party, like Illuminet. Their had to be SS7 gateway providers and that's
> > all they were allowed to do. Route SS7 traffic between LEC/ILEC/CLEC
> > networks. Oh... do I remember the pains... Gateway-Screened... CNAM
> > database corruption, LIDB services not provided.... Still makes my head
> > hurt.
> >
> > Kidd
> >
> > On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 12:28 PM, Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
> > <mike at astrocompanies.com <mailto:mike at astrocompanies.com> > wrote:
> > > > >
> > > It seems to me that this SS7 vulnerability issue is just the latest
> > > result of all of the de-regulation that?s been going on for the past? two
> > > decades or so. There was a time that you could not buy commercial access
> > > to the SS7 network; to get that access you had to be a real carrier.
> > > Also, back at that time, inter-company SS7 signalling could only occur on
> > > established, ordered signaling routes where both parties placed an order
> > > to open the route between them. Therefore, this would not have been
> > > possible back then because the carrier would not have ordered a route to
> > > the hacker?s point code(s) and it therefore would not exist.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > If I am a US local carrier in 2001, I have no need to order a
> > > signaling route to a German carrier either so even the hacker having full
> > > access to a German carrier?s network would not compromise my network. (in
> > > response to the nation-state issue) To get a call to Germany, I signal to
> > > the access tandem or IXC switch I?ve chosen to interconnect with in the US
> > > and that switch signals upstream, etc.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > If we were not on this path of de-regulation where whatever makes
> > > commercial sense for one company can open up the whole SS7 network to
> > > un-trusted parties, we likely wouldn?t be here. At some point, a decision
> > > was made somewhere to allow this loosy-goosy inter-company signaling over
> > > the SS7 network between two point codes that would not, under the original
> > > implementation of SS7, be able to talk to each other in the first place.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > If the drumbeat of ?solve everything with IP!? continues, I hope that
> > > at least it gets solved by establishing something close to what the VPF
> > > was supposed to be, and not just a general dumping of all voice traffic
> > > across the internet between carriers. That certainly wouldn?t bode well
> > > for reliability or security.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Mike
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
> > >
> > > Astro Companies, LLC
> > >
> > > 11523 Palm Brush Trail #401
> > >
> > > Lakewood Ranch, FL 34202
> > >
> > > DIRECT: call or text 941 600-0207
> > >
> > > http://www.astrocompanies.com <http://www.astrocompanies.com>
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org
> > > <mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org> ] On Behalf Of Dan York
> > > Sent: Thursday, April 21, 2016 3:45 PM
> > > To: Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com <mailto:kiddfilby at gmail.com> >
> > > Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org <mailto:voiceops at voiceops.org>
> > > Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] SS7
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > This is generally true if the calls are *unencrypted* on VoIP...
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 2:20 PM, Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com
> > > <mailto:kiddfilby at gmail.com> > wrote:
> > >
> > > > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Also folks, don't forget, the same outcome of recording someone's
> > > > call is MUCH easier to accomplish once it is VoIP. IMHO, of course.
> > > > ;-)
> > > >
> > > > > > >
> > >
> > >
> > > ... BUT... what's fascinating is the recent rise in end-to-end (e2e)
> > > encryption among IP-based communications platforms that include voice.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > WhatsApp, for instance, just completed the rollout of e2e encryption
> > > on April 5, and not just for messaging, but also for voice and video calls
> > > as well as file transfers (
> > > https://blog.whatsapp.com/10000618/end-to-end-encryption ). Just
> > > yesterday the team behind Viber announced that they will soon have e2e
> > > encryption for all clients. The app Wire ( http://wire.com ) also does
> > > e2e encryption for voice, video and group chats.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > In a US Congress hearing this week, a Congressman asked a Dept of
> > > Homeland Security representative if e2e encryption available in apps would
> > > have prevented this interception that happened via SS7. The DHS answer was
> > > that it would mitigate the interception of the content, although the
> > > location meta-data would still be available. (You can view the exchange
> > > via the link in this tweet:
> > > https://twitter.com/csoghoian/status/722854012567969794 )
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > The end result is that we're definitely moving to a space where the
> > > communication over IP-based solutions will wind up being far more secure
> > > than what we had before.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Interesting times,
> > >
> > > Dan
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Dan York
> > >
> > > dyork at lodestar2.com <mailto:dyork at lodestar2.com> +1-802-735-1624
> > > Skype:danyork
> > >
> > > My writing -> http://www.danyork.me/
> > >
> > > http://www.danyork.com/ <http://www.danyork.com/>
> > >
> > > http://twitter.com/danyork <http://twitter.com/danyork>
> > >
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > VoiceOps mailing list
> > > VoiceOps at voiceops.org <mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
> > > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> > > > >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Kidd Filby
> > 661.557.5640 (C)
> > http://www.linkedin.com/in/kiddfilby
> > _______________________________________________
> > VoiceOps mailing list
> > VoiceOps at voiceops.org <mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
> > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> > > _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
April 23, 2016
SS7
by mike@astrocompanies.com
I didn?t realize that either until we switched SS7 providers recently. Our former one (Whom I am beginning to miss, truth be told) made it impossible to exchange signaling traffic with anything that you didn?t have a route built (and paid) for, which is how it?s been as far as I know since I got into this biz nearly two decades ago.
However, our new SS7 provider apparently lets any SS7 point code communicate with ours, as we started seeing random traffic from unknown point codes shortly after we switched providers. We reported it and they blocked that traffic, but in the process it became clear that they let anything through until and unless we ask them to block it. There?s also language in our ICA with them that says that if we are communicating with any point code that we haven?t purchased a route for, they have the right to back-bill it one they discover it.
We?re in a contract now for three years, but at the end of it we may switch back to the original provider for this and other reasons. SS7 certainly feels a lot less secure than it did before. Luckily, our Class 5 End Office switch does not provide any data nor redirection capabilities over SS7 such as those exploited in the article. We also found that while we received the traffic from the unknown point code, our switch did not respond because we did not have a route built for it on the switch. But it still means that a DOS attack may be possible, and it feels like assigning our switch a public IP without a firewall in place, which makes me crazy.
Mike
Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
Astro Companies, LLC
11523 Palm Brush Trail #401
Lakewood Ranch, FL 34202
DIRECT: call or text 941 600-0207
<http://www.astrocompanies.com> http://www.astrocompanies.com
From: Christopher Aloi [mailto:ctaloi at gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, April 22, 2016 9:28 PM
To: Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com>; Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE <mike at astrocompanies.com>
Cc: VoiceOps <voiceops at voiceops.org>
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] SS7
I didn't realize you can now connect to another company without ordering the route-set from a third party. How does this work ? I feel old !
On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 2:40 PM Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com <mailto:kiddfilby at gmail.com> > wrote:
Very well said Mike.
Back In The Day... Interconnection between 2 companies had to occur via a 3rd party, like Illuminet. Their had to be SS7 gateway providers and that's all they were allowed to do. Route SS7 traffic between LEC/ILEC/CLEC networks. Oh... do I remember the pains... Gateway-Screened... CNAM database corruption, LIDB services not provided.... Still makes my head hurt.
Kidd
On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 12:28 PM, Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE <mike at astrocompanies.com <mailto:mike at astrocompanies.com> > wrote:
It seems to me that this SS7 vulnerability issue is just the latest result of all of the de-regulation that?s been going on for the past? two decades or so. There was a time that you could not buy commercial access to the SS7 network; to get that access you had to be a real carrier. Also, back at that time, inter-company SS7 signalling could only occur on established, ordered signaling routes where both parties placed an order to open the route between them. Therefore, this would not have been possible back then because the carrier would not have ordered a route to the hacker?s point code(s) and it therefore would not exist.
If I am a US local carrier in 2001, I have no need to order a signaling route to a German carrier either so even the hacker having full access to a German carrier?s network would not compromise my network. (in response to the nation-state issue) To get a call to Germany, I signal to the access tandem or IXC switch I?ve chosen to interconnect with in the US and that switch signals upstream, etc.
If we were not on this path of de-regulation where whatever makes commercial sense for one company can open up the whole SS7 network to un-trusted parties, we likely wouldn?t be here. At some point, a decision was made somewhere to allow this loosy-goosy inter-company signaling over the SS7 network between two point codes that would not, under the original implementation of SS7, be able to talk to each other in the first place.
If the drumbeat of ?solve everything with IP!? continues, I hope that at least it gets solved by establishing something close to what the VPF was supposed to be, and not just a general dumping of all voice traffic across the internet between carriers. That certainly wouldn?t bode well for reliability or security.
Mike
Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
Astro Companies, LLC
11523 Palm Brush Trail #401
Lakewood Ranch, FL 34202
DIRECT: call or text 941 600-0207 <tel:941%20600-0207>
<http://www.astrocompanies.com> http://www.astrocompanies.com
From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org <mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org> ] On Behalf Of Dan York
Sent: Thursday, April 21, 2016 3:45 PM
To: Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com <mailto:kiddfilby at gmail.com> >
Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org <mailto:voiceops at voiceops.org>
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] SS7
This is generally true if the calls are *unencrypted* on VoIP...
On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 2:20 PM, Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com <mailto:kiddfilby at gmail.com> > wrote:
Also folks, don't forget, the same outcome of recording someone's call is MUCH easier to accomplish once it is VoIP. IMHO, of course. ;-)
... BUT... what's fascinating is the recent rise in end-to-end (e2e) encryption among IP-based communications platforms that include voice.
WhatsApp, for instance, just completed the rollout of e2e encryption on April 5, and not just for messaging, but also for voice and video calls as well as file transfers ( https://blog.whatsapp.com/10000618/end-to-end-encryption ). Just yesterday the team behind Viber announced that they will soon have e2e encryption for all clients. The app Wire ( http://wire.com ) also does e2e encryption for voice, video and group chats.
In a US Congress hearing this week, a Congressman asked a Dept of Homeland Security representative if e2e encryption available in apps would have prevented this interception that happened via SS7. The DHS answer was that it would mitigate the interception of the content, although the location meta-data would still be available. (You can view the exchange via the link in this tweet: https://twitter.com/csoghoian/status/722854012567969794 )
The end result is that we're definitely moving to a space where the communication over IP-based solutions will wind up being far more secure than what we had before.
Interesting times,
Dan
--
Dan York
<mailto:dyork at lodestar2.com> dyork at lodestar2.com +1-802-735-1624 <tel:%2B1-802-735-1624> Skype:danyork
My writing -> http://www.danyork.me/
<http://www.danyork.com/> http://www.danyork.com/
http:// <http://twitter.com/danyork> twitter.com/danyork
_______________________________________________
VoiceOps mailing list
VoiceOps at voiceops.org <mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
--
Kidd Filby
661.557.5640 (C)
http://www.linkedin.com/in/kiddfilby
_______________________________________________
VoiceOps mailing list
VoiceOps at voiceops.org <mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
April 23, 2016
SS7
by ctaloi@gmail.com
I didn't realize you can now connect to another company without ordering
the route-set from a third party. How does this work ? I feel old !
On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 2:40 PM Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com> wrote:
> Very well said Mike.
>
> Back In The Day... Interconnection between 2 companies had to occur via a
> 3rd party, like Illuminet. Their had to be SS7 gateway providers and
> that's all they were allowed to do. Route SS7 traffic between
> LEC/ILEC/CLEC networks. Oh... do I remember the pains...
> Gateway-Screened... CNAM database corruption, LIDB services not
> provided.... Still makes my head hurt.
>
> Kidd
>
> On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 12:28 PM, Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE <
> mike at astrocompanies.com> wrote:
>
>> It seems to me that this SS7 vulnerability issue is just the latest
>> result of all of the de-regulation that?s been going on for the past? two
>> decades or so. There was a time that you could not buy commercial access
>> to the SS7 network; to get that access you had to be a real carrier. Also,
>> back at that time, inter-company SS7 signalling could only occur on
>> established, ordered signaling routes where both parties placed an order to
>> open the route between them. Therefore, this would not have been possible
>> back then because the carrier would not have ordered a route to the
>> hacker?s point code(s) and it therefore would not exist.
>>
>>
>>
>> If I am a US local carrier in 2001, I have no need to order a signaling
>> route to a German carrier either so even the hacker having full access to a
>> German carrier?s network would not compromise my network. (in response to
>> the nation-state issue) To get a call to Germany, I signal to the access
>> tandem or IXC switch I?ve chosen to interconnect with in the US and that
>> switch signals upstream, etc.
>>
>>
>>
>> If we were not on this path of de-regulation where whatever makes
>> commercial sense for one company can open up the whole SS7 network to
>> un-trusted parties, we likely wouldn?t be here. At some point, a decision
>> was made somewhere to allow this loosy-goosy inter-company signaling over
>> the SS7 network between two point codes that would not, under the original
>> implementation of SS7, be able to talk to each other in the first place.
>>
>>
>>
>> If the drumbeat of ?solve everything with IP!? continues, I hope that at
>> least it gets solved by establishing something close to what the VPF was
>> supposed to be, and not just a general dumping of all voice traffic across
>> the internet between carriers. That certainly wouldn?t bode well for
>> reliability or security.
>>
>>
>>
>> Mike
>>
>>
>>
>> Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
>>
>> Astro Companies, LLC
>>
>> 11523 Palm Brush Trail #401
>>
>> Lakewood Ranch, FL 34202
>>
>> DIRECT: call or text 941 600-0207
>>
>> http://www.astrocompanies.com
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] *On Behalf Of *Dan
>> York
>> *Sent:* Thursday, April 21, 2016 3:45 PM
>> *To:* Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com>
>> *Cc:* voiceops at voiceops.org
>> *Subject:* Re: [VoiceOps] SS7
>>
>>
>>
>> This is generally true if the calls are *unencrypted* on VoIP...
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 2:20 PM, Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Also folks, don't forget, the same outcome of recording someone's call is
>> MUCH easier to accomplish once it is VoIP. IMHO, of course. ;-)
>>
>>
>>
>> ... BUT... what's fascinating is the recent rise in end-to-end (e2e)
>> encryption among IP-based communications platforms that include voice.
>>
>>
>>
>> WhatsApp, for instance, just completed the rollout of e2e encryption on
>> April 5, and not just for messaging, but also for voice and video calls as
>> well as file transfers (
>> https://blog.whatsapp.com/10000618/end-to-end-encryption ). Just
>> yesterday the team behind Viber announced that they will soon have e2e
>> encryption for all clients. The app Wire ( http://wire.com ) also does
>> e2e encryption for voice, video and group chats.
>>
>>
>>
>> In a US Congress hearing this week, a Congressman asked a Dept of
>> Homeland Security representative if e2e encryption available in apps would
>> have prevented this interception that happened via SS7. The DHS answer was
>> that it would mitigate the interception of the content, although the
>> location meta-data would still be available. (You can view the exchange
>> via the link in this tweet:
>> https://twitter.com/csoghoian/status/722854012567969794 )
>>
>>
>>
>> The end result is that we're definitely moving to a space where the
>> communication over IP-based solutions will wind up being far more secure
>> than what we had before.
>>
>>
>>
>> Interesting times,
>>
>> Dan
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>>
>>
>>
>> Dan York
>>
>> dyork at lodestar2.com +1-802-735-1624 Skype:danyork
>>
>> My writing -> http://www.danyork.me/
>>
>> http://www.danyork.com/
>>
>> http://twitter.com/danyork
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> VoiceOps mailing list
>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>>
>>
>
>
> --
> Kidd Filby
> 661.557.5640 (C)
> http://www.linkedin.com/in/kiddfilby
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
April 23, 2016
Recommendations for high-cps SS7 OC-X gear?
by avorlando@yahoo.com
I would be concerned about the IP infringement lawsuit they lost to Genband. My experience hasn't been good with them when using other application servers.
Sent from my iPhone
> On Apr 22, 2016, at 12:47 PM, Brandon Buckner <brandon at kamikos.com> wrote:
>
> Just curious: Is there a reason to avoid Metaswitch?
>
> My main experience is in Metaswitch and Sonus, but in Metaswitch it was limited to the 2510 and 3510 gateways and the accompanying servers up to 7.4 software and none of the newer blade platforms. At the time I would have said that Metaswitch would have worked quite well for what is being asked, especially if wanting to split across many smaller gateways and geographically distributed. Is there something with the new hardware and/or software I don't know about quality-wise?
>
> Sonus killed off the GSX4000 which would have lent better to spreading around a bunch of smaller boxes. They still have the GSX9000 which goes up to single OC-3 cards (so you'd have to have a couple to split an OC-48 still), but their main push seems to be the SBC5210 and SBC7000 which are IP only, no TDM. But spread across gateways the call processing can easily do the 500 CPS.
>
>> On 4/21/2016 5:00 AM, Anthony Orlando via VoiceOps wrote:
>> Avoid Meta at all cost.
>>
>> Sent from my iPhone
>>
>> On Apr 20, 2016, at 10:35 PM, Paul Timmins <paul at timmins.net> wrote:
>>
>>> You're going to handle 500CPS of legacy sonet based TDM and question dropping 7 figures on the solution? *cringes*
>>>
>>> This is literally what platforms like metaswitch, sonus and many others are made for. If you're looking for low cost, Taqua's solution is decent, and if you need to take that entire OC-48, you're all but eyeballs deep in Sonus or Metaswitch land.
>>>
>>> -Paul
>>>
>>>> On Apr 20, 2016, at 17:54, Brooks Bridges <bbridges at o1.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Looking for suggestions for NEBS compliant gear that can support SS7, handle OC-3 or higher levels of channels, and can support (in aggregate) up to around 500 cps through a *good* (key word) SIP interface. I?m willing to entertain the idea of a single larger device that can take a full OC-48 and support the full 500 cps, but I?d prefer spread the load across multiple devices and smaller interfaces for load balancing and redundancy.
>>>>
>>>> Any pointers? Obviously there are products out there by the really big players, but I?d really rather not have to drop 7 figures on this project unless I have to.
>>>>
>>>> Thanks!
>>>>
>>>> Brooks Bridges | Sr. Voice Services Engineer
>>>> O1 Communications
>>>> 5190 Golden Foothill Pkwy
>>>> El Dorado Hills, CA 95762
>>>> office: 916.235.2097 | main: 888.444.1111, Option 2
>>>> email: bbridges at o1.com | web: www.o1.com
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> VoiceOps mailing list
>>>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>>>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> VoiceOps mailing list
>>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> VoiceOps mailing list
>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
April 22, 2016
Recommendations for high-cps SS7 OC-X gear?
by avorlando@yahoo.com
I've used in the past. Good success with them.
Sent from my iPhone
> On Apr 22, 2016, at 1:26 PM, Calvin Ellison <calvin.ellison at voxox.com> wrote:
>
> Anyone using TelcoBridges gear?
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Calvin Ellison
> Voice Operations Engineer
> calvin.ellison at voxox.com
> +1 (213) 285-0555
>
> -----------------------------------------------
> voxox.com
> 5825 Oberlin Drive, Suite 5
> San Diego, CA 92121
>
>
>> On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 10:47 AM, Brandon Buckner <brandon at kamikos.com> wrote:
>> Just curious: Is there a reason to avoid Metaswitch?
>>
>> My main experience is in Metaswitch and Sonus, but in Metaswitch it was limited to the 2510 and 3510 gateways and the accompanying servers up to 7.4 software and none of the newer blade platforms. At the time I would have said that Metaswitch would have worked quite well for what is being asked, especially if wanting to split across many smaller gateways and geographically distributed. Is there something with the new hardware and/or software I don't know about quality-wise?
>>
>> Sonus killed off the GSX4000 which would have lent better to spreading around a bunch of smaller boxes. They still have the GSX9000 which goes up to single OC-3 cards (so you'd have to have a couple to split an OC-48 still), but their main push seems to be the SBC5210 and SBC7000 which are IP only, no TDM. But spread across gateways the call processing can easily do the 500 CPS.
>>
>>> On 4/21/2016 5:00 AM, Anthony Orlando via VoiceOps wrote:
>>> Avoid Meta at all cost.
>>>
>>> Sent from my iPhone
>>>
>>> On Apr 20, 2016, at 10:35 PM, Paul Timmins <paul at timmins.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>> You're going to handle 500CPS of legacy sonet based TDM and question dropping 7 figures on the solution? *cringes*
>>>>
>>>> This is literally what platforms like metaswitch, sonus and many others are made for. If you're looking for low cost, Taqua's solution is decent, and if you need to take that entire OC-48, you're all but eyeballs deep in Sonus or Metaswitch land.
>>>>
>>>> -Paul
>>>>
>>>>> On Apr 20, 2016, at 17:54, Brooks Bridges <bbridges at o1.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Looking for suggestions for NEBS compliant gear that can support SS7, handle OC-3 or higher levels of channels, and can support (in aggregate) up to around 500 cps through a *good* (key word) SIP interface. I?m willing to entertain the idea of a single larger device that can take a full OC-48 and support the full 500 cps, but I?d prefer spread the load across multiple devices and smaller interfaces for load balancing and redundancy.
>>>>>
>>>>> Any pointers? Obviously there are products out there by the really big players, but I?d really rather not have to drop 7 figures on this project unless I have to.
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks!
>>>>>
>>>>> Brooks Bridges | Sr. Voice Services Engineer
>>>>> O1 Communications
>>>>> 5190 Golden Foothill Pkwy
>>>>> El Dorado Hills, CA 95762
>>>>> office: 916.235.2097 | main: 888.444.1111, Option 2
>>>>> email: bbridges at o1.com | web: www.o1.com
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> VoiceOps mailing list
>>>>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>>>>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> VoiceOps mailing list
>>>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>>>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> VoiceOps mailing list
>>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> VoiceOps mailing list
>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
April 22, 2016
SS7
by kiddfilby@gmail.com
Very well said Mike.
Back In The Day... Interconnection between 2 companies had to occur via a
3rd party, like Illuminet. Their had to be SS7 gateway providers and
that's all they were allowed to do. Route SS7 traffic between
LEC/ILEC/CLEC networks. Oh... do I remember the pains...
Gateway-Screened... CNAM database corruption, LIDB services not
provided.... Still makes my head hurt.
Kidd
On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 12:28 PM, Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE <
mike at astrocompanies.com> wrote:
> It seems to me that this SS7 vulnerability issue is just the latest result
> of all of the de-regulation that?s been going on for the past? two decades
> or so. There was a time that you could not buy commercial access to the
> SS7 network; to get that access you had to be a real carrier. Also, back
> at that time, inter-company SS7 signalling could only occur on established,
> ordered signaling routes where both parties placed an order to open the
> route between them. Therefore, this would not have been possible back then
> because the carrier would not have ordered a route to the hacker?s point
> code(s) and it therefore would not exist.
>
>
>
> If I am a US local carrier in 2001, I have no need to order a signaling
> route to a German carrier either so even the hacker having full access to a
> German carrier?s network would not compromise my network. (in response to
> the nation-state issue) To get a call to Germany, I signal to the access
> tandem or IXC switch I?ve chosen to interconnect with in the US and that
> switch signals upstream, etc.
>
>
>
> If we were not on this path of de-regulation where whatever makes
> commercial sense for one company can open up the whole SS7 network to
> un-trusted parties, we likely wouldn?t be here. At some point, a decision
> was made somewhere to allow this loosy-goosy inter-company signaling over
> the SS7 network between two point codes that would not, under the original
> implementation of SS7, be able to talk to each other in the first place.
>
>
>
> If the drumbeat of ?solve everything with IP!? continues, I hope that at
> least it gets solved by establishing something close to what the VPF was
> supposed to be, and not just a general dumping of all voice traffic across
> the internet between carriers. That certainly wouldn?t bode well for
> reliability or security.
>
>
>
> Mike
>
>
>
> Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
>
> Astro Companies, LLC
>
> 11523 Palm Brush Trail #401
>
> Lakewood Ranch, FL 34202
>
> DIRECT: call or text 941 600-0207
>
> http://www.astrocompanies.com
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] *On Behalf Of *Dan
> York
> *Sent:* Thursday, April 21, 2016 3:45 PM
> *To:* Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com>
> *Cc:* voiceops at voiceops.org
> *Subject:* Re: [VoiceOps] SS7
>
>
>
> This is generally true if the calls are *unencrypted* on VoIP...
>
>
>
> On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 2:20 PM, Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> Also folks, don't forget, the same outcome of recording someone's call is
> MUCH easier to accomplish once it is VoIP. IMHO, of course. ;-)
>
>
>
> ... BUT... what's fascinating is the recent rise in end-to-end (e2e)
> encryption among IP-based communications platforms that include voice.
>
>
>
> WhatsApp, for instance, just completed the rollout of e2e encryption on
> April 5, and not just for messaging, but also for voice and video calls as
> well as file transfers (
> https://blog.whatsapp.com/10000618/end-to-end-encryption ). Just
> yesterday the team behind Viber announced that they will soon have e2e
> encryption for all clients. The app Wire ( http://wire.com ) also does
> e2e encryption for voice, video and group chats.
>
>
>
> In a US Congress hearing this week, a Congressman asked a Dept of Homeland
> Security representative if e2e encryption available in apps would have
> prevented this interception that happened via SS7. The DHS answer was that
> it would mitigate the interception of the content, although the location
> meta-data would still be available. (You can view the exchange via the
> link in this tweet:
> https://twitter.com/csoghoian/status/722854012567969794 )
>
>
>
> The end result is that we're definitely moving to a space where the
> communication over IP-based solutions will wind up being far more secure
> than what we had before.
>
>
>
> Interesting times,
>
> Dan
>
>
>
> --
>
>
>
> Dan York
>
> dyork at lodestar2.com +1-802-735-1624 Skype:danyork
>
> My writing -> http://www.danyork.me/
>
> http://www.danyork.com/
>
> http://twitter.com/danyork
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
--
Kidd Filby
661.557.5640 (C)
http://www.linkedin.com/in/kiddfilby
April 22, 2016
Recommendations for high-cps SS7 OC-X gear?
by kiddfilby@gmail.com
I agree. A distributed Architecture, geographically dispersed, is the best
design for what is being asked of. The only issue I would see with the
Sonus deployment is they are very expensive. MetaSwitch would be able to
handle this load, as far as I know. Probably not as expensive as Sonus
but... not free either.
There are other options as well. Some would be checking out Squire,
GenBand and AudioCodes. Each of these vendors brings good things to the
table and I believe they could all handle the BH traffic you are looking at.
Kidd
On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 11:47 AM, Brandon Buckner <brandon at kamikos.com>
wrote:
> Just curious: Is there a reason to avoid Metaswitch?
>
> My main experience is in Metaswitch and Sonus, but in Metaswitch it was
> limited to the 2510 and 3510 gateways and the accompanying servers up to
> 7.4 software and none of the newer blade platforms. At the time I would
> have said that Metaswitch would have worked quite well for what is being
> asked, especially if wanting to split across many smaller gateways and
> geographically distributed. Is there something with the new hardware and/or
> software I don't know about quality-wise?
>
> Sonus killed off the GSX4000 which would have lent better to spreading
> around a bunch of smaller boxes. They still have the GSX9000 which goes up
> to single OC-3 cards (so you'd have to have a couple to split an OC-48
> still), but their main push seems to be the SBC5210 and SBC7000 which are
> IP only, no TDM. But spread across gateways the call processing can easily
> do the 500 CPS.
>
> On 4/21/2016 5:00 AM, Anthony Orlando via VoiceOps wrote:
>
> Avoid Meta at all cost.
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> On Apr 20, 2016, at 10:35 PM, Paul Timmins < <paul at timmins.net>
> paul at timmins.net> wrote:
>
> You're going to handle 500CPS of legacy sonet based TDM and question
> dropping 7 figures on the solution? *cringes*
>
> This is literally what platforms like metaswitch, sonus and many others
> are made for. If you're looking for low cost, Taqua's solution is decent,
> and if you need to take that entire OC-48, you're all but eyeballs deep in
> Sonus or Metaswitch land.
>
> -Paul
>
> On Apr 20, 2016, at 17:54, Brooks Bridges <bbridges at o1.com> wrote:
>
> Looking for suggestions for NEBS compliant gear that can support SS7,
> handle OC-3 or higher levels of channels, and can support (in aggregate) up
> to around 500 cps through a **good** (key word) SIP interface. I?m
> willing to entertain the idea of a single larger device that can take a
> full OC-48 and support the full 500 cps, but I?d prefer spread the load
> across multiple devices and smaller interfaces for load balancing and
> redundancy.
>
> Any pointers? Obviously there are products out there by the really big
> players, but I?d really rather not have to drop 7 figures on this project
> unless I have to.
>
> Thanks!
>
> *Brooks Bridges | *Sr. Voice Services Engineer
> *O1 Communications*
> 5190 Golden Foothill Pkwy
> El Dorado Hills, CA 95762
> *office:* 916.235.2097 | *main:* 888.444.1111, Option 2
> *email:* <bbridges at o1.com>bbridges at o1.com | *web:* <http://www.o1.com/>
> www.o1.com
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing listVoiceOps at voiceops.orghttps://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
--
Kidd Filby
661.557.5640 (C)
http://www.linkedin.com/in/kiddfilby
April 22, 2016
SS7
by mike@astrocompanies.com
It seems to me that this SS7 vulnerability issue is just the latest result of all of the de-regulation that?s been going on for the past? two decades or so. There was a time that you could not buy commercial access to the SS7 network; to get that access you had to be a real carrier. Also, back at that time, inter-company SS7 signalling could only occur on established, ordered signaling routes where both parties placed an order to open the route between them. Therefore, this would not have been possible back then because the carrier would not have ordered a route to the hacker?s point code(s) and it therefore would not exist.
If I am a US local carrier in 2001, I have no need to order a signaling route to a German carrier either so even the hacker having full access to a German carrier?s network would not compromise my network. (in response to the nation-state issue) To get a call to Germany, I signal to the access tandem or IXC switch I?ve chosen to interconnect with in the US and that switch signals upstream, etc.
If we were not on this path of de-regulation where whatever makes commercial sense for one company can open up the whole SS7 network to un-trusted parties, we likely wouldn?t be here. At some point, a decision was made somewhere to allow this loosy-goosy inter-company signaling over the SS7 network between two point codes that would not, under the original implementation of SS7, be able to talk to each other in the first place.
If the drumbeat of ?solve everything with IP!? continues, I hope that at least it gets solved by establishing something close to what the VPF was supposed to be, and not just a general dumping of all voice traffic across the internet between carriers. That certainly wouldn?t bode well for reliability or security.
Mike
Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
Astro Companies, LLC
11523 Palm Brush Trail #401
Lakewood Ranch, FL 34202
DIRECT: call or text 941 600-0207
<http://www.astrocompanies.com> http://www.astrocompanies.com
From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of Dan York
Sent: Thursday, April 21, 2016 3:45 PM
To: Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com>
Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] SS7
This is generally true if the calls are *unencrypted* on VoIP...
On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 2:20 PM, Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com <mailto:kiddfilby at gmail.com> > wrote:
Also folks, don't forget, the same outcome of recording someone's call is MUCH easier to accomplish once it is VoIP. IMHO, of course. ;-)
... BUT... what's fascinating is the recent rise in end-to-end (e2e) encryption among IP-based communications platforms that include voice.
WhatsApp, for instance, just completed the rollout of e2e encryption on April 5, and not just for messaging, but also for voice and video calls as well as file transfers ( https://blog.whatsapp.com/10000618/end-to-end-encryption ). Just yesterday the team behind Viber announced that they will soon have e2e encryption for all clients. The app Wire ( http://wire.com ) also does e2e encryption for voice, video and group chats.
In a US Congress hearing this week, a Congressman asked a Dept of Homeland Security representative if e2e encryption available in apps would have prevented this interception that happened via SS7. The DHS answer was that it would mitigate the interception of the content, although the location meta-data would still be available. (You can view the exchange via the link in this tweet: https://twitter.com/csoghoian/status/722854012567969794 )
The end result is that we're definitely moving to a space where the communication over IP-based solutions will wind up being far more secure than what we had before.
Interesting times,
Dan
--
Dan York
<mailto:dyork at lodestar2.com> dyork at lodestar2.com +1-802-735-1624 Skype:danyork
My writing -> http://www.danyork.me/
<http://www.danyork.com/> http://www.danyork.com/
http:// <http://twitter.com/danyork> twitter.com/danyork
April 22, 2016
Recommendations for high-cps SS7 OC-X gear?
by calvin.ellison@voxox.com
Anyone using TelcoBridges gear?
Regards,
*Calvin Ellison*
Voice Operations Engineer
calvin.ellison at voxox.com
+1 (213) 285-0555
-----------------------------------------------
*voxox.com <http://www.voxox.com/> *
5825 Oberlin Drive, Suite 5
San Diego, CA 92121
[image: Voxox]
On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 10:47 AM, Brandon Buckner <brandon at kamikos.com>
wrote:
> Just curious: Is there a reason to avoid Metaswitch?
>
> My main experience is in Metaswitch and Sonus, but in Metaswitch it was
> limited to the 2510 and 3510 gateways and the accompanying servers up to
> 7.4 software and none of the newer blade platforms. At the time I would
> have said that Metaswitch would have worked quite well for what is being
> asked, especially if wanting to split across many smaller gateways and
> geographically distributed. Is there something with the new hardware and/or
> software I don't know about quality-wise?
>
> Sonus killed off the GSX4000 which would have lent better to spreading
> around a bunch of smaller boxes. They still have the GSX9000 which goes up
> to single OC-3 cards (so you'd have to have a couple to split an OC-48
> still), but their main push seems to be the SBC5210 and SBC7000 which are
> IP only, no TDM. But spread across gateways the call processing can easily
> do the 500 CPS.
>
> On 4/21/2016 5:00 AM, Anthony Orlando via VoiceOps wrote:
>
> Avoid Meta at all cost.
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> On Apr 20, 2016, at 10:35 PM, Paul Timmins < <paul at timmins.net>
> paul at timmins.net> wrote:
>
> You're going to handle 500CPS of legacy sonet based TDM and question
> dropping 7 figures on the solution? *cringes*
>
> This is literally what platforms like metaswitch, sonus and many others
> are made for. If you're looking for low cost, Taqua's solution is decent,
> and if you need to take that entire OC-48, you're all but eyeballs deep in
> Sonus or Metaswitch land.
>
> -Paul
>
> On Apr 20, 2016, at 17:54, Brooks Bridges <bbridges at o1.com> wrote:
>
> Looking for suggestions for NEBS compliant gear that can support SS7,
> handle OC-3 or higher levels of channels, and can support (in aggregate) up
> to around 500 cps through a **good** (key word) SIP interface. I?m
> willing to entertain the idea of a single larger device that can take a
> full OC-48 and support the full 500 cps, but I?d prefer spread the load
> across multiple devices and smaller interfaces for load balancing and
> redundancy.
>
> Any pointers? Obviously there are products out there by the really big
> players, but I?d really rather not have to drop 7 figures on this project
> unless I have to.
>
> Thanks!
>
> *Brooks Bridges | *Sr. Voice Services Engineer
> *O1 Communications*
> 5190 Golden Foothill Pkwy
> El Dorado Hills, CA 95762
> *office:* 916.235.2097 | *main:* 888.444.1111, Option 2
> *email:* <bbridges at o1.com>bbridges at o1.com | *web:* <http://www.o1.com/>
> www.o1.com
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing listVoiceOps at voiceops.orghttps://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
April 22, 2016