VoiceOps
By thread
voiceops@voiceops.org
By month
Messages by month
- ----- 2026 -----
- November
- October
- September
- August
- July
- June
- May
- April
- March
- February
- January
- ----- 2025 -----
- December
- November
- October
- September
- August
- July
- June
- May
- April
- March
- February
- January
- ----- 2024 -----
- December
- November
- October
- September
- August
- July
- June
- May
- April
- March
- February
- January
- ----- 2023 -----
- December
- November
- October
- September
- August
- July
- June
- May
- April
- March
- February
- January
- ----- 2022 -----
- December
- November
- October
- September
- August
- July
- June
- May
- April
- March
- February
- January
- ----- 2021 -----
- December
- November
- October
- September
- August
- July
- June
- May
- April
- March
- February
- January
- ----- 2020 -----
- December
- November
- October
- September
- August
- July
- June
- May
- April
- March
- February
- January
- ----- 2019 -----
- December
- November
- October
- September
- August
- July
- June
- May
- April
- March
- February
- January
- ----- 2018 -----
- December
- November
- October
- September
- August
- July
- June
- May
- April
- March
- February
- January
- ----- 2017 -----
- December
- November
- October
- September
- August
- July
- June
- May
- April
- March
- February
- January
- ----- 2016 -----
- December
- November
- October
- September
- August
- July
- June
- May
- April
- March
- February
- January
- ----- 2015 -----
- December
- November
- October
- September
- August
- July
- June
- May
- April
- March
- February
- January
- ----- 2014 -----
- December
- November
- October
- September
- August
- July
- June
- May
- April
- March
- February
- January
- ----- 2013 -----
- December
- November
- October
- September
- August
- July
- June
- May
- April
- March
- February
- January
- ----- 2012 -----
- December
- November
- October
- September
- August
- July
- June
- May
- April
- March
- February
- January
- ----- 2011 -----
- December
- November
- October
- September
- August
- July
- June
- May
- April
- March
- February
- January
- ----- 2010 -----
- December
- November
- October
- September
- August
- July
- June
- May
- April
- March
- February
- January
- ----- 2009 -----
- December
- November
- October
- September
- August
- July
August 2018
- 23 participants
- 82 messages
Phone auth for incoming calls?
by caalvarez@gmail.com
On the security side...there's reality and there's perception. I go
through HIPAA/PCI compliance docs all the time, and they ask things about
encryption or secure/dedicated connections. I can say "no, but...." or I
can just say "yes." Our HIPPA-covered clients are all on MPLS to us so we
can answer yes. When I say "no but" on other topics, there's always a
hassle.
There is a practical matter that there are probably more threats on the
last mile than anywhere else. Someone at Level 3 is unlikely to be
sniffing on a large connection, but consumer ISP employees have much easier
access to the data. Downstream from there, plenty of places where there is
little security. So "secure to the first server" does have a certain value.
Either way, I don't intend to use TLS. It was more of an academic question.
On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 1:48 AM Alex Balashov <abalashov at evaristesys.com>
wrote:
> Yes, but until and unless your upstream supply chain is doing TLS and
> you can provide end-to-end security, it's a pointless waste of time.
>
> My customers have numerous customers who "require" "encryption" and
> "security", and this is provided to them on the "Last Mile" SIP trunk.
> But as soon as it goes to the usual Bandwidths and friends all that TLS
> is sheathed off.
>
> As long as that is the case, and I expect it will be the case for quite
> some time, this whole concept is a joke.
>
> The second problem is how incredibly inconsistent/broken SIP-TLS is.
> It's a trainwreck with way too many moving parts. My finding over the
> years has been that when it comes to providing faux-"security", my
> happiest customers are the ones that settled for a tunnel-based
> approach.
>
> -- Alex
>
> On Wed, Aug 08, 2018 at 10:09:40PM -0700, Ryan Delgrosso wrote:
>
> > I used to follow the same logic but recently have shifted. I now
> > wholeheartedly follow the encrypt everywhere stance. Too many industries
> > have compliance regulations where VoIP got the exemption because of
> > grandfathered PSTN focused laws, but just because you CAN go plaintext
> > doesnt make it the best answer, and its always stronger to say "yes" to
> the
> > encryption question than "No but..."
> >
> >
> >
> > On 8/8/2018 5:14 PM, Alex Balashov wrote:
> > > Agree with everything Ryan said, with the caveat that TLS for TLS's
> sake is, in my own humble opinion, a terrible idea from a troubleshooting
> and general complexity perspective. Use where absolutely necessary and
> nowhere else.
> > >
> > > On August 8, 2018 7:37:13 PM EDT, Ryan Delgrosso <
> ryandelgrosso at gmail.com> wrote:
> > > > OK so to expand on my previous smug-ness
> > > >
> > > > Upsides:
> > > >
> > > > * No more signaling nat issues. Literally zero. If you want to be
> > > > super-sneaky run your edge over TLS port 443 and most things wont
> > > > touch you.
> > > > * No retransmission's or registration avalanches. They simply
> cannot
> > > > happen since you need a tcp session first.
> > > > * No packet fragmentation issues. Send massive bloated SDP's and
> never
> > > > worry about pruning headers again. If you are doing sip SIMPLE
> send
> > > > mime bodies in messages if you want. Its all good.
> > > > * Faster convergence (if you reset the TCP connections to your
> devices
> > > > it will usually trigger an instantaneous proxy advance)
> > > > * Real-HA on carrier grade SBC's works just fine and TCP state is
> > > > maintained across pairs (Acme, Perimeta etc)
> > > > * Never chase lost signaling
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Downsides:
> > > >
> > > > * Conventional HA doesnt work so well. Your reg/subscription etc
> will
> > > > all be in the context of a single TCP session (with or without
> TLS).
> > > > This means for that second when you restart your proxy the
> session
> > > > is lost and MUST be re-establised by the client.
> > > > * SIP Outbound support, which would basically be the answer here
> > > > basically doesn't exist in a usable fashion for reliable
> dual-reg.
> > > > Device support is partial and broken. Its not good. There are
> > > > potential solutions but it involves real commitment to this right
> > > > now and the gulf of experience between having and not isnt huge.
> > > > * Moderately more load since TCP state must be retained, but on
> modern
> > > > hardware this is so trivial its almost not worth mentioning.
> > > > * Need to re-learn KPI's for network. The entire signaling profile
> > > > changes. Its just a different animal.
> > > > * Most of your sniffer-based diagnostic tools become useless (for
> tls)
> > > > since packets wont be readable. This is dodged with an edge that
> > > > will feed encrypted traffic to a collector.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Suggestions:
> > > >
> > > > STRONGLY recommend terminating TCP/TLS at the edge and still running
> > > > core in straight UDP with jumbo frames. You dont want a cascde of tcp
> > > > session reestablishments
> > > >
> > > > I have a growing SP network today doing this with great success and
> > > > also
> > > > advise my consulting clients to take this path.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On 8/8/2018 12:36 PM, Alex Balashov wrote:
> > > > > On Wed, Aug 08, 2018 at 12:21:09PM -0700, Carlos Alvarez wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > So...who else on the list uses TCP and has any comments about it?
> > > > > We are not an ITSP and are Polycom-only with a trivial number of
> > > > > endpoints, but we do use it and it works just fine.
> > > > >
> > > > > However, we have numerous customers, some of whom use TCP
> > > > predominantly
> > > > > for thousands of endpoints. It works just fine.
> > > > >
> > > > > In terms of downsides:
> > > > >
> > > > > In addition to a historical lack of (RFC 3261-mandated) support,
> > > > there
> > > > > are of course theoretical trade-offs involved in using TCP. There's
> > > > > more overhead, and connection state to be maintained on the server
> > > > side,
> > > > > which of course consumes resources ? resources considered trivial
> > > > > nowadays, but once upon a time, when RFC 3261 was ratified (2002),
> > > > > perhaps not. As with all things TCP, it can also present a DoS
> vector
> > > > if
> > > > > you don't limit the number of connections somewhere.
> > > > >
> > > > > The congestion control/end-to-end delay aspects of TCP are
> certainly
> > > > not
> > > > > as important now as they were at a time when the public IP backbone
> > > > and
> > > > > was in an entirely different place in its evolution. Also, nowadays
> > > > the
> > > > > congestion/windowing algorithms used in TCP can be tweaked to
> > > > something
> > > > > more efficient.
> > > > >
> > > > > I think the most damning thing about using TCP is perceived to be
> the
> > > > > relative difficulty of failing over TCP session state to a
> different
> > > > > host. UDP does not require connection state, so as long as you have
> > > > some
> > > > > means of handling requests in a relatively stateless fashion,
> things
> > > > can
> > > > > just carry on as they did before in the event of an IP takeover
> > > > without
> > > > > anyone having to "reconnect". This is one area where the big
> > > > enterprise
> > > > > boxes certainly trump the open-source ecosystem, where transparent
> > > > TCP
> > > > > failover *for SIP* doesn't really exist, although in my opinion the
> > > > > whole issue is getting a bit moot with the way cloud infrastructure
> > > > and
> > > > > virtualisation networking is evolving.
> > > > >
> > > > > -- Alex
> > > > >
> > >
> > > -- Alex
> > >
> > > --
> > > Sent via mobile, please forgive typos and brevity.
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > VoiceOps mailing list
> > > VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> > > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > VoiceOps mailing list
> > VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
> --
> Alex Balashov | Principal | Evariste Systems LLC
>
> Tel: +1-706-510-6800 / +1-800-250-5920 (toll-free)
> Web: http://www.evaristesys.com/, http://www.csrpswitch.com/
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
Aug. 9, 2018
Phone auth for incoming calls?
by calvin.ellison@voxox.com
Alex, what has been your experience with tunnel based solutions? Our choice
seems to be IPSec VPN on existing gear or spending some cash on an SRTP-RTP
"transcoder".
Regards,
*Calvin Ellison*
Voice Operations Engineer
calvin.ellison at voxox.com
+1 (213) 285-0555
-----------------------------------------------
*voxox.com <http://www.voxox.com/> *
5825 Oberlin Drive, Suite 5
San Diego, CA 92121
[image: Voxox]
On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 1:46 AM, Alex Balashov <abalashov at evaristesys.com>
wrote:
> Yes, but until and unless your upstream supply chain is doing TLS and
> you can provide end-to-end security, it's a pointless waste of time.
>
> My customers have numerous customers who "require" "encryption" and
> "security", and this is provided to them on the "Last Mile" SIP trunk.
> But as soon as it goes to the usual Bandwidths and friends all that TLS
> is sheathed off.
>
> As long as that is the case, and I expect it will be the case for quite
> some time, this whole concept is a joke.
>
> The second problem is how incredibly inconsistent/broken SIP-TLS is.
> It's a trainwreck with way too many moving parts. My finding over the
> years has been that when it comes to providing faux-"security", my
> happiest customers are the ones that settled for a tunnel-based
> approach.
>
> -- Alex
>
> On Wed, Aug 08, 2018 at 10:09:40PM -0700, Ryan Delgrosso wrote:
>
> > I used to follow the same logic but recently have shifted. I now
> > wholeheartedly follow the encrypt everywhere stance. Too many industries
> > have compliance regulations where VoIP got the exemption because of
> > grandfathered PSTN focused laws, but just because you CAN go plaintext
> > doesnt make it the best answer, and its always stronger to say "yes" to
> the
> > encryption question than "No but..."
> >
> >
> >
> > On 8/8/2018 5:14 PM, Alex Balashov wrote:
> > > Agree with everything Ryan said, with the caveat that TLS for TLS's
> sake is, in my own humble opinion, a terrible idea from a troubleshooting
> and general complexity perspective. Use where absolutely necessary and
> nowhere else.
> > >
> > > On August 8, 2018 7:37:13 PM EDT, Ryan Delgrosso <
> ryandelgrosso at gmail.com> wrote:
> > > > OK so to expand on my previous smug-ness
> > > >
> > > > Upsides:
> > > >
> > > > * No more signaling nat issues. Literally zero. If you want to be
> > > > super-sneaky run your edge over TLS port 443 and most things wont
> > > > touch you.
> > > > * No retransmission's or registration avalanches. They simply
> cannot
> > > > happen since you need a tcp session first.
> > > > * No packet fragmentation issues. Send massive bloated SDP's and
> never
> > > > worry about pruning headers again. If you are doing sip SIMPLE
> send
> > > > mime bodies in messages if you want. Its all good.
> > > > * Faster convergence (if you reset the TCP connections to your
> devices
> > > > it will usually trigger an instantaneous proxy advance)
> > > > * Real-HA on carrier grade SBC's works just fine and TCP state is
> > > > maintained across pairs (Acme, Perimeta etc)
> > > > * Never chase lost signaling
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Downsides:
> > > >
> > > > * Conventional HA doesnt work so well. Your reg/subscription etc
> will
> > > > all be in the context of a single TCP session (with or without
> TLS).
> > > > This means for that second when you restart your proxy the
> session
> > > > is lost and MUST be re-establised by the client.
> > > > * SIP Outbound support, which would basically be the answer here
> > > > basically doesn't exist in a usable fashion for reliable
> dual-reg.
> > > > Device support is partial and broken. Its not good. There are
> > > > potential solutions but it involves real commitment to this right
> > > > now and the gulf of experience between having and not isnt huge.
> > > > * Moderately more load since TCP state must be retained, but on
> modern
> > > > hardware this is so trivial its almost not worth mentioning.
> > > > * Need to re-learn KPI's for network. The entire signaling profile
> > > > changes. Its just a different animal.
> > > > * Most of your sniffer-based diagnostic tools become useless (for
> tls)
> > > > since packets wont be readable. This is dodged with an edge that
> > > > will feed encrypted traffic to a collector.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Suggestions:
> > > >
> > > > STRONGLY recommend terminating TCP/TLS at the edge and still running
> > > > core in straight UDP with jumbo frames. You dont want a cascde of tcp
> > > > session reestablishments
> > > >
> > > > I have a growing SP network today doing this with great success and
> > > > also
> > > > advise my consulting clients to take this path.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On 8/8/2018 12:36 PM, Alex Balashov wrote:
> > > > > On Wed, Aug 08, 2018 at 12:21:09PM -0700, Carlos Alvarez wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > So...who else on the list uses TCP and has any comments about it?
> > > > > We are not an ITSP and are Polycom-only with a trivial number of
> > > > > endpoints, but we do use it and it works just fine.
> > > > >
> > > > > However, we have numerous customers, some of whom use TCP
> > > > predominantly
> > > > > for thousands of endpoints. It works just fine.
> > > > >
> > > > > In terms of downsides:
> > > > >
> > > > > In addition to a historical lack of (RFC 3261-mandated) support,
> > > > there
> > > > > are of course theoretical trade-offs involved in using TCP. There's
> > > > > more overhead, and connection state to be maintained on the server
> > > > side,
> > > > > which of course consumes resources ? resources considered trivial
> > > > > nowadays, but once upon a time, when RFC 3261 was ratified (2002),
> > > > > perhaps not. As with all things TCP, it can also present a DoS
> vector
> > > > if
> > > > > you don't limit the number of connections somewhere.
> > > > >
> > > > > The congestion control/end-to-end delay aspects of TCP are
> certainly
> > > > not
> > > > > as important now as they were at a time when the public IP backbone
> > > > and
> > > > > was in an entirely different place in its evolution. Also, nowadays
> > > > the
> > > > > congestion/windowing algorithms used in TCP can be tweaked to
> > > > something
> > > > > more efficient.
> > > > >
> > > > > I think the most damning thing about using TCP is perceived to be
> the
> > > > > relative difficulty of failing over TCP session state to a
> different
> > > > > host. UDP does not require connection state, so as long as you have
> > > > some
> > > > > means of handling requests in a relatively stateless fashion,
> things
> > > > can
> > > > > just carry on as they did before in the event of an IP takeover
> > > > without
> > > > > anyone having to "reconnect". This is one area where the big
> > > > enterprise
> > > > > boxes certainly trump the open-source ecosystem, where transparent
> > > > TCP
> > > > > failover *for SIP* doesn't really exist, although in my opinion the
> > > > > whole issue is getting a bit moot with the way cloud infrastructure
> > > > and
> > > > > virtualisation networking is evolving.
> > > > >
> > > > > -- Alex
> > > > >
> > >
> > > -- Alex
> > >
> > > --
> > > Sent via mobile, please forgive typos and brevity.
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > VoiceOps mailing list
> > > VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> > > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > VoiceOps mailing list
> > VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
> --
> Alex Balashov | Principal | Evariste Systems LLC
>
> Tel: +1-706-510-6800 / +1-800-250-5920 (toll-free)
> Web: http://www.evaristesys.com/, http://www.csrpswitch.com/
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
Aug. 9, 2018
SBCs - Ribbon and AudioCodes
by ryan@finnesey.com
I am going to have to install a series of SBCs for a? voice offering connected to Microsoft Teams.? We are going to pass the SIP traffic off to a large number of SIP providers.? I would like? to get some feedback from the group on SBCs from Ribbon and AudioCodes . I am leaning towards a software based SBC over an appliance.
Would be helpful to get the other members feedback on Ribbon or AudioCodes deployments within their networks.
Cheers
Ryan
Aug. 9, 2018
Phone auth for incoming calls?
by abalashov@evaristesys.com
Yes, but until and unless your upstream supply chain is doing TLS and
you can provide end-to-end security, it's a pointless waste of time.
My customers have numerous customers who "require" "encryption" and
"security", and this is provided to them on the "Last Mile" SIP trunk.
But as soon as it goes to the usual Bandwidths and friends all that TLS
is sheathed off.
As long as that is the case, and I expect it will be the case for quite
some time, this whole concept is a joke.
The second problem is how incredibly inconsistent/broken SIP-TLS is.
It's a trainwreck with way too many moving parts. My finding over the
years has been that when it comes to providing faux-"security", my
happiest customers are the ones that settled for a tunnel-based
approach.
-- Alex
On Wed, Aug 08, 2018 at 10:09:40PM -0700, Ryan Delgrosso wrote:
> I used to follow the same logic but recently have shifted. I now
> wholeheartedly follow the encrypt everywhere stance. Too many industries
> have compliance regulations where VoIP got the exemption because of
> grandfathered PSTN focused laws, but just because you CAN go plaintext
> doesnt make it the best answer, and its always stronger to say "yes" to the
> encryption question than "No but..."
>
>
>
> On 8/8/2018 5:14 PM, Alex Balashov wrote:
> > Agree with everything Ryan said, with the caveat that TLS for TLS's sake is, in my own humble opinion, a terrible idea from a troubleshooting and general complexity perspective. Use where absolutely necessary and nowhere else.
> >
> > On August 8, 2018 7:37:13 PM EDT, Ryan Delgrosso <ryandelgrosso at gmail.com> wrote:
> > > OK so to expand on my previous smug-ness
> > >
> > > Upsides:
> > >
> > > * No more signaling nat issues. Literally zero. If you want to be
> > > super-sneaky run your edge over TLS port 443 and most things wont
> > > touch you.
> > > * No retransmission's or registration avalanches. They simply cannot
> > > happen since you need a tcp session first.
> > > * No packet fragmentation issues. Send massive bloated SDP's and never
> > > worry about pruning headers again. If you are doing sip SIMPLE send
> > > mime bodies in messages if you want. Its all good.
> > > * Faster convergence (if you reset the TCP connections to your devices
> > > it will usually trigger an instantaneous proxy advance)
> > > * Real-HA on carrier grade SBC's works just fine and TCP state is
> > > maintained across pairs (Acme, Perimeta etc)
> > > * Never chase lost signaling
> > >
> > >
> > > Downsides:
> > >
> > > * Conventional HA doesnt work so well. Your reg/subscription etc will
> > > all be in the context of a single TCP session (with or without TLS).
> > > This means for that second when you restart your proxy the session
> > > is lost and MUST be re-establised by the client.
> > > * SIP Outbound support, which would basically be the answer here
> > > basically doesn't exist in a usable fashion for reliable dual-reg.
> > > Device support is partial and broken. Its not good. There are
> > > potential solutions but it involves real commitment to this right
> > > now and the gulf of experience between having and not isnt huge.
> > > * Moderately more load since TCP state must be retained, but on modern
> > > hardware this is so trivial its almost not worth mentioning.
> > > * Need to re-learn KPI's for network. The entire signaling profile
> > > changes. Its just a different animal.
> > > * Most of your sniffer-based diagnostic tools become useless (for tls)
> > > since packets wont be readable. This is dodged with an edge that
> > > will feed encrypted traffic to a collector.
> > >
> > >
> > > Suggestions:
> > >
> > > STRONGLY recommend terminating TCP/TLS at the edge and still running
> > > core in straight UDP with jumbo frames. You dont want a cascde of tcp
> > > session reestablishments
> > >
> > > I have a growing SP network today doing this with great success and
> > > also
> > > advise my consulting clients to take this path.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On 8/8/2018 12:36 PM, Alex Balashov wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Aug 08, 2018 at 12:21:09PM -0700, Carlos Alvarez wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > So...who else on the list uses TCP and has any comments about it?
> > > > We are not an ITSP and are Polycom-only with a trivial number of
> > > > endpoints, but we do use it and it works just fine.
> > > >
> > > > However, we have numerous customers, some of whom use TCP
> > > predominantly
> > > > for thousands of endpoints. It works just fine.
> > > >
> > > > In terms of downsides:
> > > >
> > > > In addition to a historical lack of (RFC 3261-mandated) support,
> > > there
> > > > are of course theoretical trade-offs involved in using TCP. There's
> > > > more overhead, and connection state to be maintained on the server
> > > side,
> > > > which of course consumes resources ? resources considered trivial
> > > > nowadays, but once upon a time, when RFC 3261 was ratified (2002),
> > > > perhaps not. As with all things TCP, it can also present a DoS vector
> > > if
> > > > you don't limit the number of connections somewhere.
> > > >
> > > > The congestion control/end-to-end delay aspects of TCP are certainly
> > > not
> > > > as important now as they were at a time when the public IP backbone
> > > and
> > > > was in an entirely different place in its evolution. Also, nowadays
> > > the
> > > > congestion/windowing algorithms used in TCP can be tweaked to
> > > something
> > > > more efficient.
> > > >
> > > > I think the most damning thing about using TCP is perceived to be the
> > > > relative difficulty of failing over TCP session state to a different
> > > > host. UDP does not require connection state, so as long as you have
> > > some
> > > > means of handling requests in a relatively stateless fashion, things
> > > can
> > > > just carry on as they did before in the event of an IP takeover
> > > without
> > > > anyone having to "reconnect". This is one area where the big
> > > enterprise
> > > > boxes certainly trump the open-source ecosystem, where transparent
> > > TCP
> > > > failover *for SIP* doesn't really exist, although in my opinion the
> > > > whole issue is getting a bit moot with the way cloud infrastructure
> > > and
> > > > virtualisation networking is evolving.
> > > >
> > > > -- Alex
> > > >
> >
> > -- Alex
> >
> > --
> > Sent via mobile, please forgive typos and brevity.
> > _______________________________________________
> > VoiceOps mailing list
> > VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
--
Alex Balashov | Principal | Evariste Systems LLC
Tel: +1-706-510-6800 / +1-800-250-5920 (toll-free)
Web: http://www.evaristesys.com/, http://www.csrpswitch.com/
Aug. 9, 2018
Phone auth for incoming calls?
by ryandelgrosso@gmail.com
I used to follow the same logic but recently have shifted. I now
wholeheartedly follow the encrypt everywhere stance. Too many industries
have compliance regulations where VoIP got the exemption because of
grandfathered PSTN focused laws, but just because you CAN go plaintext
doesnt make it the best answer, and its always stronger to say "yes" to
the encryption question than "No but..."
On 8/8/2018 5:14 PM, Alex Balashov wrote:
> Agree with everything Ryan said, with the caveat that TLS for TLS's sake is, in my own humble opinion, a terrible idea from a troubleshooting and general complexity perspective. Use where absolutely necessary and nowhere else.
>
> On August 8, 2018 7:37:13 PM EDT, Ryan Delgrosso <ryandelgrosso at gmail.com> wrote:
>> OK so to expand on my previous smug-ness
>>
>> Upsides:
>>
>> * No more signaling nat issues. Literally zero. If you want to be
>> super-sneaky run your edge over TLS port 443 and most things wont
>> touch you.
>> * No retransmission's or registration avalanches. They simply cannot
>> happen since you need a tcp session first.
>> * No packet fragmentation issues. Send massive bloated SDP's and never
>> worry about pruning headers again. If you are doing sip SIMPLE send
>> mime bodies in messages if you want. Its all good.
>> * Faster convergence (if you reset the TCP connections to your devices
>> it will usually trigger an instantaneous proxy advance)
>> * Real-HA on carrier grade SBC's works just fine and TCP state is
>> maintained across pairs (Acme, Perimeta etc)
>> * Never chase lost signaling
>>
>>
>> Downsides:
>>
>> * Conventional HA doesnt work so well. Your reg/subscription etc will
>> all be in the context of a single TCP session (with or without TLS).
>> This means for that second when you restart your proxy the session
>> is lost and MUST be re-establised by the client.
>> * SIP Outbound support, which would basically be the answer here
>> basically doesn't exist in a usable fashion for reliable dual-reg.
>> Device support is partial and broken. Its not good. There are
>> potential solutions but it involves real commitment to this right
>> now and the gulf of experience between having and not isnt huge.
>> * Moderately more load since TCP state must be retained, but on modern
>> hardware this is so trivial its almost not worth mentioning.
>> * Need to re-learn KPI's for network. The entire signaling profile
>> changes. Its just a different animal.
>> * Most of your sniffer-based diagnostic tools become useless (for tls)
>> since packets wont be readable. This is dodged with an edge that
>> will feed encrypted traffic to a collector.
>>
>>
>> Suggestions:
>>
>> STRONGLY recommend terminating TCP/TLS at the edge and still running
>> core in straight UDP with jumbo frames. You dont want a cascde of tcp
>> session reestablishments
>>
>> I have a growing SP network today doing this with great success and
>> also
>> advise my consulting clients to take this path.
>>
>>
>>
>> On 8/8/2018 12:36 PM, Alex Balashov wrote:
>>> On Wed, Aug 08, 2018 at 12:21:09PM -0700, Carlos Alvarez wrote:
>>>
>>>> So...who else on the list uses TCP and has any comments about it?
>>> We are not an ITSP and are Polycom-only with a trivial number of
>>> endpoints, but we do use it and it works just fine.
>>>
>>> However, we have numerous customers, some of whom use TCP
>> predominantly
>>> for thousands of endpoints. It works just fine.
>>>
>>> In terms of downsides:
>>>
>>> In addition to a historical lack of (RFC 3261-mandated) support,
>> there
>>> are of course theoretical trade-offs involved in using TCP. There's
>>> more overhead, and connection state to be maintained on the server
>> side,
>>> which of course consumes resources ? resources considered trivial
>>> nowadays, but once upon a time, when RFC 3261 was ratified (2002),
>>> perhaps not. As with all things TCP, it can also present a DoS vector
>> if
>>> you don't limit the number of connections somewhere.
>>>
>>> The congestion control/end-to-end delay aspects of TCP are certainly
>> not
>>> as important now as they were at a time when the public IP backbone
>> and
>>> was in an entirely different place in its evolution. Also, nowadays
>> the
>>> congestion/windowing algorithms used in TCP can be tweaked to
>> something
>>> more efficient.
>>>
>>> I think the most damning thing about using TCP is perceived to be the
>>> relative difficulty of failing over TCP session state to a different
>>> host. UDP does not require connection state, so as long as you have
>> some
>>> means of handling requests in a relatively stateless fashion, things
>> can
>>> just carry on as they did before in the event of an IP takeover
>> without
>>> anyone having to "reconnect". This is one area where the big
>> enterprise
>>> boxes certainly trump the open-source ecosystem, where transparent
>> TCP
>>> failover *for SIP* doesn't really exist, although in my opinion the
>>> whole issue is getting a bit moot with the way cloud infrastructure
>> and
>>> virtualisation networking is evolving.
>>>
>>> -- Alex
>>>
>
> -- Alex
>
> --
> Sent via mobile, please forgive typos and brevity.
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
Aug. 9, 2018
Phone auth for incoming calls?
by abalashov@evaristesys.com
Agree with everything Ryan said, with the caveat that TLS for TLS's sake is, in my own humble opinion, a terrible idea from a troubleshooting and general complexity perspective. Use where absolutely necessary and nowhere else.
On August 8, 2018 7:37:13 PM EDT, Ryan Delgrosso <ryandelgrosso at gmail.com> wrote:
>OK so to expand on my previous smug-ness
>
>Upsides:
>
> * No more signaling nat issues. Literally zero. If you want to be
> super-sneaky run your edge over TLS port 443 and most things wont
> touch you.
> * No retransmission's or registration avalanches. They simply cannot
> happen since you need a tcp session first.
> * No packet fragmentation issues. Send massive bloated SDP's and never
> worry about pruning headers again. If you are doing sip SIMPLE send
> mime bodies in messages if you want. Its all good.
> * Faster convergence (if you reset the TCP connections to your devices
> it will usually trigger an instantaneous proxy advance)
> * Real-HA on carrier grade SBC's works just fine and TCP state is
> maintained across pairs (Acme, Perimeta etc)
> * Never chase lost signaling
>
>
>Downsides:
>
> * Conventional HA doesnt work so well. Your reg/subscription etc will
> all be in the context of a single TCP session (with or without TLS).
> This means for that second when you restart your proxy the session
> is lost and MUST be re-establised by the client.
> * SIP Outbound support, which would basically be the answer here
> basically doesn't exist in a usable fashion for reliable dual-reg.
> Device support is partial and broken. Its not good. There are
> potential solutions but it involves real commitment to this right
> now and the gulf of experience between having and not isnt huge.
> * Moderately more load since TCP state must be retained, but on modern
> hardware this is so trivial its almost not worth mentioning.
> * Need to re-learn KPI's for network. The entire signaling profile
> changes. Its just a different animal.
> * Most of your sniffer-based diagnostic tools become useless (for tls)
> since packets wont be readable. This is dodged with an edge that
> will feed encrypted traffic to a collector.
>
>
>Suggestions:
>
>STRONGLY recommend terminating TCP/TLS at the edge and still running
>core in straight UDP with jumbo frames. You dont want a cascde of tcp
>session reestablishments
>
>I have a growing SP network today doing this with great success and
>also
>advise my consulting clients to take this path.
>
>
>
>On 8/8/2018 12:36 PM, Alex Balashov wrote:
>> On Wed, Aug 08, 2018 at 12:21:09PM -0700, Carlos Alvarez wrote:
>>
>>> So...who else on the list uses TCP and has any comments about it?
>> We are not an ITSP and are Polycom-only with a trivial number of
>> endpoints, but we do use it and it works just fine.
>>
>> However, we have numerous customers, some of whom use TCP
>predominantly
>> for thousands of endpoints. It works just fine.
>>
>> In terms of downsides:
>>
>> In addition to a historical lack of (RFC 3261-mandated) support,
>there
>> are of course theoretical trade-offs involved in using TCP. There's
>> more overhead, and connection state to be maintained on the server
>side,
>> which of course consumes resources ? resources considered trivial
>> nowadays, but once upon a time, when RFC 3261 was ratified (2002),
>> perhaps not. As with all things TCP, it can also present a DoS vector
>if
>> you don't limit the number of connections somewhere.
>>
>> The congestion control/end-to-end delay aspects of TCP are certainly
>not
>> as important now as they were at a time when the public IP backbone
>and
>> was in an entirely different place in its evolution. Also, nowadays
>the
>> congestion/windowing algorithms used in TCP can be tweaked to
>something
>> more efficient.
>>
>> I think the most damning thing about using TCP is perceived to be the
>> relative difficulty of failing over TCP session state to a different
>> host. UDP does not require connection state, so as long as you have
>some
>> means of handling requests in a relatively stateless fashion, things
>can
>> just carry on as they did before in the event of an IP takeover
>without
>> anyone having to "reconnect". This is one area where the big
>enterprise
>> boxes certainly trump the open-source ecosystem, where transparent
>TCP
>> failover *for SIP* doesn't really exist, although in my opinion the
>> whole issue is getting a bit moot with the way cloud infrastructure
>and
>> virtualisation networking is evolving.
>>
>> -- Alex
>>
-- Alex
--
Sent via mobile, please forgive typos and brevity.
Aug. 9, 2018
Phone auth for incoming calls?
by ryandelgrosso@gmail.com
OK so to expand on my previous smug-ness
Upsides:
* No more signaling nat issues. Literally zero. If you want to be
super-sneaky run your edge over TLS port 443 and most things wont
touch you.
* No retransmission's or registration avalanches. They simply cannot
happen since you need a tcp session first.
* No packet fragmentation issues. Send massive bloated SDP's and never
worry about pruning headers again. If you are doing sip SIMPLE send
mime bodies in messages if you want. Its all good.
* Faster convergence (if you reset the TCP connections to your devices
it will usually trigger an instantaneous proxy advance)
* Real-HA on carrier grade SBC's works just fine and TCP state is
maintained across pairs (Acme, Perimeta etc)
* Never chase lost signaling
Downsides:
* Conventional HA doesnt work so well. Your reg/subscription etc will
all be in the context of a single TCP session (with or without TLS).
This means for that second when you restart your proxy the session
is lost and MUST be re-establised by the client.
* SIP Outbound support, which would basically be the answer here
basically doesn't exist in a usable fashion for reliable dual-reg.
Device support is partial and broken. Its not good. There are
potential solutions but it involves real commitment to this right
now and the gulf of experience between having and not isnt huge.
* Moderately more load since TCP state must be retained, but on modern
hardware this is so trivial its almost not worth mentioning.
* Need to re-learn KPI's for network. The entire signaling profile
changes. Its just a different animal.
* Most of your sniffer-based diagnostic tools become useless (for tls)
since packets wont be readable. This is dodged with an edge that
will feed encrypted traffic to a collector.
Suggestions:
STRONGLY recommend terminating TCP/TLS at the edge and still running
core in straight UDP with jumbo frames. You dont want a cascde of tcp
session reestablishments
I have a growing SP network today doing this with great success and also
advise my consulting clients to take this path.
On 8/8/2018 12:36 PM, Alex Balashov wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 08, 2018 at 12:21:09PM -0700, Carlos Alvarez wrote:
>
>> So...who else on the list uses TCP and has any comments about it?
> We are not an ITSP and are Polycom-only with a trivial number of
> endpoints, but we do use it and it works just fine.
>
> However, we have numerous customers, some of whom use TCP predominantly
> for thousands of endpoints. It works just fine.
>
> In terms of downsides:
>
> In addition to a historical lack of (RFC 3261-mandated) support, there
> are of course theoretical trade-offs involved in using TCP. There's
> more overhead, and connection state to be maintained on the server side,
> which of course consumes resources ? resources considered trivial
> nowadays, but once upon a time, when RFC 3261 was ratified (2002),
> perhaps not. As with all things TCP, it can also present a DoS vector if
> you don't limit the number of connections somewhere.
>
> The congestion control/end-to-end delay aspects of TCP are certainly not
> as important now as they were at a time when the public IP backbone and
> was in an entirely different place in its evolution. Also, nowadays the
> congestion/windowing algorithms used in TCP can be tweaked to something
> more efficient.
>
> I think the most damning thing about using TCP is perceived to be the
> relative difficulty of failing over TCP session state to a different
> host. UDP does not require connection state, so as long as you have some
> means of handling requests in a relatively stateless fashion, things can
> just carry on as they did before in the event of an IP takeover without
> anyone having to "reconnect". This is one area where the big enterprise
> boxes certainly trump the open-source ecosystem, where transparent TCP
> failover *for SIP* doesn't really exist, although in my opinion the
> whole issue is getting a bit moot with the way cloud infrastructure and
> virtualisation networking is evolving.
>
> -- Alex
>
Aug. 8, 2018
Phone auth for incoming calls?
by ryandelgrosso@gmail.com
Step 1: Move everything to TCP (or better yet TLS).
Step 2: Use LetsEncrypt for free perpetual certificates.
Step 3: Profit (and smug superiority over UDP based competitors battling
nat issues).
On 8/8/2018 10:43 AM, Carlos Alvarez wrote:
> Do most of you have the phones authenticate incoming calls?? We
> haven't been, but occasionally find a router that has unfiltered full
> cone NAT (Cisco) or that puts one phone on 5060 with no filtering by
> IP.? The result is that the phone will start ringing at random as
> script kiddies hit the IP and port 5060 trying to find servers to
> exploit.? I don't see a downside to changing to auth, but not having
> done it outside of a few tests of a small number of phones, I figured
> I would ask.
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
Aug. 8, 2018
Phone auth for incoming calls?
by abalashov@evaristesys.com
On Wed, Aug 08, 2018 at 12:39:17PM -0700, Carlos Alvarez wrote:
> So those of you using TCP, are you also using TLS?
For some customers who require it, it's done, though as we both know,
it's silly since you can only provide encryption on the last mile.
But no, SIP-TLS is a whole different ball of wax with an entirely
different reliability, interoperability and practicality profile, and
one I would not advise you to get into unnecessarily.
--
Alex Balashov | Principal | Evariste Systems LLC
Tel: +1-706-510-6800 / +1-800-250-5920 (toll-free)
Web: http://www.evaristesys.com/, http://www.csrpswitch.com/
Aug. 8, 2018
Phone auth for incoming calls?
by caalvarez@gmail.com
So those of you using TCP, are you also using TLS?
On Wed, Aug 8, 2018 at 12:36 PM Alex Balashov <abalashov at evaristesys.com>
wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 08, 2018 at 12:21:09PM -0700, Carlos Alvarez wrote:
>
> > So...who else on the list uses TCP and has any comments about it?
>
> We are not an ITSP and are Polycom-only with a trivial number of
> endpoints, but we do use it and it works just fine.
>
> However, we have numerous customers, some of whom use TCP predominantly
> for thousands of endpoints. It works just fine.
>
> In terms of downsides:
>
> In addition to a historical lack of (RFC 3261-mandated) support, there
> are of course theoretical trade-offs involved in using TCP. There's
> more overhead, and connection state to be maintained on the server side,
> which of course consumes resources ? resources considered trivial
> nowadays, but once upon a time, when RFC 3261 was ratified (2002),
> perhaps not. As with all things TCP, it can also present a DoS vector if
> you don't limit the number of connections somewhere.
>
> The congestion control/end-to-end delay aspects of TCP are certainly not
> as important now as they were at a time when the public IP backbone and
> was in an entirely different place in its evolution. Also, nowadays the
> congestion/windowing algorithms used in TCP can be tweaked to something
> more efficient.
>
> I think the most damning thing about using TCP is perceived to be the
> relative difficulty of failing over TCP session state to a different
> host. UDP does not require connection state, so as long as you have some
> means of handling requests in a relatively stateless fashion, things can
> just carry on as they did before in the event of an IP takeover without
> anyone having to "reconnect". This is one area where the big enterprise
> boxes certainly trump the open-source ecosystem, where transparent TCP
> failover *for SIP* doesn't really exist, although in my opinion the
> whole issue is getting a bit moot with the way cloud infrastructure and
> virtualisation networking is evolving.
>
> -- Alex
>
> --
> Alex Balashov | Principal | Evariste Systems LLC
>
> Tel: +1-706-510-6800 / +1-800-250-5920 (toll-free)
> Web: http://www.evaristesys.com/, http://www.csrpswitch.com/
>
Aug. 8, 2018