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December 2019
- 23 participants
- 54 messages
STIR/SHAKEN Discussion: Will it help?
by beckman@angryox.com
On Tue, 17 Dec 2019, mike at astrocompanies.com wrote:
> Good question. First, if you're using Hooli, you'll have to migrate to
> Pipernet sooner or later. Their middle-out compression provides much better
> call quality so it's worth the effort to migrate.
Doh! What's their Weissman score?
> But to the issue you raised, the purpose of STIR/SHAKEN is not to block
> robocalls per se, it is to provide an authentication chain so that you can
> determine and contact the originating carrier regardless of the route the
> call took to reach the terminating side.
AFAIK, it is only the first originating carrier that gets a SIP Invite that
contains no STIR/SHAKEN header. Each carrier does not also add their own
header. I may be incorrect.
> So, now we can see that the call was attested by Hooli, and if Hooli does
> not cooperate with our fraud/nuisance investigations we are now authorized
> to block traffic signed by Hooli. That does fix the problem to a large
> degree.
Sure, but have you ever tried to contact a carrier for which you do not
have a business relationship and get them to do something, and you are
smaller and less consequential than they are?
We can block Hooli, but now OUR customers are livid, and Hooli doesn't
really care.
> However, it's also worthy of note that this is not the main problem that
> needs to be solved. The main problem that needs to be solved is the case
> where you are sending the call to Hooli originating from a number that is
> assigned to our CLEC, which you don't have permission to use. This does
> solve that problem, because Hooli is only going to issue partial attestation
> for that call since it's not their number. So we can still contact Hooli
> about it because they attested it and from that I can find them, but we or
> our subscriber can also block calls with partial attestations if we/they
> choose to.
But if I DO have a number assigned to me BY as CLEC that is not the
terminating carrier (e.g. Acme gives me a DID, which I am authorized to
use, then try to terminate using that DID as CallerID through Hooli, Hooli
does not know (and cannot know for certain) that I, the Hooli customer, is
authorized to use that DID as CallerID, even though I am. This results in
a Hooli Partial Attestation, even though the call is fully compliant with
all the rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Beckman Internet Guy
beckman at angryox.com http://www.angryox.com/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dec. 17, 2019
STIR/SHAKEN Discussion: Will it help?
by abalashov@evaristesys.com
I knew Gavin Belson was behind this.
?
Sent from mobile, with due apologies for brevity and errors.
> On Dec 17, 2019, at 4:07 PM, Paul Timmins <paul at timmins.net> wrote:
>
> ?
> I see it as stopping fraud the same way SPF and DKIM stopped spam.
>
> On 12/17/19 3:38 PM, Dovid Bender wrote:
>> Mike beat me to it. It's going to stop fraud. The bigger issue you are going to have is the larger packets. So many devices out there can't seem to fragment packets correctly.
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 3:28 PM <mike at astrocompanies.com> wrote:
>>> Hi Peter,
>>>
>>> Good question. First, if you're using Hooli, you'll have to migrate to
>>> Pipernet sooner or later. Their middle-out compression provides much better
>>> call quality so it's worth the effort to migrate.
>>>
>>> But to the issue you raised, the purpose of STIR/SHAKEN is not to block
>>> robocalls per se, it is to provide an authentication chain so that you can
>>> determine and contact the originating carrier regardless of the route the
>>> call took to reach the terminating side. This has been a big issue; many
>>> VoIP companies hand off calls to large indifferent CLEC or IXCs who send
>>> them everywhere but won't respond to the terminating carrier's fraud and
>>> nuisance requests.
>>>
>>> So, now we can see that the call was attested by Hooli, and if Hooli does
>>> not cooperate with our fraud/nuisance investigations we are now authorized
>>> to block traffic signed by Hooli. That does fix the problem to a large
>>> degree.
>>>
>>> However, it's also worthy of note that this is not the main problem that
>>> needs to be solved. The main problem that needs to be solved is the case
>>> where you are sending the call to Hooli originating from a number that is
>>> assigned to our CLEC, which you don't have permission to use. This does
>>> solve that problem, because Hooli is only going to issue partial attestation
>>> for that call since it's not their number. So we can still contact Hooli
>>> about it because they attested it and from that I can find them, but we or
>>> our subscriber can also block calls with partial attestations if we/they
>>> choose to.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Mike
>>>
>>> Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
>>> Astro Companies, LLC
>>> 11523 Palm Brush Trail #401
>>> Lakewood Ranch, FL 34202
>>> DIRECT: call or text 941 600-0207
>>> http://www.astrocompanies.com
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: VoiceOps <voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org> On Behalf Of Peter Beckman
>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 17, 2019 2:58 PM
>>> To: VoiceOps <voiceops at voiceops.org>
>>> Subject: [VoiceOps] STIR/SHAKEN Discussion: Will it help?
>>>
>>> A few months ago I attended an FCC STIR/SHAKEN discussion in Washington DC.
>>> They didn't get deep into the technical details but there were a bunch of
>>> big carrier representatives there.
>>>
>>> If you haven't followed STIR/SHAKEN, it's really just an additional SIP
>>> header that contains cryptographically-signed information about the origin
>>> point of the call.
>>>
>>> You can verify the signature with publically published public keys so you
>>> know whomever signed it is really them.
>>>
>>> Here's a few resources if you want to learn more:
>>>
>>> https://www.bandwidth.com/glossary/stir-shaken/
>>> https://www.fcc.gov/call-authentication
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STIR/SHAKEN
>>> https://www.home.neustar/stir-shaken-resource-hub
>>>
>>> There are three levels to tell you how much you should trust the origin of
>>> the call:
>>>
>>> 1. Full -- The call came from the originating carrier's customer and is
>>> authorized to use the number
>>>
>>> 2. Partial -- The call came from the originating carrier's customer but
>>> may or may not be authorized to use the number
>>>
>>> 3. Gateway -- The carrier has authenticated from where it received the
>>> call, but cannot authenticate the call source (e.g., International
>>> Gateway call).
>>>
>>> As an example, as will be many legit cases, a Verizon Wireless mobile
>>> customer will place a call, which will route to Verizon, who will sign the
>>> call using STIR/SHAKEN with Full Attestation and we can all "trust" the
>>> call.
>>>
>>> But now we throw in VoIP.
>>>
>>> I'm a small customer, Initech, of a larger carrier, Hooli. I don't sign my
>>> calls, so I hand my calls to my larger carrier, Hooli. Hooli sees the call
>>> from me (their customer) with a valid CallerID I'm authorized to use and so
>>> Hooli signs the call with STIR/SHAKEN with Full Attestation.
>>>
>>> Turns out the call was a robocall.
>>>
>>> What changes? The only thing that changes is that the receiving party, say
>>> Soylent Corp, knows that Hooli originated the call. Soylent is not Hooli's
>>> customer, so how does Soylent complain to Hooli about the content of the
>>> call?
>>>
>>> And as carriers, we are not legally responsible for the content of our
>>> customer's calls.
>>>
>>> How will Soylent accept 90% of Hooli's Fully Attested valid traffic but
>>> avoid the 10% that is spam/robocalls that are ALSO Fully Attested?
>>>
>>> How exactly does STIR/SHAKEN help fix the robocall and spam call problem?
>>>
>>> Yes, I could block all of Hooli's calls where the attestation is Partial or
>>> Gateway, but you run the risk of false positives, especially in the
>>> International category, or just when Hooli isn't sure, like when I rent a
>>> DID from Acme but do termination through Hooli -- Hooli doesn't know that I
>>> am authorized to use that DID from Acme, even though I am, so Hooli has to
>>> mark my call as Partial or Gateway.
>>>
>>> I'm all for reducing annoying spam and robocalls, but I'm still not yet
>>> convinced that STIR/SHAKEN is going to materially reduce them.
>>>
>>> Let's discuss!
>>>
>>> Beckman
>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> Peter Beckman Internet Guy
>>> beckman at angryox.com http://www.angryox.com/
>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> VoiceOps mailing list
>>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> VoiceOps mailing list
>>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> VoiceOps mailing list
>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
Dec. 17, 2019
STIR/SHAKEN Discussion: Will it help?
by paul@timmins.net
I see it as stopping fraud the same way SPF and DKIM stopped spam.
On 12/17/19 3:38 PM, Dovid Bender wrote:
> Mike beat me to it. It's going to stop fraud. The bigger issue you are
> going to have is the larger packets. So many devices out there can't
> seem to fragment packets correctly.
>
>
> On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 3:28 PM <mike at astrocompanies.com
> <mailto:mike at astrocompanies.com>> wrote:
>
> Hi Peter,
>
> Good question.? First, if you're using Hooli, you'll have to
> migrate to
> Pipernet sooner or later.? Their middle-out compression provides
> much better
> call quality so it's worth the effort to migrate.
>
> But to the issue you raised, the purpose of STIR/SHAKEN is not to
> block
> robocalls per se, it is to provide an authentication chain so that
> you can
> determine and contact the originating carrier regardless of the
> route the
> call took to reach the terminating side.? This has been a big
> issue; many
> VoIP companies hand off calls to large indifferent CLEC or IXCs
> who send
> them everywhere but won't respond to the terminating carrier's
> fraud and
> nuisance requests.
>
> So, now we can see that the call was attested by Hooli, and if
> Hooli does
> not cooperate with our fraud/nuisance investigations we are now
> authorized
> to block traffic signed by Hooli.? That does fix the problem to a
> large
> degree.
>
> However, it's also worthy of note that this is not the main
> problem that
> needs to be solved.? The main problem that needs to be solved is
> the case
> where you are sending the call to Hooli originating from a number
> that is
> assigned to our CLEC, which you don't have permission to use. This
> does
> solve that problem, because Hooli is only going to issue partial
> attestation
> for that call since it's not their number.? So we can still
> contact Hooli
> about it because they attested it and from that I can find them,
> but we or
> our subscriber can also block calls with partial attestations if
> we/they
> choose to.
>
> Regards,
>
> Mike
>
> Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
> Astro Companies, LLC
> 11523 Palm Brush Trail #401
> Lakewood Ranch, FL? 34202
> DIRECT: call or text 941 600-0207
> http://www.astrocompanies.com
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: VoiceOps <voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org
> <mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org>> On Behalf Of Peter Beckman
> Sent: Tuesday, December 17, 2019 2:58 PM
> To: VoiceOps <voiceops at voiceops.org <mailto:voiceops at voiceops.org>>
> Subject: [VoiceOps] STIR/SHAKEN Discussion: Will it help?
>
> A few months ago I attended an FCC STIR/SHAKEN discussion in
> Washington DC.
> They didn't get deep into the technical details but there were a
> bunch of
> big carrier representatives there.
>
> If you haven't followed STIR/SHAKEN, it's really just an
> additional SIP
> header that contains cryptographically-signed information about
> the origin
> point of the call.
>
> You can verify the signature with publically published public keys
> so you
> know whomever signed it is really them.
>
> Here's a few resources if you want to learn more:
>
> https://www.bandwidth.com/glossary/stir-shaken/
> https://www.fcc.gov/call-authentication
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STIR/SHAKEN
> https://www.home.neustar/stir-shaken-resource-hub
>
> There are three levels to tell you how much you should trust the
> origin of
> the call:
>
> ? ? ?1. Full -- The call came from the originating carrier's
> customer and is
> ? ? ? ? ?authorized to use the number
>
> ? ? ?2. Partial -- The call came from the originating carrier's
> customer but
> ? ? ? ? ?may or may not be authorized to use the number
>
> ? ? ?3. Gateway -- The carrier has authenticated from where it
> received the
> ? ? ? ? ?call, but cannot authenticate the call source (e.g.,
> International
> ? ? ? ? ?Gateway call).
>
> As an example, as will be many legit cases, a Verizon Wireless mobile
> customer will place a call, which will route to Verizon, who will
> sign the
> call using STIR/SHAKEN with Full Attestation and we can all
> "trust" the
> call.
>
> But now we throw in VoIP.
>
> I'm a small customer, Initech, of a larger carrier, Hooli. I don't
> sign my
> calls, so I hand my calls to my larger carrier, Hooli. Hooli sees
> the call
> from me (their customer) with a valid CallerID I'm authorized to
> use and so
> Hooli signs the call with STIR/SHAKEN with Full Attestation.
>
> Turns out the call was a robocall.
>
> What changes? The only thing that changes is that the receiving
> party, say
> Soylent Corp, knows that Hooli originated the call. Soylent is not
> Hooli's
> customer, so how does Soylent complain to Hooli about the content
> of the
> call?
>
> And as carriers, we are not legally responsible for the content of our
> customer's calls.
>
> How will Soylent accept 90% of Hooli's Fully Attested valid
> traffic but
> avoid the 10% that is spam/robocalls that are ALSO Fully Attested?
>
> How exactly does STIR/SHAKEN help fix the robocall and spam call
> problem?
>
> Yes, I could block all of Hooli's calls where the attestation is
> Partial or
> Gateway, but you run the risk of false positives, especially in the
> International category, or just when Hooli isn't sure, like when I
> rent a
> DID from Acme but do termination through Hooli -- Hooli doesn't
> know that I
> am authorized to use that DID from Acme, even though I am, so
> Hooli has to
> mark my call as Partial or Gateway.
>
> I'm all for reducing annoying spam and robocalls, but I'm still
> not yet
> convinced that STIR/SHAKEN is going to materially reduce them.
>
> Let's discuss!
>
> Beckman
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Peter Beckman Internet Guy
> beckman at angryox.com <mailto:beckman at angryox.com>
> http://www.angryox.com/
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org <mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org <mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
Dec. 17, 2019
STIR/SHAKEN Discussion: Will it help?
by dovid@telecurve.com
Mike beat me to it. It's going to stop fraud. The bigger issue you are
going to have is the larger packets. So many devices out there can't seem
to fragment packets correctly.
On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 3:28 PM <mike at astrocompanies.com> wrote:
> Hi Peter,
>
> Good question. First, if you're using Hooli, you'll have to migrate to
> Pipernet sooner or later. Their middle-out compression provides much
> better
> call quality so it's worth the effort to migrate.
>
> But to the issue you raised, the purpose of STIR/SHAKEN is not to block
> robocalls per se, it is to provide an authentication chain so that you can
> determine and contact the originating carrier regardless of the route the
> call took to reach the terminating side. This has been a big issue; many
> VoIP companies hand off calls to large indifferent CLEC or IXCs who send
> them everywhere but won't respond to the terminating carrier's fraud and
> nuisance requests.
>
> So, now we can see that the call was attested by Hooli, and if Hooli does
> not cooperate with our fraud/nuisance investigations we are now authorized
> to block traffic signed by Hooli. That does fix the problem to a large
> degree.
>
> However, it's also worthy of note that this is not the main problem that
> needs to be solved. The main problem that needs to be solved is the case
> where you are sending the call to Hooli originating from a number that is
> assigned to our CLEC, which you don't have permission to use. This does
> solve that problem, because Hooli is only going to issue partial
> attestation
> for that call since it's not their number. So we can still contact Hooli
> about it because they attested it and from that I can find them, but we or
> our subscriber can also block calls with partial attestations if we/they
> choose to.
>
> Regards,
>
> Mike
>
> Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
> Astro Companies, LLC
> 11523 Palm Brush Trail #401
> Lakewood Ranch, FL 34202
> DIRECT: call or text 941 600-0207
> http://www.astrocompanies.com
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: VoiceOps <voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org> On Behalf Of Peter Beckman
> Sent: Tuesday, December 17, 2019 2:58 PM
> To: VoiceOps <voiceops at voiceops.org>
> Subject: [VoiceOps] STIR/SHAKEN Discussion: Will it help?
>
> A few months ago I attended an FCC STIR/SHAKEN discussion in Washington DC.
> They didn't get deep into the technical details but there were a bunch of
> big carrier representatives there.
>
> If you haven't followed STIR/SHAKEN, it's really just an additional SIP
> header that contains cryptographically-signed information about the origin
> point of the call.
>
> You can verify the signature with publically published public keys so you
> know whomever signed it is really them.
>
> Here's a few resources if you want to learn more:
>
> https://www.bandwidth.com/glossary/stir-shaken/
> https://www.fcc.gov/call-authentication
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STIR/SHAKEN
> https://www.home.neustar/stir-shaken-resource-hub
>
> There are three levels to tell you how much you should trust the origin of
> the call:
>
> 1. Full -- The call came from the originating carrier's customer and
> is
> authorized to use the number
>
> 2. Partial -- The call came from the originating carrier's customer
> but
> may or may not be authorized to use the number
>
> 3. Gateway -- The carrier has authenticated from where it received the
> call, but cannot authenticate the call source (e.g., International
> Gateway call).
>
> As an example, as will be many legit cases, a Verizon Wireless mobile
> customer will place a call, which will route to Verizon, who will sign the
> call using STIR/SHAKEN with Full Attestation and we can all "trust" the
> call.
>
> But now we throw in VoIP.
>
> I'm a small customer, Initech, of a larger carrier, Hooli. I don't sign my
> calls, so I hand my calls to my larger carrier, Hooli. Hooli sees the call
> from me (their customer) with a valid CallerID I'm authorized to use and so
> Hooli signs the call with STIR/SHAKEN with Full Attestation.
>
> Turns out the call was a robocall.
>
> What changes? The only thing that changes is that the receiving party, say
> Soylent Corp, knows that Hooli originated the call. Soylent is not Hooli's
> customer, so how does Soylent complain to Hooli about the content of the
> call?
>
> And as carriers, we are not legally responsible for the content of our
> customer's calls.
>
> How will Soylent accept 90% of Hooli's Fully Attested valid traffic but
> avoid the 10% that is spam/robocalls that are ALSO Fully Attested?
>
> How exactly does STIR/SHAKEN help fix the robocall and spam call problem?
>
> Yes, I could block all of Hooli's calls where the attestation is Partial or
> Gateway, but you run the risk of false positives, especially in the
> International category, or just when Hooli isn't sure, like when I rent a
> DID from Acme but do termination through Hooli -- Hooli doesn't know that I
> am authorized to use that DID from Acme, even though I am, so Hooli has to
> mark my call as Partial or Gateway.
>
> I'm all for reducing annoying spam and robocalls, but I'm still not yet
> convinced that STIR/SHAKEN is going to materially reduce them.
>
> Let's discuss!
>
> Beckman
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Peter Beckman Internet Guy
> beckman at angryox.com
> http://www.angryox.com/
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
Dec. 17, 2019
STIR/SHAKEN Discussion: Will it help?
by mike@astrocompanies.com
Hi Peter,
Good question. First, if you're using Hooli, you'll have to migrate to
Pipernet sooner or later. Their middle-out compression provides much better
call quality so it's worth the effort to migrate.
But to the issue you raised, the purpose of STIR/SHAKEN is not to block
robocalls per se, it is to provide an authentication chain so that you can
determine and contact the originating carrier regardless of the route the
call took to reach the terminating side. This has been a big issue; many
VoIP companies hand off calls to large indifferent CLEC or IXCs who send
them everywhere but won't respond to the terminating carrier's fraud and
nuisance requests.
So, now we can see that the call was attested by Hooli, and if Hooli does
not cooperate with our fraud/nuisance investigations we are now authorized
to block traffic signed by Hooli. That does fix the problem to a large
degree.
However, it's also worthy of note that this is not the main problem that
needs to be solved. The main problem that needs to be solved is the case
where you are sending the call to Hooli originating from a number that is
assigned to our CLEC, which you don't have permission to use. This does
solve that problem, because Hooli is only going to issue partial attestation
for that call since it's not their number. So we can still contact Hooli
about it because they attested it and from that I can find them, but we or
our subscriber can also block calls with partial attestations if we/they
choose to.
Regards,
Mike
Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE
Astro Companies, LLC
11523 Palm Brush Trail #401
Lakewood Ranch, FL? 34202
DIRECT: call or text 941 600-0207
http://www.astrocompanies.com
-----Original Message-----
From: VoiceOps <voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org> On Behalf Of Peter Beckman
Sent: Tuesday, December 17, 2019 2:58 PM
To: VoiceOps <voiceops at voiceops.org>
Subject: [VoiceOps] STIR/SHAKEN Discussion: Will it help?
A few months ago I attended an FCC STIR/SHAKEN discussion in Washington DC.
They didn't get deep into the technical details but there were a bunch of
big carrier representatives there.
If you haven't followed STIR/SHAKEN, it's really just an additional SIP
header that contains cryptographically-signed information about the origin
point of the call.
You can verify the signature with publically published public keys so you
know whomever signed it is really them.
Here's a few resources if you want to learn more:
https://www.bandwidth.com/glossary/stir-shaken/
https://www.fcc.gov/call-authentication
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STIR/SHAKEN
https://www.home.neustar/stir-shaken-resource-hub
There are three levels to tell you how much you should trust the origin of
the call:
1. Full -- The call came from the originating carrier's customer and is
authorized to use the number
2. Partial -- The call came from the originating carrier's customer but
may or may not be authorized to use the number
3. Gateway -- The carrier has authenticated from where it received the
call, but cannot authenticate the call source (e.g., International
Gateway call).
As an example, as will be many legit cases, a Verizon Wireless mobile
customer will place a call, which will route to Verizon, who will sign the
call using STIR/SHAKEN with Full Attestation and we can all "trust" the
call.
But now we throw in VoIP.
I'm a small customer, Initech, of a larger carrier, Hooli. I don't sign my
calls, so I hand my calls to my larger carrier, Hooli. Hooli sees the call
from me (their customer) with a valid CallerID I'm authorized to use and so
Hooli signs the call with STIR/SHAKEN with Full Attestation.
Turns out the call was a robocall.
What changes? The only thing that changes is that the receiving party, say
Soylent Corp, knows that Hooli originated the call. Soylent is not Hooli's
customer, so how does Soylent complain to Hooli about the content of the
call?
And as carriers, we are not legally responsible for the content of our
customer's calls.
How will Soylent accept 90% of Hooli's Fully Attested valid traffic but
avoid the 10% that is spam/robocalls that are ALSO Fully Attested?
How exactly does STIR/SHAKEN help fix the robocall and spam call problem?
Yes, I could block all of Hooli's calls where the attestation is Partial or
Gateway, but you run the risk of false positives, especially in the
International category, or just when Hooli isn't sure, like when I rent a
DID from Acme but do termination through Hooli -- Hooli doesn't know that I
am authorized to use that DID from Acme, even though I am, so Hooli has to
mark my call as Partial or Gateway.
I'm all for reducing annoying spam and robocalls, but I'm still not yet
convinced that STIR/SHAKEN is going to materially reduce them.
Let's discuss!
Beckman
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Beckman Internet Guy
beckman at angryox.com http://www.angryox.com/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_______________________________________________
VoiceOps mailing list
VoiceOps at voiceops.org
https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
Dec. 17, 2019
STIR/SHAKEN Discussion: Will it help?
by beckman@angryox.com
A few months ago I attended an FCC STIR/SHAKEN discussion in Washington DC.
They didn't get deep into the technical details but there were a bunch of
big carrier representatives there.
If you haven't followed STIR/SHAKEN, it's really just an additional SIP
header that contains cryptographically-signed information about the origin
point of the call.
You can verify the signature with publically published public keys so you
know whomever signed it is really them.
Here's a few resources if you want to learn more:
https://www.bandwidth.com/glossary/stir-shaken/
https://www.fcc.gov/call-authentication
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STIR/SHAKEN
https://www.home.neustar/stir-shaken-resource-hub
There are three levels to tell you how much you should trust the origin of
the call:
1. Full -- The call came from the originating carrier's customer and is
authorized to use the number
2. Partial -- The call came from the originating carrier's customer but
may or may not be authorized to use the number
3. Gateway -- The carrier has authenticated from where it received the
call, but cannot authenticate the call source (e.g., International
Gateway call).
As an example, as will be many legit cases, a Verizon Wireless mobile
customer will place a call, which will route to Verizon, who will sign the
call using STIR/SHAKEN with Full Attestation and we can all "trust" the
call.
But now we throw in VoIP.
I'm a small customer, Initech, of a larger carrier, Hooli. I don't sign my
calls, so I hand my calls to my larger carrier, Hooli. Hooli sees the call
from me (their customer) with a valid CallerID I'm authorized to use and so
Hooli signs the call with STIR/SHAKEN with Full Attestation.
Turns out the call was a robocall.
What changes? The only thing that changes is that the receiving party, say
Soylent Corp, knows that Hooli originated the call. Soylent is not Hooli's
customer, so how does Soylent complain to Hooli about the content of the
call?
And as carriers, we are not legally responsible for the content of our
customer's calls.
How will Soylent accept 90% of Hooli's Fully Attested valid traffic but
avoid the 10% that is spam/robocalls that are ALSO Fully Attested?
How exactly does STIR/SHAKEN help fix the robocall and spam call problem?
Yes, I could block all of Hooli's calls where the attestation is Partial or
Gateway, but you run the risk of false positives, especially in the
International category, or just when Hooli isn't sure, like when I rent a
DID from Acme but do termination through Hooli -- Hooli doesn't know that I
am authorized to use that DID from Acme, even though I am, so Hooli has to
mark my call as Partial or Gateway.
I'm all for reducing annoying spam and robocalls, but I'm still not yet
convinced that STIR/SHAKEN is going to materially reduce them.
Let's discuss!
Beckman
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Beckman Internet Guy
beckman at angryox.com http://www.angryox.com/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dec. 17, 2019
API for Intl CLI in spam lists
by dovid@telecurve.com
yup. I tried it already. It seems there is no solid system for intl.
On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 2:35 PM Peter Beckman <beckman at angryox.com> wrote:
> Nomorobo has an API as a paid service. Still only US-based AFAIK.
>
> On Tue, 17 Dec 2019, Dovid Bender wrote:
>
> > The options that Twillios has is actually not that bad for the US. Our
> > issue is that we have a large customer presence in Europe and there isn't
> > really a service that works for us. I wish TrueCaller would allow access
> to
> > their API.
> >
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 12:56 PM Brandon Svec <
> bsvec at teamonesolutions.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> >> I fear that is an endless game of whack-a-mole now. Neighbor scams that
> >> use the same NPA/NXX as the called number and using legitimate number
> >> spoofs (like IRS, Utility Company, etc.) are really impossible to just
> >> outright block.
> >>
> >> I have been following and reading some things about this company that
> >> might be of interest to you though: https://firstorion.com
> >>
> >> Brandon
> >>
> >> On Dec 16, 2019, at 12:53 PM, Dovid Bender <dovid at telecurve.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> Hi,
> >>
> >> Does anyone know of an API that will give accurate results to see if a
> >> calling number is spam? The ones available on twillio seem to be geared
> to
> >> US phone numbers. When we try numbers that are set listed as spam in
> true
> >> caller they show clean on all the API's that twillio offers. Does anyone
> >> know of any other API's that offer something more accurate like
> TrueCaller?
> >>
> >> TIA.
> >>
> >> Dovid
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> VoiceOps mailing list
> >> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> >> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Peter Beckman Internet Guy
> beckman at angryox.com
> http://www.angryox.com/
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------_______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
Dec. 17, 2019
API for Intl CLI in spam lists
by beckman@angryox.com
Nomorobo has an API as a paid service. Still only US-based AFAIK.
On Tue, 17 Dec 2019, Dovid Bender wrote:
> The options that Twillios has is actually not that bad for the US. Our
> issue is that we have a large customer presence in Europe and there isn't
> really a service that works for us. I wish TrueCaller would allow access to
> their API.
>
>
>
> On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 12:56 PM Brandon Svec <bsvec at teamonesolutions.com>
> wrote:
>
>> I fear that is an endless game of whack-a-mole now. Neighbor scams that
>> use the same NPA/NXX as the called number and using legitimate number
>> spoofs (like IRS, Utility Company, etc.) are really impossible to just
>> outright block.
>>
>> I have been following and reading some things about this company that
>> might be of interest to you though: https://firstorion.com
>>
>> Brandon
>>
>> On Dec 16, 2019, at 12:53 PM, Dovid Bender <dovid at telecurve.com> wrote:
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> Does anyone know of an API that will give accurate results to see if a
>> calling number is spam? The ones available on twillio seem to be geared to
>> US phone numbers. When we try numbers that are set listed as spam in true
>> caller they show clean on all the API's that twillio offers. Does anyone
>> know of any other API's that offer something more accurate like TrueCaller?
>>
>> TIA.
>>
>> Dovid
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> VoiceOps mailing list
>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>>
>>
>>
>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Beckman Internet Guy
beckman at angryox.com http://www.angryox.com/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dec. 17, 2019
API for Intl CLI in spam lists
by dovid@telecurve.com
The options that Twillios has is actually not that bad for the US. Our
issue is that we have a large customer presence in Europe and there isn't
really a service that works for us. I wish TrueCaller would allow access to
their API.
On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 12:56 PM Brandon Svec <bsvec at teamonesolutions.com>
wrote:
> I fear that is an endless game of whack-a-mole now. Neighbor scams that
> use the same NPA/NXX as the called number and using legitimate number
> spoofs (like IRS, Utility Company, etc.) are really impossible to just
> outright block.
>
> I have been following and reading some things about this company that
> might be of interest to you though: https://firstorion.com
>
> Brandon
>
> On Dec 16, 2019, at 12:53 PM, Dovid Bender <dovid at telecurve.com> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> Does anyone know of an API that will give accurate results to see if a
> calling number is spam? The ones available on twillio seem to be geared to
> US phone numbers. When we try numbers that are set listed as spam in true
> caller they show clean on all the API's that twillio offers. Does anyone
> know of any other API's that offer something more accurate like TrueCaller?
>
> TIA.
>
> Dovid
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
>
Dec. 17, 2019
API for Intl CLI in spam lists
by bsvec@teamonesolutions.com
I fear that is an endless game of whack-a-mole now. Neighbor scams that use the same NPA/NXX as the called number and using legitimate number spoofs (like IRS, Utility Company, etc.) are really impossible to just outright block.
I have been following and reading some things about this company that might be of interest to you though: https://firstorion.com <https://firstorion.com/>
Brandon
> On Dec 16, 2019, at 12:53 PM, Dovid Bender <dovid at telecurve.com> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> Does anyone know of an API that will give accurate results to see if a calling number is spam? The ones available on twillio seem to be geared to US phone numbers. When we try numbers that are set listed as spam in true caller they show clean on all the API's that twillio offers. Does anyone know of any other API's that offer something more accurate like TrueCaller?
>
> TIA.
>
> Dovid
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
Dec. 17, 2019