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July 2023
- 25 participants
- 56 messages
Update on STIR/SHAKEN
by dwhite@atheral.com
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July 13, 2023
Update on STIR/SHAKEN
by dfrankel@zipdx.com
Nathan: Thanks for sharing your thinking and a specific example.
I can't speak for the FCC or the ITG (obviously) and they probably won't
weigh in here. But, as Mary has done, I can share what I hope is a
reasonably accurate perspective.
I hope, Nathan, that the key is your statement: "But sans any violations to
look into...how would they know?" And, I would add, why would they care? If
the group you describe isn't a bunch of trouble-makers, then surely there
are other fish to fry when it comes to compliance issues. Let's put our
focus on the ones that are actually wreaking havoc.
I hadn't heard of Atheral before, but I see that they have a SHAKEN token
per iconectiv, so they can sign calls. They list several customers on their
web page; I spot checked those and the ones I searched do NOT have tokens
but ARE registered in the Robocall Mitigation Database. I did see that a
couple of them had very nicely written Robocall Mitigation Plans (Zirkel,
for example, with Vistabeam in second place) that explained exactly how they
work with Atheral in terms of getting calls signed.
We could debate (and in fact, we are debating at the FCC) whether, for
example, it's OK for Atheral to sign calls with Atheral's token on behalf of
Zirkel. We might argue that Zirkel is the one with the direct authenticated
relationship with their customer, so it should be a Zirkel signature on
those calls. Or you can make a semantic argument that Atheral is the
"Originating Voice Service Provider" and that it is through their agent
Zirkel that they have the customer relationship. Zirkel explains how they
validate the phone numbers that their customers use, and pass that
information on to Atheral for proper attestation. It all appears to be on
the up-and-up.
Atheral has to understand that by putting the Atheral signature on calls
coming via Zirkel and others, Atheral is putting its own reputation on the
line. So Atheral is presumably motivated to ensure everybody plays nice,
which they probably do at least in part via their contractual agreements.
To my knowledge, the ITG does not "block traffic" or enforce rules about
tokens. The ITG is in the business of traceback, and it makes the
information it gathers through that process available, selectively, to
others that can then act on it. That includes not just government enforcers
but, for example, others in the call chain. If a particular provider is
involved in a traceback, they get visibility to whether their upstream is
responding to that traceback. If not, or if that upstream failed to sign a
call when they should have, then the downstream provider can initiate action
on its own with respect to that upstream.
Back to Atheral -- our RRAPTOR robocall surveillance platform has never
captured a problematic call with an Atheral signature. That doesn't mean we
know for certain that no "bad" robocalls flow via Atheral, but it's probably
safe to say that at the moment, Atheral and its customers aren't a cause of
great concern.
Lastly, thanks Nathan for the nice words about our test tool.
David Frankel
ZipDXR LLC
St. George, UT USA
-----Original Message-----
From: VoiceOps <voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org> On Behalf Of Nathan Anderson
via VoiceOps
Sent: Wednesday, July 12, 2023 4:21 PM
To: 'Voice Ops' <voiceops at voiceops.org>
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Update on STIR/SHAKEN
Personally, I'm quite curious to know how the ITG would even be identifying
these companies as being distinct from the wholesaler, at least without a
traceback request for an actual violation, where the investigation (that the
wholesaler would likely be not only cooperative with but actively involved
in) eventually revealed that all of the violations were originating from one
particular customer of theirs. But sans any violations to look into...how
would they know?
In particular, when asking these questions, what I specifically have in mind
are wholesalers not like VI/Sangoma et al., but more like e.g.
https://atheral.com/, which carries traffic for a bunch of smaller regional
ISPs that want to offer VoIP but don't want any of the headaches associated
with doing so. So most of them I presume literally own no infrastructure of
their own...no softswitch, no SBC, no nothing. They might be 499 filers,
but that's likely the extent of their direct regulatory involvement.
I believe Daniel might be hanging around on this list, so perhaps he can
shed some light on how they have been advised to approach this (whether they
are signing all calls with their own SHAKEN cert/key, or whether they can
host SHAKEN certs owned by their customers and sign the end-users of that
customer's calls with that customer's own cert, or a mix of both).
-- Nathan
-----Original Message-----
From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of Mary Lou
Carey via VoiceOps
Sent: Wednesday, July 12, 2023 1:29 PM
To: voiceops at voiceops.org
Subject: [VoiceOps] Update on STIR/SHAKEN
I spoke with my FCC contact today and was told to read the last order issued
in March so his response wasn't crystal clear. He said the FCC is still in
the process of deciding which types of companies can sign with a third-party
vendor's token and which ones can't.
I told him my concern is that the ITG is going to start blocking traffic in
August and companies won't know that they aren't compliant because their
wholesale provider told them they were fine. I specifically asked, "If the
ITG decides a company should have had its own token, will you give them time
to get one?" He said they have a process for handling these issues, but he
didn't come out and say "Yes" so here's what I would suggest since the
process can sometimes take longer than the 30 days they give you to comply.
If you are using a third-party provider whose signing with their token.
At least complete the preliminary steps to qualify for your own STIR/SHAKEN
token. That way if they do come to you and tell you that you need to get it
on a moment's notice, you won't be fighting the clock so much. The
pre-requisites for filing with the STI-PA to become an approved carrier are:
1. Order your own OCN (aka company code from NECA) IPES is the correct type
for all VOIP carriers 2. Have your 499 up to date and fees paid. If you've
never filed a 499A yet, get your 499 filer ID and submit your first 499-A.
(All carriers delivering long-distance traffic in the US should have already
completed this step anyways).
3. Robocall Mitigation Plan filed.
There are multiple companies helping carriers get their STIR/SHAKEN
certificate, so it doesn't matter if you use my services or anyone else's. I
just want to make sure everyone is aware of what they need to do to make
sure their traffic doesn't get blocked because thats a lot harder to fix
than getting a certificate/token is!
MARY LOU CAREY
BackUP Telecom Consulting
Office: 615-791-9969
Cell: 615-796-1111
_______________________________________________
VoiceOps mailing list
VoiceOps at voiceops.org
https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
_______________________________________________
VoiceOps mailing list
VoiceOps at voiceops.org
https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
July 13, 2023
Update on STIR/SHAKEN
by nathana@fsr.com
Personally, I'm quite curious to know how the ITG would even be identifying these companies as being distinct from the wholesaler, at least without a traceback request for an actual violation, where the investigation (that the wholesaler would likely be not only cooperative with but actively involved in) eventually revealed that all of the violations were originating from one particular customer of theirs. But sans any violations to look into...how would they know?
In particular, when asking these questions, what I specifically have in mind are wholesalers not like VI/Sangoma et al., but more like e.g. https://atheral.com/, which carries traffic for a bunch of smaller regional ISPs that want to offer VoIP but don't want any of the headaches associated with doing so. So most of them I presume literally own no infrastructure of their own...no softswitch, no SBC, no nothing. They might be 499 filers, but that's likely the extent of their direct regulatory involvement.
I believe Daniel might be hanging around on this list, so perhaps he can shed some light on how they have been advised to approach this (whether they are signing all calls with their own SHAKEN cert/key, or whether they can host SHAKEN certs owned by their customers and sign the end-users of that customer's calls with that customer's own cert, or a mix of both).
-- Nathan
-----Original Message-----
From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of Mary Lou Carey via VoiceOps
Sent: Wednesday, July 12, 2023 1:29 PM
To: voiceops at voiceops.org
Subject: [VoiceOps] Update on STIR/SHAKEN
I spoke with my FCC contact today and was told to read the last order
issued in March so his response wasn't crystal clear. He said the FCC is
still in the process of deciding which types of companies can sign with
a third-party vendor's token and which ones can't.
I told him my concern is that the ITG is going to start blocking traffic
in August and companies won't know that they aren't compliant because
their wholesale provider told them they were fine. I specifically asked,
"If the ITG decides a company should have had its own token, will you
give them time to get one?" He said they have a process for handling
these issues, but he didn't come out and say "Yes" so here's what I
would suggest since the process can sometimes take longer than the 30
days they give you to comply.
If you are using a third-party provider whose signing with their token.
At least complete the preliminary steps to qualify for your own
STIR/SHAKEN token. That way if they do come to you and tell you that you
need to get it on a moment's notice, you won't be fighting the clock so
much. The pre-requisites for filing with the STI-PA to become an
approved carrier are:
1. Order your own OCN (aka company code from NECA) IPES is the correct
type for all VOIP carriers
2. Have your 499 up to date and fees paid. If you've never filed a 499A
yet, get your 499 filer ID and submit your first 499-A. (All carriers
delivering long-distance traffic in the US should have already completed
this step anyways).
3. Robocall Mitigation Plan filed.
There are multiple companies helping carriers get their STIR/SHAKEN
certificate, so it doesn't matter if you use my services or anyone
else's. I just want to make sure everyone is aware of what they need to
do to make sure their traffic doesn't get blocked because thats a lot
harder to fix than getting a certificate/token is!
MARY LOU CAREY
BackUP Telecom Consulting
Office: 615-791-9969
Cell: 615-796-1111
_______________________________________________
VoiceOps mailing list
VoiceOps at voiceops.org
https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
July 12, 2023
STIR/SHAKEN warning!
by nathana@fsr.com
I guess I should clarify that what I intended to communicate by "a few years
ago" would be more, like, 5-10 years or even more; heh. And I'd wager that
even for as rapidly as SIP has been adopted in the corporate world, even a
decade ago there had to be considerably more Fortune 500s out there with a wide
installed base of PRI trunks relative even to today. And of course, if anybody
were using their TFN as their outbound CID more than 2-3 years ago, not only
would S/S not even have been much of a thing yet at that point (to the extent
it was implemented at all, my understanding was that it was mostly being
bootstrapped with self-signed certs), but apparently there was also no
authoritative CNAM database for TFNs prior to March 2020 as was just clarified
in this thread. So it makes sense that now that both of those things exist +
how many inroads SIP trunking has made into enterprises that the use of TFNs in
CID has exploded in just a couple of years' time.
Just as a potentially interesting data point, we have had TFNs parked with
various SIP-first providers (who also act as RespOrgs as well), none of which
have yet to pass a single S/S PASSporT/Identity header our way on any calls
made to any of those numbers...
By the way, love your service. Thanks for putting it together and maintaining
it...what a gift to the community. There are a handful of S/S testing tools
out there, but yours is easily the most comprehensive...most just audibly read
back to you whether or not your call was attested, and if so at what level.
Nothing about who signed it, whether the backing cert and entire chain of trust
is valid or not, and so on, as yours does. And since most other tests only
provide one call-in number, if the call path between you and that testing tool
happens to go through an intermediate carrier that strips out our PASSporT and
either replaces it with their own or drops it entirely, tough noogies. Whereas
you provide multiple call-in numbers across multiple carriers, which not only
provides opportunity to work around such issues, but gives you some idea of
call paths that might be breaking transmission of your PASSporT and which ones
are okay. Super helpful!
From: David Frankel [mailto:dfrankel at zipdx.com]
Sent: Friday, July 7, 2023 3:21 PM
To: Nathan Anderson; 'Voice Ops'
Subject: RE: [VoiceOps] STIR/SHAKEN warning!
Nathan,
Regarding TFN???s as caller-ID: This became quite popular more than a mere few
years ago. Many customer support operations (banks, brokerages, airlines,
insurance companies, credit card companies) place outbound calls using their
toll-free customer support number as caller-ID. In our RRAPTOR robocall
surveillance platform, we have captured many, many thousands of calls with a
TFN as the calling number. And the majority of those calls are signed, with
varying levels of attestation. Most enterprise calls these days that I???m
familiar with are initiated over SIP trunks (not PRI or analog trunks or POTS
lines) and include the calling (FROM) number in the SIP INVITE.
Regarding signatures on calls TO TFNs: This also definitely happens. Our SHAKEN
identity test tool (at https://portal.legalcallsonly.org/Info/Identity) lets
users call any of several test numbers, including some TFNs. We see signatures
on many calls to those test TFNs. (We don???t save data for calls that do NOT
have signatures, so I can???t tell you the fraction.) I do know that there are
some toll-free providers that ALWAYS (or usually) have TDM in the call path.
Since IDENTITY headers don???t travel over TDM, those calls will not have
signatures at the terminating end.
David
From: VoiceOps <voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org> On Behalf Of Nathan Anderson via
VoiceOps
Sent: Friday, July 7, 2023 3:55 PM
To: Voice Ops <voiceops at voiceops.org>
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] STIR/SHAKEN warning!
Thanks; I had no idea this was a thing.
-- Nathan
From: Paul Timmins [mailto:paul at timmins.net]
Sent: Friday, July 7, 2023 2:39 PM
To: Nathan Anderson
Cc: Voice Ops
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] STIR/SHAKEN warning!
Always worth pointing out that in March 2020, Somos rolled out TFNIdentity. We
have it set up on customers who want to source from their TFNs, I haven't seen
many carriers actually look it up, but it does exist.
On Jul 7, 2023, at 5:34 PM, Nathan Anderson via VoiceOps <voiceops at voiceops.org
> wrote:
I suspect things might be different now (& I just haven't kept up), but
although it is clearly *possible* to transmit a TFN as the calling number /
CID, I seem to remember that even just a mere few years ago, it was HIGHLY
discouraged, and if you ever were to receive a call bearing a TFN as its CID,
it had a very high likelihood of being fraudulent or spam. This was of course
back when the vast, vast majority of TFNs were essentially implemented as a
call forward or alias to a number that hung off of a local exchange. So of
course outbound calls that many? most? companies with TFNs would make would
typically be sourced from their local exchange number(s) and not from the TFN
(s) (unless maybe a given company had a PRI and their provider allowed them to
source calls from their TFN?). Thus the expectation for a long time (as I
understood it) was that TFNs were truly inbound-only and should be treated as
such.
Loosely tangentially related, as a purely anecdotal report, I will note that I
have yet to see a S/S signature/PASSporT attached to ANY calls made *to* ANY of
our TFNs, via any of the 3 SIP wholesalers we have used as both RespOrgs & for
actual traffic.
-- Nathan
From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of David
Frankel via VoiceOps
Sent: Friday, July 7, 2023 7:52 AM
To: 'Ivan Kovacevic'; 'Voice Ops'
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] STIR/SHAKEN warning!
Ivan asks: ???How are you handling TFN atestations????
When the signer of a call gives A-level attestation, it means that the signer
knows that the caller ???is authorized to use??? the calling number.
The signer can ???know??? that in any of a variety of ways. For toll-free numbers,
the most sophisticated and secure is probably via Delegate Certificates. SOMOS,
the North American Toll-Free Number Administrator, has commented about this in
a current FCC proceeding: https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/10605623514445/1
As the signer, there are other ways you could determine that the caller is
authorized to use the number. For example, you could solicit some documentation
from them (like an invoice from their RespOrg and/or service provider) and you
could call the number and verify that your caller answers. The regulations
(today) do not specify exactly how you ???know??? so you (as the signer) need to
act in the spirit of the rules.
This problem is not unique to toll-free numbers. I might have a geographic
number that I obtain from provider A (and that???s how I get inbound calls to the
number), but I make outbound calls from that number via providers B and C for
redundancy and cost reasons.
Bear in mind that providers can set their own rules for what calls they will
accept and what attestations they will assign, and those rules can be more
restrictive than what might be dictated by regulation. For example, a provider
might say ???I will only assign A-level attestation to calls that use calling
numbers assigned by me.??? That???s their prerogative. In fact, a provider might
say: ???I will only accept calls that use calling numbers assigned by me. Those
calls will get A-level attestation. I will reject all other calls.??? There are
no rules (to my knowledge) that prohibit providers from setting these kinds of
rules.
From: VoiceOps <voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org> On Behalf Of Ivan Kovacevic via
VoiceOps
Sent: Friday, July 7, 2023 7:27 AM
To: Voice Ops <voiceops at voiceops.org>
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] STIR/SHAKEN warning!
Hopefully on-topic. How are you handling TFN atestations?
Although a part of NANP - it's a different technology at the network level in
terms of chain of authority and routing.
RespOrg manages the number, but can provision and use many carriers to make
outbound calls using the TFN Caller ID (and to receive inbound calls via the
same TFN)... RespOrgs is not necessarily a carrier - who and how checks that
RespOrg has the authority in case of delegated attestation. I may be
overcomplicating it in my mind.. but it doesn't feel like the regulation maps
1-to-1 over to TFNs... Just wondering what everyone's experience is.
Thanks,
Ivan
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https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
nt-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>
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July 12, 2023
Update on STIR/SHAKEN
by marylou@backuptelecom.com
I spoke with my FCC contact today and was told to read the last order
issued in March so his response wasn't crystal clear. He said the FCC is
still in the process of deciding which types of companies can sign with
a third-party vendor's token and which ones can't.
I told him my concern is that the ITG is going to start blocking traffic
in August and companies won't know that they aren't compliant because
their wholesale provider told them they were fine. I specifically asked,
"If the ITG decides a company should have had its own token, will you
give them time to get one?" He said they have a process for handling
these issues, but he didn't come out and say "Yes" so here's what I
would suggest since the process can sometimes take longer than the 30
days they give you to comply.
If you are using a third-party provider whose signing with their token.
At least complete the preliminary steps to qualify for your own
STIR/SHAKEN token. That way if they do come to you and tell you that you
need to get it on a moment's notice, you won't be fighting the clock so
much. The pre-requisites for filing with the STI-PA to become an
approved carrier are:
1. Order your own OCN (aka company code from NECA) IPES is the correct
type for all VOIP carriers
2. Have your 499 up to date and fees paid. If you've never filed a 499A
yet, get your 499 filer ID and submit your first 499-A. (All carriers
delivering long-distance traffic in the US should have already completed
this step anyways).
3. Robocall Mitigation Plan filed.
There are multiple companies helping carriers get their STIR/SHAKEN
certificate, so it doesn't matter if you use my services or anyone
else's. I just want to make sure everyone is aware of what they need to
do to make sure their traffic doesn't get blocked because thats a lot
harder to fix than getting a certificate/token is!
MARY LOU CAREY
BackUP Telecom Consulting
Office: 615-791-9969
Cell: 615-796-1111
July 12, 2023
STIR/SHAKEN warning!
by marylou@backuptelecom.com
To answer your question regarding 499s and OCNs, foreign companies can
acquire both. If you want to message me privately, I can give you the
contact information of the person I refer foreign companies to.
MARY LOU CAREY
BackUP Telecom Consulting
Office: 615-791-9969
Cell: 615-796-1111
On 2023-07-06 03:07 PM, Markus via VoiceOps wrote:
> Am 04.07.2023 um 07:35 schrieb Paul Timmins:
>>> What if I'm an European telecom operator and have US-based end-users
>>> (via SIP) who are calling to the US and who would like to signal
>>> their United States A-number to the called party?
>>>
>>> What if I'm an European telecom operator and have Euro end-users (via
>>> SIP) who are calling to the US and who would like to signal their
>>> European A-number to the called party?
>>>
>>> If I try to register here -
>>> https://authenticatereg.iconectiv.com/register - "Country: United
>>> States" is hard-coded.
>>>
>>> Is there a way for Euro TSPs to get STIR/SHAKEN without creating a US
>>> entity/company just for this purpose?
>>
>> I'm pretty sure it's the job of whoever is providing gateway services
>> into the USA to sign the call, and that anyone in the STIR/SHAKEN
>> system in the US has some sort of regulatory nexus here where they
>> could be held legally responsible. It's all about finding a throat to
>> choke if there's misconduct.
>
> I asked iconectiv that question and now I have clarity:
>
> Me:
> "I have some fundamental questions about STIR/SHAKEN: What if I'm an
> European telecom operator and have US-based end-users (via SIP) who
> are calling to the US and who would like to signal their United States
> A-number to the called party? -> Do we need to get a STIR/SHAKEN
> certificate? [...]"
>
> iconectiv:
> "The revised SPC token Access Policy requires providers seeking to
> register with the STI-Policy Administrator (STI-PA) to:
> 1) Have a current form 499A on file with the FCC;
> 2) Have been assigned an Operating Company Number (OCN); [...]
>
> Me:
> "Since registering as 499A and getting an own OCN is only possible for
> US companies, I figure getting a STIR/SHAKEN certificate through you
> is currently not possible for non-US companies. Is that correct?"
>
> iconectiv:
> "That is correct."
>
> The confusion also came from the fact that many non-US companies that
> registered in the Robocall Mitigation Database -
> https://fccprod.servicenowservices.com/rmd?id=rmd_listings - chose
> "Complete STIR/SHAKEN implementation" or "Partial STIR/SHAKEN
> implementation", which, unless they also have a US subsidiary, seems
> to be a lie. Probably they chose something that looked cool in the
> dropdown box, or were too lazy to develop a Robocall Mitigation Plan
> (this is what you gotta upload as DOCUMENT if you choose "No
> STIR/SHAKEN implementation". I also noticed some non-US companies just
> uploaded some random document to the database, like a high school
> report or just some random letters or words... so much about the
> quality of that database.
>
> Good luck
> Markus
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
July 12, 2023
STIR/SHAKEN warning!
by dfrankel@zipdx.com
Nathan,
Regarding TFN's as caller-ID: This became quite popular more than a mere few
years ago. Many customer support operations (banks, brokerages, airlines,
insurance companies, credit card companies) place outbound calls using their
toll-free customer support number as caller-ID. In our RRAPTOR robocall
surveillance platform, we have captured many, many thousands of calls with a
TFN as the calling number. And the majority of those calls are signed, with
varying levels of attestation. Most enterprise calls these days that I'm
familiar with are initiated over SIP trunks (not PRI or analog trunks or
POTS lines) and include the calling (FROM) number in the SIP INVITE.
Regarding signatures on calls TO TFNs: This also definitely happens. Our
SHAKEN identity test tool (at
https://portal.legalcallsonly.org/Info/Identity) lets users call any of
several test numbers, including some TFNs. We see signatures on many calls
to those test TFNs. (We don't save data for calls that do NOT have
signatures, so I can't tell you the fraction.) I do know that there are some
toll-free providers that ALWAYS (or usually) have TDM in the call path.
Since IDENTITY headers don't travel over TDM, those calls will not have
signatures at the terminating end.
David
From: VoiceOps <voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org> On Behalf Of Nathan Anderson
via VoiceOps
Sent: Friday, July 7, 2023 3:55 PM
To: Voice Ops <voiceops at voiceops.org>
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] STIR/SHAKEN warning!
Thanks; I had no idea this was a thing.
-- Nathan
From: Paul Timmins [mailto:paul at timmins.net]
Sent: Friday, July 7, 2023 2:39 PM
To: Nathan Anderson
Cc: Voice Ops
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] STIR/SHAKEN warning!
Always worth pointing out that in March 2020, Somos rolled out TFNIdentity.
We have it set up on customers who want to source from their TFNs, I haven't
seen many carriers actually look it up, but it does exist.
On Jul 7, 2023, at 5:34 PM, Nathan Anderson via VoiceOps
<voiceops at voiceops.org <mailto:voiceops at voiceops.org> > wrote:
I suspect things might be different now (& I just haven't kept up), but
although it is clearly *possible* to transmit a TFN as the calling number /
CID, I seem to remember that even just a mere few years ago, it was HIGHLY
discouraged, and if you ever were to receive a call bearing a TFN as its
CID, it had a very high likelihood of being fraudulent or spam. This was of
course back when the vast, vast majority of TFNs were essentially
implemented as a call forward or alias to a number that hung off of a local
exchange. So of course outbound calls that many? most? companies with TFNs
would make would typically be sourced from their local exchange number(s)
and not from the TFN(s) (unless maybe a given company had a PRI and their
provider allowed them to source calls from their TFN?). Thus the
expectation for a long time (as I understood it) was that TFNs were truly
inbound-only and should be treated as such.
Loosely tangentially related, as a purely anecdotal report, I will note that
I have yet to see a S/S signature/PASSporT attached to ANY calls made *to*
ANY of our TFNs, via any of the 3 SIP wholesalers we have used as both
RespOrgs & for actual traffic.
-- Nathan
From: VoiceOps [ <mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org>
mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of David Frankel via
VoiceOps
Sent: Friday, July 7, 2023 7:52 AM
To: 'Ivan Kovacevic'; 'Voice Ops'
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] STIR/SHAKEN warning!
Ivan asks: "How are you handling TFN atestations?"
When the signer of a call gives A-level attestation, it means that the
signer knows that the caller "is authorized to use" the calling number.
The signer can "know" that in any of a variety of ways. For toll-free
numbers, the most sophisticated and secure is probably via Delegate
Certificates. SOMOS, the North American Toll-Free Number Administrator, has
commented about this in a current FCC proceeding:
<https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/10605623514445/1>
https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/10605623514445/1
As the signer, there are other ways you could determine that the caller is
authorized to use the number. For example, you could solicit some
documentation from them (like an invoice from their RespOrg and/or service
provider) and you could call the number and verify that your caller answers.
The regulations (today) do not specify exactly how you "know" so you (as the
signer) need to act in the spirit of the rules.
This problem is not unique to toll-free numbers. I might have a geographic
number that I obtain from provider A (and that's how I get inbound calls to
the number), but I make outbound calls from that number via providers B and
C for redundancy and cost reasons.
Bear in mind that providers can set their own rules for what calls they will
accept and what attestations they will assign, and those rules can be more
restrictive than what might be dictated by regulation. For example, a
provider might say "I will only assign A-level attestation to calls that use
calling numbers assigned by me." That's their prerogative. In fact, a
provider might say: "I will only accept calls that use calling numbers
assigned by me. Those calls will get A-level attestation. I will reject all
other calls." There are no rules (to my knowledge) that prohibit providers
from setting these kinds of rules.
From: VoiceOps < <mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org>
voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org> On Behalf Of Ivan Kovacevic via VoiceOps
Sent: Friday, July 7, 2023 7:27 AM
To: Voice Ops < <mailto:voiceops at voiceops.org> voiceops at voiceops.org>
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] STIR/SHAKEN warning!
Hopefully on-topic. How are you handling TFN atestations?
Although a part of NANP - it's a different technology at the network level
in terms of chain of authority and routing.
RespOrg manages the number, but can provision and use many carriers to make
outbound calls using the TFN Caller ID (and to receive inbound calls via the
same TFN)... RespOrgs is not necessarily a carrier - who and how checks that
RespOrg has the authority in case of delegated attestation. I may be
overcomplicating it in my mind.. but it doesn't feel like the regulation
maps 1-to-1 over to TFNs... Just wondering what everyone's experience is.
Thanks,
Ivan
_______________________________________________
VoiceOps mailing list
<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
<https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops>
https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
July 7, 2023
STIR/SHAKEN warning!
by nathana@fsr.com
Thanks; I had no idea this was a thing.
-- Nathan
From: Paul Timmins [mailto:paul at timmins.net]
Sent: Friday, July 7, 2023 2:39 PM
To: Nathan Anderson
Cc: Voice Ops
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] STIR/SHAKEN warning!
Always worth pointing out that in March 2020, Somos rolled out TFNIdentity. We
have it set up on customers who want to source from their TFNs, I haven't seen
many carriers actually look it up, but it does exist.
On Jul 7, 2023, at 5:34 PM, Nathan Anderson via VoiceOps <voiceops at voiceops.org
> wrote:
I suspect things might be different now (& I just haven't kept up), but
although it is clearly *possible* to transmit a TFN as the calling number /
CID, I seem to remember that even just a mere few years ago, it was HIGHLY
discouraged, and if you ever were to receive a call bearing a TFN as its CID,
it had a very high likelihood of being fraudulent or spam. This was of course
back when the vast, vast majority of TFNs were essentially implemented as a
call forward or alias to a number that hung off of a local exchange. So of
course outbound calls that many? most? companies with TFNs would make would
typically be sourced from their local exchange number(s) and not from the TFN
(s) (unless maybe a given company had a PRI and their provider allowed them to
source calls from their TFN?). Thus the expectation for a long time (as I
understood it) was that TFNs were truly inbound-only and should be treated as
such.
Loosely tangentially related, as a purely anecdotal report, I will note that I
have yet to see a S/S signature/PASSporT attached to ANY calls made *to* ANY of
our TFNs, via any of the 3 SIP wholesalers we have used as both RespOrgs & for
actual traffic.
-- Nathan
From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of David
Frankel via VoiceOps
Sent: Friday, July 7, 2023 7:52 AM
To: 'Ivan Kovacevic'; 'Voice Ops'
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] STIR/SHAKEN warning!
Ivan asks: ???How are you handling TFN atestations????
When the signer of a call gives A-level attestation, it means that the signer
knows that the caller ???is authorized to use??? the calling number.
The signer can ???know??? that in any of a variety of ways. For toll-free numbers,
the most sophisticated and secure is probably via Delegate Certificates. SOMOS,
the North American Toll-Free Number Administrator, has commented about this in
a current FCC proceeding: https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/10605623514445/1
As the signer, there are other ways you could determine that the caller is
authorized to use the number. For example, you could solicit some documentation
from them (like an invoice from their RespOrg and/or service provider) and you
could call the number and verify that your caller answers. The regulations
(today) do not specify exactly how you ???know??? so you (as the signer) need to
act in the spirit of the rules.
This problem is not unique to toll-free numbers. I might have a geographic
number that I obtain from provider A (and that???s how I get inbound calls to the
number), but I make outbound calls from that number via providers B and C for
redundancy and cost reasons.
Bear in mind that providers can set their own rules for what calls they will
accept and what attestations they will assign, and those rules can be more
restrictive than what might be dictated by regulation. For example, a provider
might say ???I will only assign A-level attestation to calls that use calling
numbers assigned by me.??? That???s their prerogative. In fact, a provider might
say: ???I will only accept calls that use calling numbers assigned by me. Those
calls will get A-level attestation. I will reject all other calls.??? There are
no rules (to my knowledge) that prohibit providers from setting these kinds of
rules.
From: VoiceOps <voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org> On Behalf Of Ivan Kovacevic via
VoiceOps
Sent: Friday, July 7, 2023 7:27 AM
To: Voice Ops <voiceops at voiceops.org>
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] STIR/SHAKEN warning!
Hopefully on-topic. How are you handling TFN atestations?
Although a part of NANP - it's a different technology at the network level in
terms of chain of authority and routing.
RespOrg manages the number, but can provision and use many carriers to make
outbound calls using the TFN Caller ID (and to receive inbound calls via the
same TFN)... RespOrgs is not necessarily a carrier - who and how checks that
RespOrg has the authority in case of delegated attestation. I may be
overcomplicating it in my mind.. but it doesn't feel like the regulation maps
1-to-1 over to TFNs... Just wondering what everyone's experience is.
Thanks,
Ivan
_______________________________________________
VoiceOps mailing list
VoiceOps at voiceops.org
https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
July 7, 2023
STIR/SHAKEN warning!
by paul@timmins.net
Always worth pointing out that in March 2020, Somos rolled out TFNIdentity. We have it set up on customers who want to source from their TFNs, I haven't seen many carriers actually look it up, but it does exist.
> On Jul 7, 2023, at 5:34 PM, Nathan Anderson via VoiceOps <voiceops at voiceops.org> wrote:
>
> I suspect things might be different now (& I just haven't kept up), but although it is clearly *possible* to transmit a TFN as the calling number / CID, I seem to remember that even just a mere few years ago, it was HIGHLY discouraged, and if you ever were to receive a call bearing a TFN as its CID, it had a very high likelihood of being fraudulent or spam. This was of course back when the vast, vast majority of TFNs were essentially implemented as a call forward or alias to a number that hung off of a local exchange. So of course outbound calls that many? most? companies with TFNs would make would typically be sourced from their local exchange number(s) and not from the TFN(s) (unless maybe a given company had a PRI and their provider allowed them to source calls from their TFN?). Thus the expectation for a long time (as I understood it) was that TFNs were truly inbound-only and should be treated as such.
>
> Loosely tangentially related, as a purely anecdotal report, I will note that I have yet to see a S/S signature/PASSporT attached to ANY calls made *to* ANY of our TFNs, via any of the 3 SIP wholesalers we have used as both RespOrgs & for actual traffic.
>
> -- Nathan
> ? <>
> From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of David Frankel via VoiceOps
> Sent: Friday, July 7, 2023 7:52 AM
> To: 'Ivan Kovacevic'; 'Voice Ops'
> Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] STIR/SHAKEN warning!
>
> Ivan asks: ?How are you handling TFN atestations??
>
> When the signer of a call gives A-level attestation, it means that the signer knows that the caller ?is authorized to use? the calling number.
>
> The signer can ?know? that in any of a variety of ways. For toll-free numbers, the most sophisticated and secure is probably via Delegate Certificates. SOMOS, the North American Toll-Free Number Administrator, has commented about this in a current FCC proceeding: https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/10605623514445/1
>
> As the signer, there are other ways you could determine that the caller is authorized to use the number. For example, you could solicit some documentation from them (like an invoice from their RespOrg and/or service provider) and you could call the number and verify that your caller answers. The regulations (today) do not specify exactly how you ?know? so you (as the signer) need to act in the spirit of the rules.
>
> This problem is not unique to toll-free numbers. I might have a geographic number that I obtain from provider A (and that?s how I get inbound calls to the number), but I make outbound calls from that number via providers B and C for redundancy and cost reasons.
>
> Bear in mind that providers can set their own rules for what calls they will accept and what attestations they will assign, and those rules can be more restrictive than what might be dictated by regulation. For example, a provider might say ?I will only assign A-level attestation to calls that use calling numbers assigned by me.? That?s their prerogative. In fact, a provider might say: ?I will only accept calls that use calling numbers assigned by me. Those calls will get A-level attestation. I will reject all other calls.? There are no rules (to my knowledge) that prohibit providers from setting these kinds of rules.
>
> From: VoiceOps <voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org <mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org>> On Behalf Of Ivan Kovacevic via VoiceOps
> Sent: Friday, July 7, 2023 7:27 AM
> To: Voice Ops <voiceops at voiceops.org <mailto:voiceops at voiceops.org>>
> Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] STIR/SHAKEN warning!
>
> Hopefully on-topic. How are you handling TFN atestations?
>
> Although a part of NANP - it's a different technology at the network level in terms of chain of authority and routing.
>
> RespOrg manages the number, but can provision and use many carriers to make outbound calls using the TFN Caller ID (and to receive inbound calls via the same TFN)... RespOrgs is not necessarily a carrier - who and how checks that RespOrg has the authority in case of delegated attestation. I may be overcomplicating it in my mind.. but it doesn't feel like the regulation maps 1-to-1 over to TFNs... Just wondering what everyone's experience is.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Ivan
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org <mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org>
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
July 7, 2023
STIR/SHAKEN warning!
by nathana@fsr.com
I suspect things might be different now (& I just haven't kept up), but
although it is clearly *possible* to transmit a TFN as the calling number /
CID, I seem to remember that even just a mere few years ago, it was HIGHLY
discouraged, and if you ever were to receive a call bearing a TFN as its CID,
it had a very high likelihood of being fraudulent or spam. This was of course
back when the vast, vast majority of TFNs were essentially implemented as a
call forward or alias to a number that hung off of a local exchange. So of
course outbound calls that many? most? companies with TFNs would make would
typically be sourced from their local exchange number(s) and not from the TFN
(s) (unless maybe a given company had a PRI and their provider allowed them to
source calls from their TFN?).
Loosely tangentially related, as a purely anecdotal report, I will note that I
have yet to see a S/S signature/PASSporT attached to ANY calls made *to* ANY of
our TFNs, via any of the 3 SIP wholesalers we have used as both RespOrgs and
for actual traffic.
-- Nathan
From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of David
Frankel via VoiceOps
Sent: Friday, July 7, 2023 7:52 AM
To: 'Ivan Kovacevic'; 'Voice Ops'
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] STIR/SHAKEN warning!
Ivan asks: ???How are you handling TFN atestations????
When the signer of a call gives A-level attestation, it means that the signer
knows that the caller ???is authorized to use??? the calling number.
The signer can ???know??? that in any of a variety of ways. For toll-free numbers,
the most sophisticated and secure is probably via Delegate Certificates. SOMOS,
the North American Toll-Free Number Administrator, has commented about this in
a current FCC proceeding: https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/10605623514445/1
As the signer, there are other ways you could determine that the caller is
authorized to use the number. For example, you could solicit some documentation
from them (like an invoice from their RespOrg and/or service provider) and you
could call the number and verify that your caller answers. The regulations
(today) do not specify exactly how you ???know??? so you (as the signer) need to
act in the spirit of the rules.
This problem is not unique to toll-free numbers. I might have a geographic
number that I obtain from provider A (and that???s how I get inbound calls to the
number), but I make outbound calls from that number via providers B and C for
redundancy and cost reasons.
Bear in mind that providers can set their own rules for what calls they will
accept and what attestations they will assign, and those rules can be more
restrictive than what might be dictated by regulation. For example, a provider
might say ???I will only assign A-level attestation to calls that use calling
numbers assigned by me.??? That???s their prerogative. In fact, a provider might
say: ???I will only accept calls that use calling numbers assigned by me. Those
calls will get A-level attestation. I will reject all other calls.??? There are
no rules (to my knowledge) that prohibit providers from setting these kinds of
rules.
From: VoiceOps <voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org> On Behalf Of Ivan Kovacevic via
VoiceOps
Sent: Friday, July 7, 2023 7:27 AM
To: Voice Ops <voiceops at voiceops.org>
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] STIR/SHAKEN warning!
Hopefully on-topic. How are you handling TFN atestations?
Although a part of NANP - it's a different technology at the network level in
terms of chain of authority and routing.
RespOrg manages the number, but can provision and use many carriers to make
outbound calls using the TFN Caller ID (and to receive inbound calls via the
same TFN)... RespOrgs is not necessarily a carrier - who and how checks that
RespOrg has the authority in case of delegated attestation. I may be
overcomplicating it in my mind.. but it doesn't feel like the regulation maps
1-to-1 over to TFNs... Just wondering what everyone's experience is.
Thanks,
Ivan
July 7, 2023