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July 2023
- 25 participants
- 56 messages
STIR/SHAKEN warning!
by paul@timmins.net
> On Jul 3, 2023, at 8:05 PM, Markus via VoiceOps <voiceops at voiceops.org> wrote:
>
> Am 30.06.2023 um 23:00 schrieb Mary Lou Carey via VoiceOps:
>> I've heard from several clients that their upstream carrier told them they don't need to worry about being STIR/SHAKEN compliant because they are taking care of everything for them.
>> THAT IS NOT CORRECT! Every phone company is required to have its own certificate/token!
>
> What if I'm an European telecom operator and have US-based end-users (via SIP) who are calling to the US and who would like to signal their United States A-number to the called party?
>
> What if I'm an European telecom operator and have Euro end-users (via SIP) who are calling to the US and who would like to signal their European A-number to the called party?
>
> If I try to register here - https://authenticatereg.iconectiv.com/register - "Country: United States" is hard-coded.
>
> Is there a way for Euro TSPs to get STIR/SHAKEN without creating a US entity/company just for this purpose?
I'm pretty sure it's the job of whoever is providing gateway services into the USA to sign the call, and that anyone in the STIR/SHAKEN system in the US has some sort of regulatory nexus here where they could be held legally responsible. It's all about finding a throat to choke if there's misconduct.
The liability would be on whoever sells you service. I think the long term idea is that other STIs would set up around the world over time and there would be a collection of root certificates much like browser SSL stacks, so you could authenticate calls that came in from other countries and tie them back to a regulatory regime that can hold them responsible.
Unless Mary has a different idea of what the plan is?
-Paul
July 4, 2023
STIR/SHAKEN warning!
by universe@truemetal.org
Am 30.06.2023 um 23:00 schrieb Mary Lou Carey via VoiceOps:
> I've heard from several clients that their upstream carrier told them
> they don't need to worry about being STIR/SHAKEN compliant because they
> are taking care of everything for them.
>
> THAT IS NOT CORRECT! Every phone company is required to have its own
> certificate/token!
What if I'm an European telecom operator and have US-based end-users
(via SIP) who are calling to the US and who would like to signal their
United States A-number to the called party?
What if I'm an European telecom operator and have Euro end-users (via
SIP) who are calling to the US and who would like to signal their
European A-number to the called party?
If I try to register here -
https://authenticatereg.iconectiv.com/register - "Country: United
States" is hard-coded.
Is there a way for Euro TSPs to get STIR/SHAKEN without creating a US
entity/company just for this purpose?
July 4, 2023
TWC Voice Contact
by calvine@gmail.com
Does anyone have a contact at TWC/Spectrum Voice NOC? It appears they
or their downstream is route advancing after ringing starts,
preventing called numbers' Remote Call Forwarding from working.
July 3, 2023
STIR/SHAKEN warning!
by marylou@backuptelecom.com
My understanding is that they can still sign for you, but they should be
signing with YOUR certificate/token and not their own. That only adds
the cost of the certificate/token to your budget.
MARY LOU CAREY
BackUP Telecom Consulting
Office: 615-791-9969
Cell: 615-796-1111
On 2023-07-03 01:45 PM, Carlos Alvarez via VoiceOps wrote:
> I would love an update here. We are an ultra tiny MSP, and have been
> told all along by the major ULCs we use that we?re fine. They are
> signing, all good. This is a monstrous change relative to our size
> and capital.
>
> On Jul 3, 2023 at 11:09:33 AM, Mary Lou Carey via VoiceOps
> <voiceops at voiceops.org> wrote:
>
>> Thanks for the input, Mark! I'm going to call my contacts at the
>> FCC as
>> well and ask specifically what their stance o this is because from
>> what
>> I've heard they plan to start enforcing STIR/SHAKEN in August. That
>> could be devastating to many since so many of the underlying
>> carriers
>> have been telling their clients they don't need their own
>> certificate/token.
>>
>> MARY LOU CAREY
>> BackUP Telecom Consulting
>> Office: 615-791-9969
>> Cell: 615-796-1111
>>
>> On 2023-06-30 05:28 PM, Mark R Lindsey wrote:
>>
>>> Like Mary Lou, I'd like to help all voice service providers get
>>> their
>>
>>> STIR/SHAKEN implementations up and running. And it's crucial to do
>>
>>> verification as well as attestation! [1]
>>
>>>
>>
>>> There are a lot of good options -- I'm personally seeing a lot of
>>
>>> activity around Neustar, Sansay, and Transnexus. I personally like
>>> to
>>
>>> implement the HTTPS REST interface, but most implementations are
>>> doing
>>
>>> it with SIP and 302. I think I've configured over 10 different
>>
>>> variations so far. There are tons of technical methods.
>>
>>>
>>
>>> BUT... the rules on this third-party SHAKEN are not completely
>>> clear
>>
>>> cut; I tell my clients that "the jury is still out," because the
>>> FCC
>>
>>> is still seeking comment on whether this is appropriate. I'm
>>> expecting
>>
>>> rules to be issued clarifying it.
>>
>>>
>>
>>> To read more about where the FCC is on this, see the section
>>> starting
>>
>>> at Paragraph 99 in FCC-23-18A1 published March 17, 2023:
>>
>>>
>>
>>>> We seek comment on whether, and under what circumstances, a
>>> third
>>
>>>> party may authenticate calls on behalf of a provider with A- or
>>
>>>> B-level attestations consistent with the ATIS standards.
>>> Pursuant to
>>
>>>> ATIS-1000074, in order to apply a B-level attestation for a
>>> call,
>>
>>>> the signing party must originate the call onto the IP-based
>>> service
>>
>>>> network and have a direct authenticated relationship with the
>>
>>>> customer.An A-level attestation additionally requires the
>>> signing
>>
>>>> provider to establish a verified association with the telephone
>>
>>>> number used for the call.341 Can a third-party authenticating a
>>> call
>>
>>>> on behalf of an originating provider satisfy all or any these
>>
>>>> criteria, and if so, how? Does the answer to that question
>>> depend on
>>
>>>> the nature of the relationship between the originating provider
>>> and
>>
>>>> the third party? For instance, is it possible for a third party
>>> that
>>
>>>> is a wholesale provider for a reseller, or an intermediate
>>> provider,
>>
>>>> to apply A- or B-level attestations on behalf of an originating
>>
>>>> provider in a manner that complies with the ATIS
>>> attestation-level
>>
>>>> criteria, but not a different type of third party? Are there
>>> third
>>
>>>> parties authenticating calls on behalf of originating providers
>>> that
>>
>>>> can only apply C-level attestations under the ATIS criteria? If
>>
>>>> commenters contend that third parties can meet the ATIS criteria
>>> for
>>
>>>> signing calls with A- and B-level attestations because they
>>
>>>> effectively stand in the shoes of the originating provider with
>>> the
>>
>>>> direct relationship with the customer, we ask that they specify
>>> the
>>
>>>> legal bases for that conclusion, e.g., the specific grounds for
>>> an
>>
>>>> agency theory, if any, and/or how the terms of the ATIS
>>> standards
>>
>>>> may be construed to include the third-party arrangement.
>>
>>>>
>>
>>>> To the extent commenters contend that third parties may satisfy
>>> the
>>
>>>> criteria to sign calls with A- or B-level attestations, what
>>
>>>> information must be shared between originating providers and
>>> third
>>
>>>> parties for those attestation levels to be applied, is that
>>
>>>> information sharing occurring, and does it implicate any legal
>>> or
>>
>>>> public interest concerns, including privacy concerns?
>>
>>>
>>
>>> Read it here:
>>> https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-23-18A1.pdf
>>
>>>
>>
>>> Mark R Lindsey | +1-229-316-0013 | mrl at ecg.co | Schedule a Meeting
>>> [2]
>>
>>> | Newsletter [3]
>>
>>>
>>
>>>> On Jun 30, 2023, at 17:00, Mary Lou Carey via VoiceOps
>>
>>>> <voiceops at voiceops.org> wrote:
>>
>>>>
>>
>>>> I've heard from several clients that their upstream carrier told
>>
>>>> them they don't need to worry about being STIR/SHAKEN compliant
>>
>>>> because they are taking care of everything for them.
>>
>>>>
>>
>>>> THAT IS NOT CORRECT! Every phone company is required to have its
>>> own
>>
>>>> certificate/token!
>>
>>>>
>>
>>>> It doesn't matter if you're a reseller or a facilities-based
>>
>>>> carrier. Whoever bills the customer is the carrier of record and
>>> is
>>
>>>> responsible for signing the customer's calls with THEIR OWN
>>
>>>> certificate/token. While an upstream carrier can sign calls for
>>> your
>>
>>>> company, they must sign with YOUR certificate/token - not their
>>> own
>>
>>>> because they don't have a direct connection with your customer.
>>
>>>>
>>
>>>> Please understand that you're putting your network at risk when
>>> you
>>
>>>> share a token with another company because there's no way to
>>
>>>> differentiate between traffic when it's all under the same
>>
>>>> certificate/token. If your upstream carrier signs all their
>>
>>>> customer's traffic with their token, it only takes one bad
>>> customer
>>
>>>> to shut their whole network down. The only way to protect your
>>
>>>> company from other companies' mistakes is to make sure your
>>> upstream
>>
>>>> carrier is signing your calls with your certificate/token.
>>
>>>>
>>
>>>> One may not think they can get away with using someone else's
>>
>>>> certificate/token because it would be difficult to monitor the
>>> call
>>
>>>> stream for offenders. Let me just tell you the ITG can easily
>>
>>>> compare the Robocall Mitigation Database with the Approved
>>> Carriers
>>
>>>> list to locate the companies that don't have their own
>>
>>>> certificate/token. They don't need to look at traffic to
>>> determine
>>
>>>> that.
>>
>>>>
>>
>>>> Please don't play Russian roulette with your company because
>>> it's
>>
>>>> not worth losing your whole business over the cost of a
>>
>>>> certificate/token. Getting your own certificate/token can take
>>
>>>> anywhere from 2 weeks to 2 months depending on where you are in
>>> the
>>
>>>> process. From what I've heard, the FCC will start blocking
>>> traffic
>>
>>>> in August so if you haven't started the process....do so now!
>>
>>>>
>>
>>>> MARY LOU CAREY
>>
>>>> BackUP Telecom Consulting
>>
>>>> Office: 615-791-9969
>>
>>>> Cell: 615-796-1111
>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>
>>>> VoiceOps mailing list
>>
>>>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>>
>>>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>>
>>>
>>
>>>
>>
>>>
>>
>>> Links:
>>
>>> ------
>>
>>> [1]
>>
>>>
>>
> https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/stirshaken-how-investigators-can-tell-youre-…
>>
>>> [2] https://ecg.co/lindsey/schedule
>>
>>> [3]
>>
>>>
>>
> https://www.linkedin.com/newsletters/mark-lindsey-voice-7021614437413330944/
>> _______________________________________________
>> VoiceOps mailing list
>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
July 3, 2023
STIR/SHAKEN warning!
by caalvarez@gmail.com
I would love an update here. We are an ultra tiny MSP, and have been told
all along by the major ULCs we use that we?re fine. They are signing, all
good. This is a monstrous change relative to our size and capital.
On Jul 3, 2023 at 11:09:33 AM, Mary Lou Carey via VoiceOps <
voiceops at voiceops.org> wrote:
> Thanks for the input, Mark! I'm going to call my contacts at the FCC as
> well and ask specifically what their stance o this is because from what
> I've heard they plan to start enforcing STIR/SHAKEN in August. That
> could be devastating to many since so many of the underlying carriers
> have been telling their clients they don't need their own
> certificate/token.
>
> MARY LOU CAREY
> BackUP Telecom Consulting
> Office: 615-791-9969
> Cell: 615-796-1111
>
> On 2023-06-30 05:28 PM, Mark R Lindsey wrote:
>
> Like Mary Lou, I'd like to help all voice service providers get their
>
> STIR/SHAKEN implementations up and running. And it's crucial to do
>
> verification as well as attestation! [1]
>
>
> There are a lot of good options -- I'm personally seeing a lot of
>
> activity around Neustar, Sansay, and Transnexus. I personally like to
>
> implement the HTTPS REST interface, but most implementations are doing
>
> it with SIP and 302. I think I've configured over 10 different
>
> variations so far. There are tons of technical methods.
>
>
> BUT... the rules on this third-party SHAKEN are not completely clear
>
> cut; I tell my clients that "the jury is still out," because the FCC
>
> is still seeking comment on whether this is appropriate. I'm expecting
>
> rules to be issued clarifying it.
>
>
> To read more about where the FCC is on this, see the section starting
>
> at Paragraph 99 in FCC-23-18A1 published March 17, 2023:
>
>
> > We seek comment on whether, and under what circumstances, a third
>
> > party may authenticate calls on behalf of a provider with A- or
>
> > B-level attestations consistent with the ATIS standards. Pursuant to
>
> > ATIS-1000074, in order to apply a B-level attestation for a call,
>
> > the signing party must originate the call onto the IP-based service
>
> > network and have a direct authenticated relationship with the
>
> > customer.An A-level attestation additionally requires the signing
>
> > provider to establish a verified association with the telephone
>
> > number used for the call.341 Can a third-party authenticating a call
>
> > on behalf of an originating provider satisfy all or any these
>
> > criteria, and if so, how? Does the answer to that question depend on
>
> > the nature of the relationship between the originating provider and
>
> > the third party? For instance, is it possible for a third party that
>
> > is a wholesale provider for a reseller, or an intermediate provider,
>
> > to apply A- or B-level attestations on behalf of an originating
>
> > provider in a manner that complies with the ATIS attestation-level
>
> > criteria, but not a different type of third party? Are there third
>
> > parties authenticating calls on behalf of originating providers that
>
> > can only apply C-level attestations under the ATIS criteria? If
>
> > commenters contend that third parties can meet the ATIS criteria for
>
> > signing calls with A- and B-level attestations because they
>
> > effectively stand in the shoes of the originating provider with the
>
> > direct relationship with the customer, we ask that they specify the
>
> > legal bases for that conclusion, e.g., the specific grounds for an
>
> > agency theory, if any, and/or how the terms of the ATIS standards
>
> > may be construed to include the third-party arrangement.
>
> >
>
> > To the extent commenters contend that third parties may satisfy the
>
> > criteria to sign calls with A- or B-level attestations, what
>
> > information must be shared between originating providers and third
>
> > parties for those attestation levels to be applied, is that
>
> > information sharing occurring, and does it implicate any legal or
>
> > public interest concerns, including privacy concerns?
>
>
> Read it here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-23-18A1.pdf
>
>
> Mark R Lindsey | +1-229-316-0013 | mrl at ecg.co | Schedule a Meeting [2]
>
> | Newsletter [3]
>
>
> > On Jun 30, 2023, at 17:00, Mary Lou Carey via VoiceOps
>
> > <voiceops at voiceops.org> wrote:
>
> >
>
> > I've heard from several clients that their upstream carrier told
>
> > them they don't need to worry about being STIR/SHAKEN compliant
>
> > because they are taking care of everything for them.
>
> >
>
> > THAT IS NOT CORRECT! Every phone company is required to have its own
>
> > certificate/token!
>
> >
>
> > It doesn't matter if you're a reseller or a facilities-based
>
> > carrier. Whoever bills the customer is the carrier of record and is
>
> > responsible for signing the customer's calls with THEIR OWN
>
> > certificate/token. While an upstream carrier can sign calls for your
>
> > company, they must sign with YOUR certificate/token - not their own
>
> > because they don't have a direct connection with your customer.
>
> >
>
> > Please understand that you're putting your network at risk when you
>
> > share a token with another company because there's no way to
>
> > differentiate between traffic when it's all under the same
>
> > certificate/token. If your upstream carrier signs all their
>
> > customer's traffic with their token, it only takes one bad customer
>
> > to shut their whole network down. The only way to protect your
>
> > company from other companies' mistakes is to make sure your upstream
>
> > carrier is signing your calls with your certificate/token.
>
> >
>
> > One may not think they can get away with using someone else's
>
> > certificate/token because it would be difficult to monitor the call
>
> > stream for offenders. Let me just tell you the ITG can easily
>
> > compare the Robocall Mitigation Database with the Approved Carriers
>
> > list to locate the companies that don't have their own
>
> > certificate/token. They don't need to look at traffic to determine
>
> > that.
>
> >
>
> > Please don't play Russian roulette with your company because it's
>
> > not worth losing your whole business over the cost of a
>
> > certificate/token. Getting your own certificate/token can take
>
> > anywhere from 2 weeks to 2 months depending on where you are in the
>
> > process. From what I've heard, the FCC will start blocking traffic
>
> > in August so if you haven't started the process....do so now!
>
> >
>
> > MARY LOU CAREY
>
> > BackUP Telecom Consulting
>
> > Office: 615-791-9969
>
> > Cell: 615-796-1111
>
> > _______________________________________________
>
> > VoiceOps mailing list
>
> > VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>
> > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
>
>
> Links:
>
> ------
>
> [1]
>
>
> https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/stirshaken-how-investigators-can-tell-youre-…
>
> [2] https://ecg.co/lindsey/schedule
>
> [3]
>
>
> https://www.linkedin.com/newsletters/mark-lindsey-voice-7021614437413330944/
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
July 3, 2023
STIR/SHAKEN warning!
by marylou@backuptelecom.com
Thanks for the input, Mark! I'm going to call my contacts at the FCC as
well and ask specifically what their stance o this is because from what
I've heard they plan to start enforcing STIR/SHAKEN in August. That
could be devastating to many since so many of the underlying carriers
have been telling their clients they don't need their own
certificate/token.
MARY LOU CAREY
BackUP Telecom Consulting
Office: 615-791-9969
Cell: 615-796-1111
On 2023-06-30 05:28 PM, Mark R Lindsey wrote:
> Like Mary Lou, I'd like to help all voice service providers get their
> STIR/SHAKEN implementations up and running. And it's crucial to do
> verification as well as attestation! [1]
>
> There are a lot of good options -- I'm personally seeing a lot of
> activity around Neustar, Sansay, and Transnexus. I personally like to
> implement the HTTPS REST interface, but most implementations are doing
> it with SIP and 302. I think I've configured over 10 different
> variations so far. There are tons of technical methods.
>
> BUT... the rules on this third-party SHAKEN are not completely clear
> cut; I tell my clients that "the jury is still out," because the FCC
> is still seeking comment on whether this is appropriate. I'm expecting
> rules to be issued clarifying it.
>
> To read more about where the FCC is on this, see the section starting
> at Paragraph 99 in FCC-23-18A1 published March 17, 2023:
>
>> We seek comment on whether, and under what circumstances, a third
>> party may authenticate calls on behalf of a provider with A- or
>> B-level attestations consistent with the ATIS standards. Pursuant to
>> ATIS-1000074, in order to apply a B-level attestation for a call,
>> the signing party must originate the call onto the IP-based service
>> network and have a direct authenticated relationship with the
>> customer.An A-level attestation additionally requires the signing
>> provider to establish a verified association with the telephone
>> number used for the call.341 Can a third-party authenticating a call
>> on behalf of an originating provider satisfy all or any these
>> criteria, and if so, how? Does the answer to that question depend on
>> the nature of the relationship between the originating provider and
>> the third party? For instance, is it possible for a third party that
>> is a wholesale provider for a reseller, or an intermediate provider,
>> to apply A- or B-level attestations on behalf of an originating
>> provider in a manner that complies with the ATIS attestation-level
>> criteria, but not a different type of third party? Are there third
>> parties authenticating calls on behalf of originating providers that
>> can only apply C-level attestations under the ATIS criteria? If
>> commenters contend that third parties can meet the ATIS criteria for
>> signing calls with A- and B-level attestations because they
>> effectively stand in the shoes of the originating provider with the
>> direct relationship with the customer, we ask that they specify the
>> legal bases for that conclusion, e.g., the specific grounds for an
>> agency theory, if any, and/or how the terms of the ATIS standards
>> may be construed to include the third-party arrangement.
>>
>> To the extent commenters contend that third parties may satisfy the
>> criteria to sign calls with A- or B-level attestations, what
>> information must be shared between originating providers and third
>> parties for those attestation levels to be applied, is that
>> information sharing occurring, and does it implicate any legal or
>> public interest concerns, including privacy concerns?
>
> Read it here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-23-18A1.pdf
>
> Mark R Lindsey | +1-229-316-0013 | mrl at ecg.co | Schedule a Meeting [2]
> | Newsletter [3]
>
>> On Jun 30, 2023, at 17:00, Mary Lou Carey via VoiceOps
>> <voiceops at voiceops.org> wrote:
>>
>> I've heard from several clients that their upstream carrier told
>> them they don't need to worry about being STIR/SHAKEN compliant
>> because they are taking care of everything for them.
>>
>> THAT IS NOT CORRECT! Every phone company is required to have its own
>> certificate/token!
>>
>> It doesn't matter if you're a reseller or a facilities-based
>> carrier. Whoever bills the customer is the carrier of record and is
>> responsible for signing the customer's calls with THEIR OWN
>> certificate/token. While an upstream carrier can sign calls for your
>> company, they must sign with YOUR certificate/token - not their own
>> because they don't have a direct connection with your customer.
>>
>> Please understand that you're putting your network at risk when you
>> share a token with another company because there's no way to
>> differentiate between traffic when it's all under the same
>> certificate/token. If your upstream carrier signs all their
>> customer's traffic with their token, it only takes one bad customer
>> to shut their whole network down. The only way to protect your
>> company from other companies' mistakes is to make sure your upstream
>> carrier is signing your calls with your certificate/token.
>>
>> One may not think they can get away with using someone else's
>> certificate/token because it would be difficult to monitor the call
>> stream for offenders. Let me just tell you the ITG can easily
>> compare the Robocall Mitigation Database with the Approved Carriers
>> list to locate the companies that don't have their own
>> certificate/token. They don't need to look at traffic to determine
>> that.
>>
>> Please don't play Russian roulette with your company because it's
>> not worth losing your whole business over the cost of a
>> certificate/token. Getting your own certificate/token can take
>> anywhere from 2 weeks to 2 months depending on where you are in the
>> process. From what I've heard, the FCC will start blocking traffic
>> in August so if you haven't started the process....do so now!
>>
>> MARY LOU CAREY
>> BackUP Telecom Consulting
>> Office: 615-791-9969
>> Cell: 615-796-1111
>> _______________________________________________
>> VoiceOps mailing list
>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
>
> Links:
> ------
> [1]
> https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/stirshaken-how-investigators-can-tell-youre-…
> [2] https://ecg.co/lindsey/schedule
> [3]
> https://www.linkedin.com/newsletters/mark-lindsey-voice-7021614437413330944/
July 3, 2023