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- 14 participants
- 10512 messages
STIR/SHAKEN warning!
by nathana@fsr.com
Good catch. I just casually scrolled through the list of companies in the Robocall Mitigation Database & stumbled across a Panamanian company and an Australian company that both claim to have "complete" STIR/SHAKEN implementations. Yet I can confirm that neither company shows up either in the 499 Filer ID database, nor in iconectiv's list of Service Provider accounts that they have authorized to have access to the STI-PA and to generate SP tokens. The FCC FRNs for both companies were also generated fairly recently.
I wonder if these foreign companies got concerned about making sure that international calls originating from their networks were getting signed with a high attestation on ingress into the U.S., arranged for this to be the case with whomever they are interconnecting with over on our shores, thought that they had to be listed in the RMD for some reason (do they? Are int'l telecoms required to be in the RMD and file an actual mitigation plan if they want to originate calls to the U.S.?), also assumed/misunderstood that having another party sign & attest their calls for them is enough to claim a "complete" implementation, and so that's why they filed the way they did. (Trying to be generous / assume the best here.)
Since implementing S/S in the U.S. requires a 499 Filer ID, it is actually kind of infuriating that the RMD does not have 499 Filer ID as a required field on their form. That would nip this issue right in the bud if they did.
-- Nathan
-----Original Message-----
From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of Markus via VoiceOps
Sent: Thursday, July 6, 2023 1:07 PM
To: voiceops at voiceops.org
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] STIR/SHAKEN warning!
Am 04.07.2023 um 07:35 schrieb Paul Timmins:
>> What if I'm an European telecom operator and have US-based end-users (via SIP) who are calling to the US and who would like to signal their United States A-number to the called party?
>>
>> What if I'm an European telecom operator and have Euro end-users (via SIP) who are calling to the US and who would like to signal their European A-number to the called party?
>>
>> If I try to register here - https://authenticatereg.iconectiv.com/register - "Country: United States" is hard-coded.
>>
>> Is there a way for Euro TSPs to get STIR/SHAKEN without creating a US entity/company just for this purpose?
>
> I'm pretty sure it's the job of whoever is providing gateway services into the USA to sign the call, and that anyone in the STIR/SHAKEN system in the US has some sort of regulatory nexus here where they could be held legally responsible. It's all about finding a throat to choke if there's misconduct.
I asked iconectiv that question and now I have clarity:
Me:
"I have some fundamental questions about STIR/SHAKEN: What if I'm an
European telecom operator and have US-based end-users (via SIP) who are
calling to the US and who would like to signal their United States
A-number to the called party? -> Do we need to get a STIR/SHAKEN
certificate? [...]"
iconectiv:
"The revised SPC token Access Policy requires providers seeking to
register with the STI-Policy Administrator (STI-PA) to:
1) Have a current form 499A on file with the FCC;
2) Have been assigned an Operating Company Number (OCN); [...]
Me:
"Since registering as 499A and getting an own OCN is only possible for
US companies, I figure getting a STIR/SHAKEN certificate through you is
currently not possible for non-US companies. Is that correct?"
iconectiv:
"That is correct."
The confusion also came from the fact that many non-US companies that
registered in the Robocall Mitigation Database -
https://fccprod.servicenowservices.com/rmd?id=rmd_listings - chose
"Complete STIR/SHAKEN implementation" or "Partial STIR/SHAKEN
implementation", which, unless they also have a US subsidiary, seems to
be a lie. Probably they chose something that looked cool in the dropdown
box, or were too lazy to develop a Robocall Mitigation Plan (this is
what you gotta upload as DOCUMENT if you choose "No STIR/SHAKEN
implementation". I also noticed some non-US companies just uploaded some
random document to the database, like a high school report or just some
random letters or words... so much about the quality of that database.
Good luck
Markus
_______________________________________________
VoiceOps mailing list
VoiceOps at voiceops.org
https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
July 6, 2023
STIR/SHAKEN warning!
by universe@truemetal.org
Am 04.07.2023 um 07:35 schrieb Paul Timmins:
>> What if I'm an European telecom operator and have US-based end-users (via SIP) who are calling to the US and who would like to signal their United States A-number to the called party?
>>
>> What if I'm an European telecom operator and have Euro end-users (via SIP) who are calling to the US and who would like to signal their European A-number to the called party?
>>
>> If I try to register here - https://authenticatereg.iconectiv.com/register - "Country: United States" is hard-coded.
>>
>> Is there a way for Euro TSPs to get STIR/SHAKEN without creating a US entity/company just for this purpose?
>
> I'm pretty sure it's the job of whoever is providing gateway services into the USA to sign the call, and that anyone in the STIR/SHAKEN system in the US has some sort of regulatory nexus here where they could be held legally responsible. It's all about finding a throat to choke if there's misconduct.
I asked iconectiv that question and now I have clarity:
Me:
"I have some fundamental questions about STIR/SHAKEN: What if I'm an
European telecom operator and have US-based end-users (via SIP) who are
calling to the US and who would like to signal their United States
A-number to the called party? -> Do we need to get a STIR/SHAKEN
certificate? [...]"
iconectiv:
"The revised SPC token Access Policy requires providers seeking to
register with the STI-Policy Administrator (STI-PA) to:
1) Have a current form 499A on file with the FCC;
2) Have been assigned an Operating Company Number (OCN); [...]
Me:
"Since registering as 499A and getting an own OCN is only possible for
US companies, I figure getting a STIR/SHAKEN certificate through you is
currently not possible for non-US companies. Is that correct?"
iconectiv:
"That is correct."
The confusion also came from the fact that many non-US companies that
registered in the Robocall Mitigation Database -
https://fccprod.servicenowservices.com/rmd?id=rmd_listings - chose
"Complete STIR/SHAKEN implementation" or "Partial STIR/SHAKEN
implementation", which, unless they also have a US subsidiary, seems to
be a lie. Probably they chose something that looked cool in the dropdown
box, or were too lazy to develop a Robocall Mitigation Plan (this is
what you gotta upload as DOCUMENT if you choose "No STIR/SHAKEN
implementation". I also noticed some non-US companies just uploaded some
random document to the database, like a high school report or just some
random letters or words... so much about the quality of that database.
Good luck
Markus
July 6, 2023
800 Lookup
by voiceops@ics-il.net
Is there a better place to look up toll-free number information than https://www.800forall.com/SearchWhoOwns.aspx ? My only connection to that is a Google search.
As we're auditing our invoices, I'm finding services we're being billed for that don't match current customers. I think I can get everything I need from the above link, just didn't know if there were better or more appropriate tools out there.
-----
Mike Hammett
Intelligent Computing Solutions
http://www.ics-il.com
Midwest Internet Exchange
http://www.midwest-ix.com
July 6, 2023
STIR/SHAKEN warning!
by dfrankel@zipdx.com
Some additional perspective on STIR/SHAKEN signing requirements. This is not
legal advice; for that, turn to your qualified attorney well-versed in
applicable telecommunications regulations (US Federal and State).
Several relevant STIR/SHAKEN regulations are here:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/47/part-64/subpart-HH.
In particular, ? 64.6301(a)(2) says that "a voice service provider shall ...
Authenticate caller identification information for all SIP calls it
originates and that it will exchange with another voice service provider or
intermediate provider and, to the extent technically feasible, transmit that
call with authenticated caller identification information to the next voice
service provider or intermediate provider in the call path."
? 64.6300(a) says "The term 'authenticate caller identification information'
refers to the process by which a voice service provider attests to the
accuracy of caller identification information transmitted with a call it
originates."
What Mary has said is consistent with this. If you are the originating Voice
Service Provider, the call must be authenticated by you -- it must carry
your signature. You can instruct somebody else to apply your signature per
your specifications (including the level of attestation). But if you are the
originating provider, the signature has to be yours.
? 64.6300(n) says "voice service" is one that "furnishes voice
communications to an end user using resources from the North American
Numbering Plan." So if your caller is using +1 numbers, then presumably you
are a voice service provider covered by these rules. The rule doesn't
specify whether you (or your customer) have to be in the United States or
not; so I assume the rules apply globally. Also, interestingly, this
particular rule doesn't seem to exclude NANP numbers that are not USA
numbers, so the rule appears to apply to those calling with Canadian numbers
and other non-USA +1 numbers. Different people might read the rule
differently regarding FROM and TO numbers. Some might argue that if the FROM
number is NOT a NANP number, even if the TO number is, then the rules do not
apply.
But it seems clear that if the call is FROM a NANP number, TO a NANP number,
then you as the originating service provider would be required to
authenticate that call with your signature (regardless of where in the world
you and/or your customer are located).
Paul alluded to limitations on the FCC's authority with respect to geography
-- at least constraints on their ability to enforce. The FCC controls their
Robocall Mitigation Database, and they do require downstream providers to
only accept calls from other providers listed in the database. So by
delisting a provider (wherever in the world that provider is), the FCC can
restrict that provider's access to the US network. See 47 CFR ?
64.6305(e)(1) & (2). (2) is applicable to foreign providers that use "North
American Numbering Plan resources that pertain to the United States in the
caller ID field to send voice traffic to residential or business subscribers
in the United States." So a US downstream provider could, if they so choose,
accept calls from a foreign provider NOT listed in the RMD as long as the
call has a non-USA number in the caller-ID field.
There are new obligations (several of which went into effect this month) on
so-called Gateway providers -- US-based providers that take calls from
foreign providers. These are in 47 CFR ? 64.6303 and 6305 and generally
require Gateway providers to sign unsigned calls. This gets to Paul's
"throat to choke" point.
The cost for a Service Provider to get their own SHAKEN token (so that their
signature can appear on the calls they originate) is not egregious. You need
an OCN, which NECA will give you for a one-time charge of $475. The STI-PA,
iconectiv, charges an annual fee based on revenue to be registered as a
SHAKEN service provider; the minimum is $500 for 2023 (as far as I can
tell). You will then need to engage an STI-CA (certificate authority) to
generate your certificate(s) for call signing. The STI-CA marketplace
appears to be competitive, as confirmed by other commenters.
As far as I know, it is possible for non-USA-based service providers to
participate in this process; I see what I believe to be foreign entities
registered on the iconectiv site
(https://authenticate.iconectiv.com/authorized-service-providers-authenticat
e).
As mentioned, the FCC has on-going formal rule-making processes happening as
we speak. You can see (and participate in) some of the relevant discussion
here:
https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/search/search-filings/results?q=(proceedings.name:(
%2217-97%22)+AND+submissiontype.description:(%22COMMENT%22%20OR%20%22REPLY%2
0TO%20COMMENTS%22%20OR%20%22NOTICE%20OF%20EXPARTE%22)). This public docket
will see a lot more action tomorrow (Wednesday), which is the due-date for
so-called "Reply Comments."
The compliance burden for voice service providers does seem to be
ever-increasing. This is not new or unique. Many tech businesses (not just
telecoms) have evolving burdens for data privacy and security compliance
(think GDPR); there are finance compliance burdens (think processing credit
cards); the list goes on. The good news in telecom is that over the past
couple of decades other costs have come down tremendously, which created the
business opportunity in the first place. Compliance is a fact of life. If
ultimately the compliance costs grow to the point that certain segments of
your business are not profitable, then it is time to exit those segments.
David Frankel
July 4, 2023
SentryPeer: A distributed peer to peer list of bad IP addresses and phone numbers collected via a SIP Honeypot
by ghenry@suretec.co.uk
Hi,
I've just released https://sentrypeer.com
About SentryPeerHQ -> https://sentrypeer.com/about
Fully Open Source -> https://github.com/SentryPeer/SentryPeerHQ
Always free -> https://sentrypeer.com/pricing (for those that contribute
data by running an official SentryPeer node or their own honeypot)
Thanks,
Gavin.
On Wed, 24 Nov 2021 at 21:21, Gavin Henry <ghenry at suretec.co.uk> wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> I hope you don't mind the post, but thought this might be of use and
> in the spirit of release early, release often I've done an alpha
> release:
>
> https://github.com/SentryPeer/SentryPeer
>
> There's a presentation too if you'd like to watch/read where I hope to
> go with this:
>
> https://blog.tadsummit.com/2021/11/17/sentrypeer/
>
> Working on the API and web UI next, then the p2p part of it. Feel free
> to submit any feature requests or have a play :-)
>
> Thanks for reading and any feedback is welcome!
>
> --
> Kind Regards,
> Gavin Henry.
>
--
Kind Regards,
Gavin Henry.
Managing Director.
T +44 (0) 330 44 50 000
D +44 (0) 330 44 55 007
M +44 (0) 7930 323266
F +44 (0) 1224 824887
E ghenry at suretec.co.uk
Open Source. Open Solutions(tm).
http://www.suretecsystems.com/
Suretec Systems is a limited company registered in Scotland. Registered
number: SC258005. Registered office: The James Gregory Centre, Campus 2,
Balgownie Road, Aberdeen. AB22 8GU.
Subject to disclaimer at http://www.suretecgroup.com/disclaimer.html
OpenPGP (GPG/PGP) Public Key: 0x8CFBA8E6 - Import from hkp://
pool.subkeys.pgp.net
or http://www.suretecgroup.com/0x8CFBA8E6.gpg
July 4, 2023
STIR/SHAKEN warning!
by paul@timmins.net
> On Jul 3, 2023, at 8:05 PM, Markus via VoiceOps <voiceops at voiceops.org> wrote:
>
> Am 30.06.2023 um 23:00 schrieb Mary Lou Carey via VoiceOps:
>> I've heard from several clients that their upstream carrier told them they don't need to worry about being STIR/SHAKEN compliant because they are taking care of everything for them.
>> THAT IS NOT CORRECT! Every phone company is required to have its own certificate/token!
>
> What if I'm an European telecom operator and have US-based end-users (via SIP) who are calling to the US and who would like to signal their United States A-number to the called party?
>
> What if I'm an European telecom operator and have Euro end-users (via SIP) who are calling to the US and who would like to signal their European A-number to the called party?
>
> If I try to register here - https://authenticatereg.iconectiv.com/register - "Country: United States" is hard-coded.
>
> Is there a way for Euro TSPs to get STIR/SHAKEN without creating a US entity/company just for this purpose?
I'm pretty sure it's the job of whoever is providing gateway services into the USA to sign the call, and that anyone in the STIR/SHAKEN system in the US has some sort of regulatory nexus here where they could be held legally responsible. It's all about finding a throat to choke if there's misconduct.
The liability would be on whoever sells you service. I think the long term idea is that other STIs would set up around the world over time and there would be a collection of root certificates much like browser SSL stacks, so you could authenticate calls that came in from other countries and tie them back to a regulatory regime that can hold them responsible.
Unless Mary has a different idea of what the plan is?
-Paul
July 4, 2023
STIR/SHAKEN warning!
by universe@truemetal.org
Am 30.06.2023 um 23:00 schrieb Mary Lou Carey via VoiceOps:
> I've heard from several clients that their upstream carrier told them
> they don't need to worry about being STIR/SHAKEN compliant because they
> are taking care of everything for them.
>
> THAT IS NOT CORRECT! Every phone company is required to have its own
> certificate/token!
What if I'm an European telecom operator and have US-based end-users
(via SIP) who are calling to the US and who would like to signal their
United States A-number to the called party?
What if I'm an European telecom operator and have Euro end-users (via
SIP) who are calling to the US and who would like to signal their
European A-number to the called party?
If I try to register here -
https://authenticatereg.iconectiv.com/register - "Country: United
States" is hard-coded.
Is there a way for Euro TSPs to get STIR/SHAKEN without creating a US
entity/company just for this purpose?
July 4, 2023
TWC Voice Contact
by calvine@gmail.com
Does anyone have a contact at TWC/Spectrum Voice NOC? It appears they
or their downstream is route advancing after ringing starts,
preventing called numbers' Remote Call Forwarding from working.
July 3, 2023
STIR/SHAKEN warning!
by marylou@backuptelecom.com
My understanding is that they can still sign for you, but they should be
signing with YOUR certificate/token and not their own. That only adds
the cost of the certificate/token to your budget.
MARY LOU CAREY
BackUP Telecom Consulting
Office: 615-791-9969
Cell: 615-796-1111
On 2023-07-03 01:45 PM, Carlos Alvarez via VoiceOps wrote:
> I would love an update here. We are an ultra tiny MSP, and have been
> told all along by the major ULCs we use that we?re fine. They are
> signing, all good. This is a monstrous change relative to our size
> and capital.
>
> On Jul 3, 2023 at 11:09:33 AM, Mary Lou Carey via VoiceOps
> <voiceops at voiceops.org> wrote:
>
>> Thanks for the input, Mark! I'm going to call my contacts at the
>> FCC as
>> well and ask specifically what their stance o this is because from
>> what
>> I've heard they plan to start enforcing STIR/SHAKEN in August. That
>> could be devastating to many since so many of the underlying
>> carriers
>> have been telling their clients they don't need their own
>> certificate/token.
>>
>> MARY LOU CAREY
>> BackUP Telecom Consulting
>> Office: 615-791-9969
>> Cell: 615-796-1111
>>
>> On 2023-06-30 05:28 PM, Mark R Lindsey wrote:
>>
>>> Like Mary Lou, I'd like to help all voice service providers get
>>> their
>>
>>> STIR/SHAKEN implementations up and running. And it's crucial to do
>>
>>> verification as well as attestation! [1]
>>
>>>
>>
>>> There are a lot of good options -- I'm personally seeing a lot of
>>
>>> activity around Neustar, Sansay, and Transnexus. I personally like
>>> to
>>
>>> implement the HTTPS REST interface, but most implementations are
>>> doing
>>
>>> it with SIP and 302. I think I've configured over 10 different
>>
>>> variations so far. There are tons of technical methods.
>>
>>>
>>
>>> BUT... the rules on this third-party SHAKEN are not completely
>>> clear
>>
>>> cut; I tell my clients that "the jury is still out," because the
>>> FCC
>>
>>> is still seeking comment on whether this is appropriate. I'm
>>> expecting
>>
>>> rules to be issued clarifying it.
>>
>>>
>>
>>> To read more about where the FCC is on this, see the section
>>> starting
>>
>>> at Paragraph 99 in FCC-23-18A1 published March 17, 2023:
>>
>>>
>>
>>>> We seek comment on whether, and under what circumstances, a
>>> third
>>
>>>> party may authenticate calls on behalf of a provider with A- or
>>
>>>> B-level attestations consistent with the ATIS standards.
>>> Pursuant to
>>
>>>> ATIS-1000074, in order to apply a B-level attestation for a
>>> call,
>>
>>>> the signing party must originate the call onto the IP-based
>>> service
>>
>>>> network and have a direct authenticated relationship with the
>>
>>>> customer.An A-level attestation additionally requires the
>>> signing
>>
>>>> provider to establish a verified association with the telephone
>>
>>>> number used for the call.341 Can a third-party authenticating a
>>> call
>>
>>>> on behalf of an originating provider satisfy all or any these
>>
>>>> criteria, and if so, how? Does the answer to that question
>>> depend on
>>
>>>> the nature of the relationship between the originating provider
>>> and
>>
>>>> the third party? For instance, is it possible for a third party
>>> that
>>
>>>> is a wholesale provider for a reseller, or an intermediate
>>> provider,
>>
>>>> to apply A- or B-level attestations on behalf of an originating
>>
>>>> provider in a manner that complies with the ATIS
>>> attestation-level
>>
>>>> criteria, but not a different type of third party? Are there
>>> third
>>
>>>> parties authenticating calls on behalf of originating providers
>>> that
>>
>>>> can only apply C-level attestations under the ATIS criteria? If
>>
>>>> commenters contend that third parties can meet the ATIS criteria
>>> for
>>
>>>> signing calls with A- and B-level attestations because they
>>
>>>> effectively stand in the shoes of the originating provider with
>>> the
>>
>>>> direct relationship with the customer, we ask that they specify
>>> the
>>
>>>> legal bases for that conclusion, e.g., the specific grounds for
>>> an
>>
>>>> agency theory, if any, and/or how the terms of the ATIS
>>> standards
>>
>>>> may be construed to include the third-party arrangement.
>>
>>>>
>>
>>>> To the extent commenters contend that third parties may satisfy
>>> the
>>
>>>> criteria to sign calls with A- or B-level attestations, what
>>
>>>> information must be shared between originating providers and
>>> third
>>
>>>> parties for those attestation levels to be applied, is that
>>
>>>> information sharing occurring, and does it implicate any legal
>>> or
>>
>>>> public interest concerns, including privacy concerns?
>>
>>>
>>
>>> Read it here:
>>> https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-23-18A1.pdf
>>
>>>
>>
>>> Mark R Lindsey | +1-229-316-0013 | mrl at ecg.co | Schedule a Meeting
>>> [2]
>>
>>> | Newsletter [3]
>>
>>>
>>
>>>> On Jun 30, 2023, at 17:00, Mary Lou Carey via VoiceOps
>>
>>>> <voiceops at voiceops.org> wrote:
>>
>>>>
>>
>>>> I've heard from several clients that their upstream carrier told
>>
>>>> them they don't need to worry about being STIR/SHAKEN compliant
>>
>>>> because they are taking care of everything for them.
>>
>>>>
>>
>>>> THAT IS NOT CORRECT! Every phone company is required to have its
>>> own
>>
>>>> certificate/token!
>>
>>>>
>>
>>>> It doesn't matter if you're a reseller or a facilities-based
>>
>>>> carrier. Whoever bills the customer is the carrier of record and
>>> is
>>
>>>> responsible for signing the customer's calls with THEIR OWN
>>
>>>> certificate/token. While an upstream carrier can sign calls for
>>> your
>>
>>>> company, they must sign with YOUR certificate/token - not their
>>> own
>>
>>>> because they don't have a direct connection with your customer.
>>
>>>>
>>
>>>> Please understand that you're putting your network at risk when
>>> you
>>
>>>> share a token with another company because there's no way to
>>
>>>> differentiate between traffic when it's all under the same
>>
>>>> certificate/token. If your upstream carrier signs all their
>>
>>>> customer's traffic with their token, it only takes one bad
>>> customer
>>
>>>> to shut their whole network down. The only way to protect your
>>
>>>> company from other companies' mistakes is to make sure your
>>> upstream
>>
>>>> carrier is signing your calls with your certificate/token.
>>
>>>>
>>
>>>> One may not think they can get away with using someone else's
>>
>>>> certificate/token because it would be difficult to monitor the
>>> call
>>
>>>> stream for offenders. Let me just tell you the ITG can easily
>>
>>>> compare the Robocall Mitigation Database with the Approved
>>> Carriers
>>
>>>> list to locate the companies that don't have their own
>>
>>>> certificate/token. They don't need to look at traffic to
>>> determine
>>
>>>> that.
>>
>>>>
>>
>>>> Please don't play Russian roulette with your company because
>>> it's
>>
>>>> not worth losing your whole business over the cost of a
>>
>>>> certificate/token. Getting your own certificate/token can take
>>
>>>> anywhere from 2 weeks to 2 months depending on where you are in
>>> the
>>
>>>> process. From what I've heard, the FCC will start blocking
>>> traffic
>>
>>>> in August so if you haven't started the process....do so now!
>>
>>>>
>>
>>>> MARY LOU CAREY
>>
>>>> BackUP Telecom Consulting
>>
>>>> Office: 615-791-9969
>>
>>>> Cell: 615-796-1111
>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>
>>>> VoiceOps mailing list
>>
>>>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>>
>>>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>>
>>>
>>
>>>
>>
>>>
>>
>>> Links:
>>
>>> ------
>>
>>> [1]
>>
>>>
>>
> https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/stirshaken-how-investigators-can-tell-youre-…
>>
>>> [2] https://ecg.co/lindsey/schedule
>>
>>> [3]
>>
>>>
>>
> https://www.linkedin.com/newsletters/mark-lindsey-voice-7021614437413330944/
>> _______________________________________________
>> VoiceOps mailing list
>> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
July 3, 2023
STIR/SHAKEN warning!
by caalvarez@gmail.com
I would love an update here. We are an ultra tiny MSP, and have been told
all along by the major ULCs we use that we?re fine. They are signing, all
good. This is a monstrous change relative to our size and capital.
On Jul 3, 2023 at 11:09:33 AM, Mary Lou Carey via VoiceOps <
voiceops at voiceops.org> wrote:
> Thanks for the input, Mark! I'm going to call my contacts at the FCC as
> well and ask specifically what their stance o this is because from what
> I've heard they plan to start enforcing STIR/SHAKEN in August. That
> could be devastating to many since so many of the underlying carriers
> have been telling their clients they don't need their own
> certificate/token.
>
> MARY LOU CAREY
> BackUP Telecom Consulting
> Office: 615-791-9969
> Cell: 615-796-1111
>
> On 2023-06-30 05:28 PM, Mark R Lindsey wrote:
>
> Like Mary Lou, I'd like to help all voice service providers get their
>
> STIR/SHAKEN implementations up and running. And it's crucial to do
>
> verification as well as attestation! [1]
>
>
> There are a lot of good options -- I'm personally seeing a lot of
>
> activity around Neustar, Sansay, and Transnexus. I personally like to
>
> implement the HTTPS REST interface, but most implementations are doing
>
> it with SIP and 302. I think I've configured over 10 different
>
> variations so far. There are tons of technical methods.
>
>
> BUT... the rules on this third-party SHAKEN are not completely clear
>
> cut; I tell my clients that "the jury is still out," because the FCC
>
> is still seeking comment on whether this is appropriate. I'm expecting
>
> rules to be issued clarifying it.
>
>
> To read more about where the FCC is on this, see the section starting
>
> at Paragraph 99 in FCC-23-18A1 published March 17, 2023:
>
>
> > We seek comment on whether, and under what circumstances, a third
>
> > party may authenticate calls on behalf of a provider with A- or
>
> > B-level attestations consistent with the ATIS standards. Pursuant to
>
> > ATIS-1000074, in order to apply a B-level attestation for a call,
>
> > the signing party must originate the call onto the IP-based service
>
> > network and have a direct authenticated relationship with the
>
> > customer.An A-level attestation additionally requires the signing
>
> > provider to establish a verified association with the telephone
>
> > number used for the call.341 Can a third-party authenticating a call
>
> > on behalf of an originating provider satisfy all or any these
>
> > criteria, and if so, how? Does the answer to that question depend on
>
> > the nature of the relationship between the originating provider and
>
> > the third party? For instance, is it possible for a third party that
>
> > is a wholesale provider for a reseller, or an intermediate provider,
>
> > to apply A- or B-level attestations on behalf of an originating
>
> > provider in a manner that complies with the ATIS attestation-level
>
> > criteria, but not a different type of third party? Are there third
>
> > parties authenticating calls on behalf of originating providers that
>
> > can only apply C-level attestations under the ATIS criteria? If
>
> > commenters contend that third parties can meet the ATIS criteria for
>
> > signing calls with A- and B-level attestations because they
>
> > effectively stand in the shoes of the originating provider with the
>
> > direct relationship with the customer, we ask that they specify the
>
> > legal bases for that conclusion, e.g., the specific grounds for an
>
> > agency theory, if any, and/or how the terms of the ATIS standards
>
> > may be construed to include the third-party arrangement.
>
> >
>
> > To the extent commenters contend that third parties may satisfy the
>
> > criteria to sign calls with A- or B-level attestations, what
>
> > information must be shared between originating providers and third
>
> > parties for those attestation levels to be applied, is that
>
> > information sharing occurring, and does it implicate any legal or
>
> > public interest concerns, including privacy concerns?
>
>
> Read it here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-23-18A1.pdf
>
>
> Mark R Lindsey | +1-229-316-0013 | mrl at ecg.co | Schedule a Meeting [2]
>
> | Newsletter [3]
>
>
> > On Jun 30, 2023, at 17:00, Mary Lou Carey via VoiceOps
>
> > <voiceops at voiceops.org> wrote:
>
> >
>
> > I've heard from several clients that their upstream carrier told
>
> > them they don't need to worry about being STIR/SHAKEN compliant
>
> > because they are taking care of everything for them.
>
> >
>
> > THAT IS NOT CORRECT! Every phone company is required to have its own
>
> > certificate/token!
>
> >
>
> > It doesn't matter if you're a reseller or a facilities-based
>
> > carrier. Whoever bills the customer is the carrier of record and is
>
> > responsible for signing the customer's calls with THEIR OWN
>
> > certificate/token. While an upstream carrier can sign calls for your
>
> > company, they must sign with YOUR certificate/token - not their own
>
> > because they don't have a direct connection with your customer.
>
> >
>
> > Please understand that you're putting your network at risk when you
>
> > share a token with another company because there's no way to
>
> > differentiate between traffic when it's all under the same
>
> > certificate/token. If your upstream carrier signs all their
>
> > customer's traffic with their token, it only takes one bad customer
>
> > to shut their whole network down. The only way to protect your
>
> > company from other companies' mistakes is to make sure your upstream
>
> > carrier is signing your calls with your certificate/token.
>
> >
>
> > One may not think they can get away with using someone else's
>
> > certificate/token because it would be difficult to monitor the call
>
> > stream for offenders. Let me just tell you the ITG can easily
>
> > compare the Robocall Mitigation Database with the Approved Carriers
>
> > list to locate the companies that don't have their own
>
> > certificate/token. They don't need to look at traffic to determine
>
> > that.
>
> >
>
> > Please don't play Russian roulette with your company because it's
>
> > not worth losing your whole business over the cost of a
>
> > certificate/token. Getting your own certificate/token can take
>
> > anywhere from 2 weeks to 2 months depending on where you are in the
>
> > process. From what I've heard, the FCC will start blocking traffic
>
> > in August so if you haven't started the process....do so now!
>
> >
>
> > MARY LOU CAREY
>
> > BackUP Telecom Consulting
>
> > Office: 615-791-9969
>
> > Cell: 615-796-1111
>
> > _______________________________________________
>
> > VoiceOps mailing list
>
> > VoiceOps at voiceops.org
>
> > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
>
>
> Links:
>
> ------
>
> [1]
>
>
> https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/stirshaken-how-investigators-can-tell-youre-…
>
> [2] https://ecg.co/lindsey/schedule
>
> [3]
>
>
> https://www.linkedin.com/newsletters/mark-lindsey-voice-7021614437413330944/
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> VoiceOps at voiceops.org
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
July 3, 2023