Honestly, I think the proper balance here (my 2c) would be creating a rolodex of properly maintained carrier contact information (with controlled distribution) so we could reach out to carriers we exchange a useful amount of traffic with, and working out privately the contortions necessary to connect to each other over SIP, and deciding then to route the intercarrier calls to each other over a private trunk group. My switches look up the LRN, and I can add anything to the translations for a particular LRN, including ISDN PRI, MF, SS7, or SIP. I can probably do H.323 to a carrier but you'll never hear me admit that (ugh!). We have all the parts we need to convert the PSTN to SIP already. We don't need FCC permission to do this, we just need to take it upon ourselves to reach out, exchange information, and set up our interconnections accordingly. The biggest concern for me would be keeping that rolodex out of the hands of sales departments so I don't get endless calls offering me LD termination, etc etc. Or looney end users complaining about spoofed numbers or collections agencies calling them from our codes and making legal threats that nobody but their pretend internet lawyers would take as a case. -Paul On 12/07/2015 12:00 PM, Pete E wrote:
These are the crux of the issue. If there were a cooperative group willing to peer to circumvent the PSTN, and if the group were large enough, then it could offer *some* competitive pressure to get the ILEC's to change. In fairness, Verizon and AT&T have been petitioning and hit some roadblocks by the FCC to retire their legacy networks. Some of these concerns are legit, some are not. Now, I'm not naive enough to believe these petitions are for the good of the consumer or for anyone other than Verizon and AT&T. But technologically, it's a step in the right direction.
But for the signaling issue mentioned above, there could potentially be a new DNS record type created which defines accepted signaling.
Trust is a whole different problem. Without a central authority, it could be chaotic and really difficult to manage. But I think the BGP analogy is a good one. If there could be a method of passing info and then either allowing or blocking it would be ideal, but it is a really big shift in VoIP security, as was pointed out.
That said, anyone interested in setting up a lab environment to hash this out?
On Sat, Dec 5, 2015 at 5:19 PM, Paul Timmins <paul at timmins.net <mailto:paul at timmins.net>> wrote:
Ah, but how would you know what IPs your inbound call should be trusted from for your SBCs? It's hard enough to get people properly interopped when the calling activity is planned, let alone have random endpoints hit your network. Are they going to use E.164? Should they send npdi/rn data? Should you trust the calling party information being sent? How do you know the original caller is even a legitimate telco and not some telemarketer going on a rampage connecting directly with everything? If you are getting problematic (abusive, illegal) inbound calls, how do you look up that IP to know who to complain about? Is WHOIS enough?
-Paul
On Dec 5, 2015, at 15:14, Erik Flournoy <erik at eespro.com <mailto:erik at eespro.com>> wrote:
Additionally to come to Neustar NPAC extremely LATE proposal rescue of using the IP and SMS fields in the NPAC to packet route calls instead of via the TDM/SS7 Path that would kinda remove IQ from the path and allow carriers to directly connect via packets. Put the call on the IP packet path if it's voice and use TDM only for faxing which I wish would disappear for goodness sakes.
On Sat, Dec 5, 2015 at 12:09 PM, Alex Balashov <abalashov at evaristesys.com <mailto:abalashov at evaristesys.com>> wrote:
On 12/05/2015 05:05 PM, Erik Flournoy wrote:
If a packet transverses your entire network as a packet then it's never a toll charge. It's a packet.
Well, right. :-) No provider of voice networks wants value-added services to go away and be replaced by OTT applications for whom they're just a low-margin, flat-rate, 95% percentile-billed transport layer.
To a point, you can understand where they're coming from. They do the hard, capital-intensive work of building out the network, while some clever mobile app out of Silicon Valley pockets all the profits. That wasn't the assumption from which they built anything.
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