You could do it by saying "hey, this handset is roaming on me" then directing the call back to the handset in question, I figure. It would be inbound only intercept, but i could see that working. -Paul On 04/21/2016 02:12 PM, Matthew Yaklin wrote:
The part I was curious about and perhaps someone can clarify who has more knowledge than I is...
It appears in order to record calls the attacker has to be in very close proximity to the target. Like radio/tower range.
You cannot record a conversation half way across the world.
Matt
------------------------------------------------------------------------ *From:* VoiceOps <voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org> on behalf of Matthew Yaklin <myaklin at firstlight.net> *Sent:* Thursday, April 21, 2016 2:09 PM *To:* Kidd Filby; Chris Aloi *Cc:* voiceops at voiceops.org *Subject:* Re: [VoiceOps] SS7
Here is a paper that may shed some light on the discussion for the curious.
https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/critical/fall-ss7--critical-se...
SANS Institute InfoSec Reading Room <https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/critical/fall-ss7--critical-se...> www.sans.org The Fall of SS7 ? How Can the Critical Security Controls Help? 4 " #$$#%!&'()#*+!"#$$#%,-')#*./-#01,2'-! area notices this registration and transfers to a Visitor ...
------------------------------------------------------------------------ *From:* Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com> *Sent:* Thursday, April 21, 2016 2:01 PM *To:* Chris Aloi *Cc:* Matthew Yaklin; voiceops at voiceops.org *Subject:* Re: [VoiceOps] SS7 In a strictly TDM world, or conversation... having access to the SS7 network gets you nothing but what and where the call traversed. NO audio is carried and without End Office controlling software for call routing, just dropping it into some IP connection is not going to afford you anything other than what you already have. You still need access to the audio carrying infrastructure of the network to get the audio.
I cannot comment on CALEA
Kidd
On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 10:56 AM, Chris Aloi <ctaloi at gmail.com <mailto:ctaloi at gmail.com>> wrote:
It looked like they had access to SS7 links (likely A links terminated to a physical server) and were using FreeSWITCH to somehow fork the media from the call and record it. Just a guess based on the quick console recording.
Correct, SS7 doesn't carry the actual voice it handles the signaling to bring up the voice channels (by identifying be point code and CICs) and various other signaling bits. Not sure if there are provisions for CALEA in SS7 that could fork a media stream or exactly how that would work.
So I guess the barrier to entry would be access to the SS7 network, not as easy as hopping on the Internet, but certainly not much of a challenge.
--- Christopher Aloi Sent from my iPhone
On Apr 21, 2016, at 11:52 AM, Kidd Filby <kiddfilby at gmail.com <mailto:kiddfilby at gmail.com>> wrote:
There is no VOICE traversing the SS7 network, so you cannot possibly record a conversation by having access to the SS7 network only.
On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 9:36 AM, Matthew Yaklin <myaklin at firstlight.net <mailto:myaklin at firstlight.net>> wrote:
In other words the hacker has to have working SS7 trunks or access to someone who does? That is how I understood it.
Not exactly a remote hack from mom's basement sort of thing.
Matt
________________________________________ From: VoiceOps <voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org <mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org>> on behalf of Peter Rad. <peter at 4isps.com <mailto:peter at 4isps.com>> Sent: Thursday, April 21, 2016 11:25 AM To: voiceops at voiceops.org <mailto:voiceops at voiceops.org> Subject: [VoiceOps] SS7
FYI...
U.S. carriers mum on 60 Minutes report on vulnerability in SS7 - http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/us-carriers-mum-60-minutes-report-vulner...
Regards,
Peter Radizeski RAD-INFO, Inc. 813.963.5884 <tel:813.963.5884> http://rad-info.net * Need bandwidth or colocation? call me _______________________________________________ VoiceOps mailing list VoiceOps at voiceops.org <mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops _______________________________________________ VoiceOps mailing list VoiceOps at voiceops.org <mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
-- Kidd Filby 661.557.5640 <tel:661.557.5640> (C) http://www.linkedin.com/in/kiddfilby _______________________________________________ VoiceOps mailing list VoiceOps at voiceops.org <mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
-- Kidd Filby 661.557.5640 (C) http://www.linkedin.com/in/kiddfilby
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