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VoIP Innovations reliability
by nathana＠fsr.com March 20, 2016

March 20, 2016

Holy schlamoly. Anybody else use them here and being handed outage after outage over the last 2 days? Seriously thinking at this point about doing something else. This is ridiculous. I desperately need sleep and if my cell goes off one more time... -- Nathan

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. DDOS Attacks and ITSP's
by timothyl＠voipinnovations.com March 20, 2016

March 20, 2016

Ryan, This is a great discussion to start. I can't contribute at this time, but I certainly plan on giving you guys all of the information about what we at VI have been doing, what has worked, what hasn't worked, what we saw, what we didn't see, etc. Certain contacts may not allow me to name company names, but I still think we can give out enough information to be useful. We definitely plan on giving this information out. Like you said, events like these are typically embarrassing and companies don't like to come out and describe exactly how negligent or naive they were to allow it. I feel that getting the knowledge out there is much more important than our pride though. Right now, we're not giving out a whole lot of information on what we are doing in fear that it will be "used against us." I do somewhat agree with your assessment about these people knowing this stuff already, but at this point we don't want to take the chance (as irrational as that seems). Once we're in a more stable place, I will certainly work with our Networking Engineer, Owner, and Operations Manager on trying to talk them into giving out the most information possible to arm you guys in the event that this occurs to any of you. In the meantime, if you have any questions, please feel free to email me. I will do my best to help as much as I can. Timothy Linn Lead Systems Engineer Voip Innovations Sent from my Verizon Wireless 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: voiceops-request at voiceops.org Date: 2016/03/19 12:00 (GMT-05:00) To: voiceops at voiceops.org Subject: VoiceOps Digest, Vol 81, Issue 38 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2016 17:07:56 -0700 From: Ryan Delgrosso <ryandelgrosso at gmail.com> To: "voiceops at voiceops.org" <voiceops at voiceops.org> Subject: [VoiceOps] DDOS Attacks and ITSP's Message-ID: <56EC985C.6050203 at gmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; Format="flowed" With the current mega-thread about VI I figured I would get an educational discussion going about DDOS. Search the archives, Ive probably started this discussion a few times in the past but each time the context is different. I have given talks at several different venues (anyone here a CFCA member, or been to a Metaswitch forum event?) about DDOS and what the current arsenal of internet attacks means to voice. Unfortunately many network operators treat DDOS like a shameful thing and don't share information about it. This makes it that much harder for network operators to do the right thing and take meaningful and decisive action and ultimately makes the jobs of the attackers that much easier. Keep in mind sharing these kinds of tactics isn't "helping the attackers". They know this stuff. Its OK to tell them what they know. Who doesn't know this stuff are other operators that haven't been hit yet. Have you been hit by DDOS? Have you built out solutions to cope with DDOS? Ill start things off: 1. How do you know its a DDOS and something isn't just broken? 1. netflow 2. SBC retransmissions (this will often be your first warning) 3. Significant deviation from normal traffic volumes 2. As a VoIP carrier, my network looks like a DDOS attack all the time (oodles of UDP traffic). this makes most commercial solutions a square peg / round hole problem. 3. DDOS survivability must be designed into the network not bolted on. 1. Place Access SBC's, Peering SBC's, Webservers, etc on different networks and on different BGP adertisements. 2. Have multiple access SBC's on different networks / routers / BGP advertisements 3. Use DNS to home ALL clients. When your Access SBC succumbs to a reflection attack you can flip your customers using SRV records to the surviving SBC's. Customers using straight IP will remain down. 4. Use CDN networks like Cloudflare / Cloudfront or just put webservers in EC2. Keep web away from voice. Webservers are attack magnets. 5. Build defense in depth. Your network is a medieval castle, have moats and walls and soldiers. 4. Be a good netizen. If you are an ISP, implement BCP38. No open DNS recursors, no open NTP or SNMP services that are reflection targets. Leave no loaded weapons for others in your network. 5. Traffic scrubbing services typically don't mix well with VoIP carriers. This is basically the TSA of the network. (there are exceptions, the price tags have commas). 6. How do you go about testing your protections? Don't just sit smugly in your house made of straw. 7. Most upstream carrier DDOS protection strategies include "blackhole the destination to protect the network". This saves them but accomplishes your attackers goal. 8. Do you know how big of a DDOS it actually takes to hurt you? Ill bet its less than you think. So lets hear it. Who has experience on this front? What would you like to share? Comments on the above? -Ryan This message is for the designated recipient only and may contain privileged, proprietary, or otherwise confidential information. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete the original. Any other use of the e-mail by you is prohibited. Unauthorized interception of this e-mail is a violation of federal criminal law. We reserve the right, when permitted by law, to scan electronic communications, including e-mail and instant messaging, for the purposes of security and compliance with our internal policy.

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CID inbound route testing from DID 417-xxx-xxxx
by rafaelpossa＠gmail.com March 19, 2016

March 19, 2016

Hi everyone, I happen to have a DID that's very similar to that of a large hospital/healthcare provider hundreds of miles away, only difference being the area code (they are 417 and I am 414). This means I get several calls a week from folks that don't pay attention to the numbers they dial (or the hospital printed some material with wrong number or has a website with the wrong number). With that in mind, I really would appreciate if you could help me test an inbound route I have on my 3cx blocking all 417* numbers calling my DID *414-269-2220* If you have access to a 417 area code DID, I'd appreciate if you could call 414-269-2220 and help me get this working. If I get it to work, I might even let it play a recording telling them they got the wrong number instead of a fast busy. Thanks in advance! Rafael

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DDOS Attacks and ITSP's
by ryandelgrosso＠gmail.com March 18, 2016

March 18, 2016

With the current mega-thread about VI I figured I would get an educational discussion going about DDOS. Search the archives, Ive probably started this discussion a few times in the past but each time the context is different. I have given talks at several different venues (anyone here a CFCA member, or been to a Metaswitch forum event?) about DDOS and what the current arsenal of internet attacks means to voice. Unfortunately many network operators treat DDOS like a shameful thing and don't share information about it. This makes it that much harder for network operators to do the right thing and take meaningful and decisive action and ultimately makes the jobs of the attackers that much easier. Keep in mind sharing these kinds of tactics isn't "helping the attackers". They know this stuff. Its OK to tell them what they know. Who doesn't know this stuff are other operators that haven't been hit yet. Have you been hit by DDOS? Have you built out solutions to cope with DDOS? Ill start things off: 1. How do you know its a DDOS and something isn't just broken? 1. netflow 2. SBC retransmissions (this will often be your first warning) 3. Significant deviation from normal traffic volumes 2. As a VoIP carrier, my network looks like a DDOS attack all the time (oodles of UDP traffic). this makes most commercial solutions a square peg / round hole problem. 3. DDOS survivability must be designed into the network not bolted on. 1. Place Access SBC's, Peering SBC's, Webservers, etc on different networks and on different BGP adertisements. 2. Have multiple access SBC's on different networks / routers / BGP advertisements 3. Use DNS to home ALL clients. When your Access SBC succumbs to a reflection attack you can flip your customers using SRV records to the surviving SBC's. Customers using straight IP will remain down. 4. Use CDN networks like Cloudflare / Cloudfront or just put webservers in EC2. Keep web away from voice. Webservers are attack magnets. 5. Build defense in depth. Your network is a medieval castle, have moats and walls and soldiers. 4. Be a good netizen. If you are an ISP, implement BCP38. No open DNS recursors, no open NTP or SNMP services that are reflection targets. Leave no loaded weapons for others in your network. 5. Traffic scrubbing services typically don't mix well with VoIP carriers. This is basically the TSA of the network. (there are exceptions, the price tags have commas). 6. How do you go about testing your protections? Don't just sit smugly in your house made of straw. 7. Most upstream carrier DDOS protection strategies include "blackhole the destination to protect the network". This saves them but accomplishes your attackers goal. 8. Do you know how big of a DDOS it actually takes to hurt you? Ill bet its less than you think. So lets hear it. Who has experience on this front? What would you like to share? Comments on the above? -Ryan

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VoIP Innovations reliability
by timothyl＠voipinnovations.com March 16, 2016

March 16, 2016

All, I can confirm that we did have 2 outages this morning spanning little over an hour due to another DDoS attack. We have been careful of the information that we have been giving out in public updates due to the possibility of the attacker reading that information and using it against us in some way. The biggest change that we've made to combat this is a DDoS protection service, which has caught a handful of attacks, but was largely useless in this latest attack. We've made mitigating changes to our existing setup which appears to have stopped today's attack so far. We do have a disaster recovery site and have, honestly, appear to have done a poor job communicating that to our customers. If you are a Voip Innovations customer, please contact me for the IP address of the disaster recovery site. During these outages, the site was taking origination calls from most of our DID vendors. We're currently working on figuring out why all of them did not switch over. I know that words aren't much right now, but I am truly sorry for the issues that you have been having. I understand the importance of reliability to you and your customers, and I know that those expectations have not been met over the last few weeks. We are working diligently with several different companies to continue to make changes to our network to mitigate these attacks. The changes have been successful for a number of the attacks that we have seen, but it's clear that we are still vulnerable and have work to do. Please contact me if you have any questions, and I will do my best to answer. Timothy Linn Lead Systems Engineer Voip Innovations ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Wed, 16 Mar 2016 11:24:04 -0400 From: Jeff Waddell <jeff+voiceops at waddellsolutions.com<mailto:jeff+voiceops at waddellsolutions.com>> To: Nathan Anderson <nathana at fsr.com<mailto:nathana at fsr.com>> Cc: Nate Burke <nate at blastcomm.com<mailto:nate at blastcomm.com>>, "voiceops at voiceops.org<mailto:voiceops at voiceops.org>" <voiceops at voiceops.org<mailto:voiceops at voiceops.org>> Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] VoIP Innovations reliability Message-ID: <CAO+x49LG2+RQyRU6a0zmgdgaAKd0yYyxASHm6+=9z97iDxjMqA at mail.gmail.com<mailto:CAO+x49LG2+RQyRU6a0zmgdgaAKd0yYyxASHm6+=9z97iDxjMqA at mail.gmail.com>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Not that it helps a lot - this was posted on the VI facebook page "[Update] As of this morning, we regret to inform you that we are again currently experiencing issues that are related to the DDoS attack being committed by unknown parties against our network. Our Network Engineers are currently working diligently with our upstream carriers as well as a network security firm to combat the attack and will continue to do so until all of the issues are resolved. Our Senior Leadership has also been in contact with the FBI. The FBI is considering these events a national security issue due to the number of firms impacted, the magnitude of the attacks, and the persistence of these attacks. The Social Media Team will post here the very moment we have further information." On Wed, Mar 16, 2016 at 10:29 AM, Nathan Anderson <nathana at fsr.com<mailto:nathana at fsr.com>> wrote: > Down again. **** me. > > > > -- Nathan > > > > *From:* VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] *On Behalf Of > *Nate Burke > *Sent:* Wednesday, March 16, 2016 6:51 AM > > *To:* voiceops at voiceops.org<mailto:voiceops at voiceops.org> > *Subject:* Re: [VoiceOps] VoIP Innovations reliability > > > > Looks like it just came back up for me. Just over 30 min. > > Nate > > On 3/16/2016 8:45 AM, Shripal Daphtary wrote: > > We are experiencing an outage as well. > > Thanks, > > > > Shripal > > > On Mar 16, 2016, at 9:36 AM, Nate Burke <nate at blastcomm.com<mailto:nate at blastcomm.com>> wrote: > > Problems again this morning? Looks to be acting the same as it has been. > > On 3/11/2016 6:00 PM, Alexander Lopez wrote: > > I added them to our monitoring platform, stated getting alarms this > past hour or so. > > Up and down. > > > > -------- Original message -------- > From: Nathan Anderson <nathana at fsr.com<mailto:nathana at fsr.com>> <nathana at fsr.com<mailto:nathana at fsr.com>> > Date: 3/11/2016 6:31 PM (GMT-05:00) > To: 'Nate Burke' <nate at blastcomm.com<mailto:nate at blastcomm.com>> <nate at blastcomm.com<mailto:nate at blastcomm.com>>, > voiceops at voiceops.org<mailto:voiceops at voiceops.org> > Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] VoIP Innovations reliability > > ...aaaaaand we're back. > > -- Nathan > > -----Original Message----- > From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org > <voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org<mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org>>] On Behalf Of Nathan Anderson > Sent: Friday, March 11, 2016 3:30 PM > To: 'Nate Burke'; voiceops at voiceops.org<mailto:voiceops at voiceops.org> > Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] VoIP Innovations reliability > > It *feels* like they are under attack again, since I get a response to > a ping once every 20 or so. > > -- Nathan > > -----Original Message----- > From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org > <voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org<mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org>>] On Behalf Of Nathan Anderson > Sent: Friday, March 11, 2016 3:28 PM > To: 'Nate Burke'; voiceops at voiceops.org<mailto:voiceops at voiceops.org> > Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] VoIP Innovations reliability > > Confirmed. > > -- Nathan > > -----Original Message----- > From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org > <voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org<mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org>>] On Behalf Of Nate Burke > Sent: Friday, March 11, 2016 3:26 PM > To: voiceops at voiceops.org<mailto:voiceops at voiceops.org> > Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] VoIP Innovations reliability > > Anyone else show them down again right now? My traceroutes aren't > even leaving Chicago. Dying at a Chicago hop on Level3. > > Nate > > On 3/6/2016 6:50 PM, Nathan Anderson wrote: > > Did anybody else just suffer another 45-minute-ish long outage from > about 4:00p PST to 4:45p PST (ending about 5 minutes ago)? > > > > -- Nathan > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: frnkblk at iname.com<mailto:frnkblk at iname.com> [mailto:frnkblk at iname.com > > <frnkblk at iname.com<mailto:frnkblk at iname.com>>] > > Sent: Sunday, March 06, 2016 4:43 PM > > To: Nathan Anderson; voiceops at voiceops.org<mailto:voiceops at voiceops.org> > > Subject: RE: VoIP Innovations reliability > > > > More here: http://blog.voipinnovations.com/blog > > > > Frank > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org > <voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org<mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org>>] On Behalf Of Nathan > > Anderson > > Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 8:27 PM > > To: voiceops at voiceops.org<mailto:voiceops at voiceops.org> > > Subject: [VoiceOps] VoIP Innovations reliability > > > > Holy schlamoly. Anybody else use them here and being handed outage > > after outage over the last 2 days? Seriously thinking at this point > > about > doing > > something else. This is ridiculous. > > > > I desperately need sleep and if my cell goes off one more time... > > > > -- Nathan > > _______________________________________________ > > VoiceOps mailing list > > VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org> > > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > VoiceOps mailing list > > VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org> > > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops > > _______________________________________________ > VoiceOps mailing list > VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org> > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops > > _______________________________________________ > VoiceOps mailing list > VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org> > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops > > _______________________________________________ > VoiceOps mailing list > VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org> > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops > > _______________________________________________ > VoiceOps mailing list > VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org> > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops > > > > _______________________________________________ > VoiceOps mailing list > VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org> > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops > > > > _______________________________________________ > VoiceOps mailing list > VoiceOps at voiceops.org<mailto:VoiceOps at voiceops.org> > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops > >

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Can someone from Level3 contact me off-list I have a client that needs and 'Old School' PRI not IP based in the 460 lata.
by alex.lopez＠opsys.com March 15, 2016

March 15, 2016

"You can either follow your fears or be led by your passions, its up to you........" Alexander Lopez OpSys Consulting Group PO Box 49-1333 Key Biscayne, FL 33149 Tel: 305 503 3000 x 122 Help-desk: (305)503-3000 Option 0 or Email: HelpDesk at OpSys.com<mailto:HelpDesk at OpSys.com>

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G.729 A/B Experiences
by robert.j＠bendtel.com March 14, 2016

March 14, 2016

Hey everyone, I'm looking to deploy a lower-bandwidth codec, and am wondering what everyone's experience has been with G.729, primary regarding voice quality. Historically, we have limited our codec use to G.711. Some test calls in the lab are showing promising results, I'm just curious what might happen in the real-world. Thank you for your time!! -- Robert Johnson BendTel, Inc. (541)389-4020 Central Oregon's Own Telephone and Internet Service Provider www.bendtel.com/about/

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Remember These Days
by erik＠eespro.com March 14, 2016

March 14, 2016

[image: Inline image 1] Happy Monday Everyone Enjoy. Erik F CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE This e-mail message, including any attachments from EESPRO.com - contain information which is CONFIDENTIAL AND/OR LEGALLY PRIVILEGED. The information is intended only for the use of the individual named above and may not be disseminated to any other party without written permission. If you are not the intended recipient, or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, disclosure, distribution, copying or taking of any action in reliance on the contents of this e-mailed information is strictly prohibited. If you have received this transmission in error, please immediately notify info at eespro.com, and permanently delete this e-mail and the attachments hereto, if any, and destroy any printout thereof.

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VoIP Innovations reliability
by peeip989＠gmail.com March 11, 2016

March 11, 2016

Bouncing up and down over the last half hour or so? On Mar 11, 2016, at 18:31, Nathan Anderson <nathana at fsr.com> wrote: This message has no content.

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DUNDi -- Do you use it? If so, how?
by beckman＠angryox.com March 9, 2016

March 9, 2016

I've been doing this for 10 years, but have never really looked at what DUNDi [1] is until today. And now that I'm looking at it, I cannot really think of a reason I would use it. Which lead me to think, well who IS using it? And why? Beckman [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_Universal_Number_Discovery --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Peter Beckman Internet Guy beckman at angryox.com http://www.angryox.com/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

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