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International Call Termination
by abrahamaabj＠yahoo.com April 28, 2010

April 28, 2010

.style5 {font-size: 9px} .style2 {font-size: 12px} .style3 {font-size: 12px; font-weight: bold; } .l {color: #F00;font-size: 13px;} If you are currently operating a direct route for call termination outside the United States or if you are interested in setting one up, Launch 3 Telecom would like to discuss the opportunity of sending you traffic. Please contact us at voip at launch3telecom.com for details. We can also be reached, during business hours, at 1-877-878-9134.(United States, Eastern Time Zone)

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A question about some international calling fraud to Eritrea
by myaklin＠g4.net April 19, 2010

April 19, 2010

Hey all, I will try to explain this the best I can. We got a call from one of our long distance carriers today telling us that we had a spike of long distance international calls going through their switch. These calls were to Africa and the country name is Eritrea. The originating number is a customer of ours. The trick is that this customer uses resold ILEC POTs lines that has their long distance calls PIC'd to the carrier who called to warn us about the spike of odd call traffic. This customer of ours happens to be a large agency in NH who has the ability to look at CDRs directly from the 5ESS in Concord, NH. A rather special situation to say the least. They can state, with quite a bit of assurance, that these calls were not generated from their PBX/network as they cannot see any records for them. Also, as I checked earlier, these calls did not go through any of my switches/asterisk servers. So the customer and I are left wondering how these calls managed to get to this long distance carrier who warned us about the spike. The calls came into this long distance carrier from the Manchester, NH Fairpoint tandem. Naturally we will try to contact Fairpoint for assistance but I am not very hopeful at this point they will be much help. The long distance carrier who warned us tends to think that the calls were generated by our customer who has something SIP/PBX insecure but when the customer has a link to look at CDR records right from the 5ESS he is rather sure that is not the case. I am trying to figure out creative ways this fraud can be happening if the customer is not at fault. One way is for a person who owns/operates a full blown switch to generate this type of fraud but it does seem unlikely. Any suggestions what I should be asking the long distance carrier who warned us about this? Any suggestions on how this type of fraud can be committed without the customer being the cause? Should I be grilling our customer one more time stating that since the originating number was theirs AND that it was PIC'd to the right long distance carrier... it is hard to imagine that someone could duplicate this fraud that easily? Thank you for your time. I hope I was clear enough to give you an idea of what is going on. matt at g4.net

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International IP blacklist
by ujjval＠simplesignal.com April 18, 2010

April 18, 2010

We have seen a lot Unauthorized attempts from Mid-East, China recently. I wanted to see if there is a blacklist of IPs that is maintained or we as Service Providers should maintain. Maybe a wild idea but worth a shot. I would like to identify whole subnets from even sending traffic to our networks. Here is the IPs we have blocked recently... 188.161.142.151 188.161.135.62 85.114.97.106 113.105.152.137 121.14.149.148 113.105.152.131 113.105.152.135 188.161.130.5 121.14.149.148 188.161.135.62 188.161.155.180 188.225.184.117 95.35.189.89 188.161.241.77 95.35.211.88 188.225.193.97 Shut the buggers out!

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Call recording solutions for Broadsoft
by bethjohnson5060＠gmail.com April 16, 2010

April 16, 2010

Hello all, We'd like to add a call recording solution to our Broadsoft network. Our weighted list of criteria are: stability stability stability features ease of use for end customers ease of use for administrators ease of implementation performance efficiency (whatnots per cpu, murphies per megabyte, etc) cost Yes, we do like our uptime, and we've got the budget to do it right the first time. In general, it seems that the marketplace has developed four different architectures: 1. Network sniffer - SPAN a port and try to make sense out of things by joining the SIP/RTP with configuration information 2. SIP server - Use SIP to redirect the call into a media proxy that captures the traffic 3. CALEA interface - Overload the CALEA function to provide recording services. 4. Dual number forward - Use two telephone numbers and a forwarding scheme to get a call into and out of a recording server at the TN level If you have experience with integrating a call recording solution with broadsoft, or thoughts on the various architectures, I'd be grateful to hear your opinion. Thank you very much.

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Qwest Forbearance
by peter＠4isps.com April 16, 2010

April 16, 2010

Released: 04/15/2010. REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND DATA RELATED TO QWEST CORPORATION'S PETITION FOR FORBEARANCE FROM CERTAIN NETWORK ELEMENT AND OTHER OBLIGATIONS IN THE PHOENIX ARIZONA MSA. (DA No. 10-647). (Dkt No 09-135 ). Comments Due: 04/29/2010. WTB . Contact: Denise Coca at (202) 418-0574 or Tim Stelzig at (202) 418-0942 http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-10-647A1.doc http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-10-647A1.pdf http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-10-647A1.txt

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Truth in CallerID act of 2010
by anorexicpoodle＠gmail.com April 15, 2010

April 15, 2010

While it hasn't been signed into law yet seems like its worth opening up a discussion on the topic since its something we all deal with. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&do… The first questions that come to mind are: Where does the liability lie in a termination/wholesale situation where the termination carrier doesn't own the numbers terminating calls through their network? How does this impact services like SkypeOut or similar that mask all calls with a common number?

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Avaya IP Office sending Caller ID
by ujjval＠simplesignal.com April 7, 2010

April 7, 2010

Hi Gents: Say if you have 2 extensions with following inbound routing to those on an Avaya IP Office: DID 3035551000 routes to ext 1000 DID 3035552000 routes to ext 2000 For outbound calls how can I make sure the DID 3035552000 shows up as the CallerID number. It only seems to Display 3035551000. The Avaya is sending the INVITE out to the SIP provider with 3035551000 in the FROM header even though SIP user Ext 2000 is making the call. Any ideas?

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Cisco 2811
by naushit＠yahoo.com April 7, 2010

April 7, 2010

I am okay with support part. we have good team of engineers who can read manuals :) and I guess their software is mature enough for new bugs. So any referral to good cisco vendors? -N ________________________________ From: Nicholas Sten <nicksten at gmail.com> To: Naushit Sakarvadia <naushit at yahoo.com> Sent: Wed, April 7, 2010 10:45:47 AM Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Cisco 2811 Naush, You can find one on the grey market, but technically, licensees are non-transferable and Cisco won't honor the license without getting the used gear certified by Cisco. This applies to any equipment with software licenses from any vendor, not just Cisco. That said, you can certainly buy one, and use it, but Cisco won't support it without you paying them to certify the equipment and then buying an M&S contract. -N On Wed, Apr 7, 2010 at 7:40 AM, Naushit Sakarvadia <naushit at yahoo.com> wrote: I am in market for Cisco 2811 ITP with software license loaded. >My local Cisco vendor told me its not possible to get ITP with license from refurbished Cisco market. > >Is that true? any referral for good refurbished Cisco vendor? > >thanks in advance. >-Naush. > > > >_______________________________________________ >>VoiceOps mailing list >VoiceOps at voiceops.org >https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops > >

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UK NTS scam
by zavoid＠gmail.com April 7, 2010

April 7, 2010

Can someone explain to me what the scam is on calls to + 44844 (UK NTS). I'm seeing a bit of traffic to these destinations and it just doesn't feel right, and they all answer to strange IVRs. I'm assuming someone has had this issue before. Thanks, Colin

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Acme Packet (Abraham Jacobowitz)
by matthew＠corp.crocker.com April 2, 2010

April 2, 2010

In days long past I bought a Redback SMS-1800 off eBay and paid Redback to get it re-certified. Once it was re-certfied I could buy a support contract on the box. It was still cheaper than buying new, best of both worlds I guess. I don't know if Acme provides re-certification but it wouldn't hurt to ask. It seems very wasteful to junk a perfectly good piece of hardware because the vendor only wants to sell new. -Matt -- Matthew S. Crocker President Crocker Communications, Inc. PO BOX 710 Greenfield, MA 01302-0710 http://www.crocker.com P: 413-746-2760

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